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I. Introduction: Domain Name Policy
“Dotcom” has acquired economic and cultural significance.
There has been a dotcom boom and a dotcom bust.1 Dotcommers
grew wealthy and went bankrupt,2 and a television sitcom parodied
this now familiar scenario.3 Amazon.com,4 Yahoo.com,5 Google.com,6
and Ebay.com7 have enormous market capitalizations8 and have
begun to have transformational effects9 on the International
economic system. “FearDotCom” is the name of a feature motion
picture—in the horror genre, of course,10 and “Startup.com” was a
successful documentary.11
But what does the word—or is it a phrase?12—”dotcom” mean?
“Dotcom” is the transliteration of the string of characters “.com”
which form part of a domain name, essentially a name for an address
on the Internet.13 In the nomenclature of the Domain Name System
1. See Phil Mullan, SPIKED, From Dotcom Boom to Dotgloom <http://www.spiked-
online.com/Articles/000000005496.htm> (Feb. 12, 2001).
2. See Lisa Margonelli, SFGate.com, Frank’s Depression: The Boom-bust of a
Dotcommer’s Identity <http://www.sfgate.com/columnists/moneytales/> (Jan. 22, 2003).
3. See TVTome, The Ellen Show  <http://www.tvtome.com/tvtome/servlet/
ShowMainServlet/showid-3163/> (accessed Mar. 12, 2003).
4. See Amazon.com, Amazon.com Home <http://www.amazon.com> (accessed Feb. 9,
2003).
5. See Yahoo!, Yahoo!.com Home <http://www.yahoo.com> (accessed Feb. 9, 2003).
6. See Google, Google Home <http://www.google.com> (accessed Feb. 9, 2003).
7. See Ebay, Ebay Home <http://www.ebay.com>  (accessed Feb. 9, 2003).
8. See Yahoo!, Yahoo! Finance, Quotes & Info,  Profile for Amazon.com, Inc.
<http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=amzn> (accessed Nov. 3, 2003) (indicating market
capitalization of Amazon.com equals 8.32 billion dollars); Yahoo!, Yahoo! Finance, Quote
& Info, Profile for eBay, Inc. <http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=ebay> (accessed Nov. 3,
2003) (indicating market capitalization of eBay equals 22.3 billion dollars); Yahoo!,
Yahoo! Finance, Quotes & Info, Profile for Yahoo! Inc.  <http://finance.yahoo.com/
q/pr?s=yhoo> (accessed Nov. 3, 2003) (indicating market capitalization of Yahoo! Equals
10.4 billion dollars).  By way of comparison, the market capitalization of General Motors
is 20.2 billion dollars. See Yahoo! Yahoo! Finance, Quotes & Info, Profile for General
Motors Corp. <http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=gm> (accessed Nov. 3, 2003).
9. See Sue White, Are You ‘On Course’ With eBusiness? Or Are You Lost at ‘EC?’
<http://www.ecommquest.com/pages/oncourse.shtml> (accessed Mar. 20, 2003).
10. See Warner Bros., Fear Dot Com <http://feardotcom.warnerbros.com/?fromtout
=video_a2> (accessed Mar. 20, 2003).
11. See Yahoo! Movies, Startup.com  <http://movies.yahoo.com/ shop?d=hv&cf=
info&id=1804383693&intl=us> (accessed Mar. 20, 2003).
12. Both dotcom and dot com are used.
13. See Network Working Group, Domain Names – Concepts and Facilities, Requests
for Comments: 882 <ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc882.txt> (accessed Feb. 16, 2003)
(describing domain name system).
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(DNS), dotcom is a Top Level Domain (TLD), the sibling of .net,
.org, .edu, .gov, .mil, and .int. Dotcom is called a generic Top Level
Domain or gTLD, in contrast to the geographically specific country
code Top Level Domains or ccTLDs, such as .uk or .fr—assigned to
the United Kingdom and France respectively. In addition, there is
another, more obscure, category of TLDs, the infrastructure Top
Level Domains (iTLDs)—which we discuss very briefly below.14
Today, control over the creation of new top level domains rests with a
private nonprofit corporation called the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). This article addresses the
fundamental policy questions that ICANN must face with respect to
the TLDs: Should new gTLDs be created, and if so, what policies and
procedures should govern their creation?
We answer these questions at two levels. We begin at the level of
theoretical economic analysis; we then move to the level of specific
policy recommendations. En route, we discuss policies and practices
in comparable telecommunications industries. Our bottom line is a
proposal for ICANN to conduct an auction of a significant number of
new gTLDs.15 We demonstrate that an auction will best serve the
interests of Internet users (including end users and information
providers),16 while preserving the stability of the Internet.
By way of preview, at the first level, we present a framework for
evaluating domain name policy in general and TLD policy in
14. See infra n. 112 and text accompanying note (discussing .arpa, the only member of
the iTLD category).
15. See infra pt. IV (A Proposed Model for Expansion of the Name Space).
16. We will adopt the following taxonomy to refer to the various groups that use the
Internet:
• Internet users—this group includes individuals, groups, firms and other entities that use
the Internet, including those who register domain names and provide content or
service on the Internet as well as those who consume those services or that content.
• End users—this group includes those who consume but do not produce information
communicated by the Internet.  For this purpose, an ordinary consumer, who browses
the web, downloads files via ftp, sends and receives e-mail, and occasionally serves up
information (for example, through a cookie stored on their hard drive) counts as an
end user—even though, technically speaking, such a user does provide information
over the Internet.
• Information providers—this group includes all those who serve up information (or
content in the wide sense) over the Internet, except those who are defined as end
users.  For example, anyone who is the proprietor of a website would count as an
information provider.  E-commerce businesses, those who host FTP sites, those who
run SMTP servers, and so forth, all are information providers.
From these definitions, it follows that domain name registrants who actually use their
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particular. We demonstrate that the domain name system is what
economists call a “private good” and not a “public good.”17 We will
elucidate the meaning of these terms in some detail below. At this
stage, we ask readers who are unfamiliar with the technical economic
meaning of the phrases “private good” and “public good” to withhold
judgment about both the soundness and the normative implications of
our assertion that the DNS provides a private good (Wait until you
see what we mean, before you decide that you disagree!). We then
show that, because of what economists call “networking effects,” root
service, the part of the domain name system that handles the gTLDs,
is a natural monopoly.18 At the first level of analysis, we establish that
gTLD policy ought to take into account these two fundamental
economic facts: (1) domain name service is a private good, and (2)
root service is a natural monopoly created by networking effects.
At the second level of analysis, we argue for a specific set of
conclusions about gTLD policy. In particular, we demonstrate that
there is a compelling case for allowing the market to operate in the
creation of new gTLDs. This could be accomplished through a variety
of mechanisms, including a rule of first occupation or through an
auction. Although the creation of gTLDs should allow for the
operation of market forces, it does not follow that ICANN itself
should act as a profit-maximizer. Instead, we reason that, because
ICANN is a non-profit corporation and because it is the trustee19 for a
natural monopoly, ICANN ought to act in the public interest. At the
second level of analysis, we conclude that ICANN should structure
the expansion of the root in a way that ensures the stability and
efficiency of root service. We offer a specific proposal for an auction
of new gTLDs, and show that this approach offers substantial
advantages over current domain name policy.
Our conclusions at both levels are reinforced by a set of
comparisons between the policy questions faced by ICANN as both a
participant in, and regulator of, the DNS and with analogous policy
questions faced by market participants and regulators in other sectors
of the telecommunications system. In particular, we argue that there
are important insights to be gleaned and lessons to be learned by
comparing domain name service with broadcasting and telephone
service.
17. See infra pt. II(B) (Domain Name Service Is Not a Public Good).
18. See infra pt. II(C) (Networking Effects and the Root Service Monopoly).
19. We mean “trustee” in the broad (or figurative) and not the narrow (or legal)
sense.
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This introduction of our Article begins with a brief description of
the DNS and a very short account of its history.20 Our next step is to
investigate ICANN as an institution, focusing on ICANN’s legal
status and governance structure.21 We then recount the history of
ICANN’s recent decisions regarding the creation of new gTLDs.22 We
conclude this introduction with a roadmap to the remainder of the
essay.23
A. The Domain Name System
This section provides an overview of the domain name system
(DNS) by answering a series of questions:
• What are domain names?24
• Why are domain names important?25
• How are domain names created?26
• How does the domain name system work?27
1. What are Domain Names?
The Internet is a powerful communications system. The
operation of that system requires that every computer (or server) on
the Internet have a unique identifier. Routing data on the Internet is
accomplished via addresses consisting of Internet Protocol Addresses
(IP Address),28 sometimes called Internet Protocol Numbers (IPN),29
each of which consists of four values ranging from 0 to 256 separated
by periods (or dots), for example “255.21.1.12.” Very roughly, the IP
Address of a computer on the Internet is the equivalent of the phone
number of a telephone, video telephone, or facsimile machine that is
20. See infra pt. I(A)  (The Domain Name System).
21. See infra pt. I(B)(2) (The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers).
22. See infra pt. I(C) (Generic Top Level Domains).
23. See infra pt. I(D)  (A Roadmap to the Arguments).
24. See infra pt. I(A)(1) (What are Domain Names?).
25. See infra pt. I(A)(2) (Why are Domain Names Important?).
26. See infra pt. I(A)(3) (How Are Domain Names Created?).
27. See infra pt. I(A)(4) (How Does the Domain Name System Work?).
28. See Webopedia, IP Address <http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/I/
IP_address.html> (modified Sept. 23, 2002); SearchWebservices.com, Definitions: IP
Address <http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci212381,00.html
(last  updated Jan. 7, 2002); The Beeline, Web Definitions <http://bton.com/tb17/webdefs/
i.html> (accessed Mar. 20, 2003).
29. See TELEcomputers.com, Acronyms Online <http://acronymsonline.com/
acronyms/i_acronyms.htm> (accessed Mar. 20, 2003); Spirit Sector <http:// www.spirit-
sector.de/techlex_i.html> (accessed Mar. 20, 2003); Webhosts4Free, Webhosting Glossary
<http://www.webhosts4free.com/definitions/ip-number.php> (accessed Mar. 20, 2003).
7
Manheim and Solum:
Published by Digital USD, 2004
SOLUM2V8-FINAL.DOC 2/9/04  10:06 AM
2003] ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DOMAIN NAME POLICY 323
connected to the telephone network.
Like phone numbers, IP Addresses are relatively difficult to
remember.30 The DNS allows an information provider31 to register a
domain name corresponding to an IP Address. Rather than entering a
meaningless string of numbers to access the website of the
International Business Machines corporation, one can instead enter a
domain name, for example www.ibm.com—more or less the
equivalent of 1-800- IBM-CORP.32 The DNS allows the domain name
to be translated into the corresponding IP Address, much like a
telephone book allows subscriber names to be translated into their
unique telephone numbers.33
A domain name, such as “www.ibm.com,” consists of parts,
themselves called “domain names” separated by periods or dots, i.e.
“.”. These parts are organized into a hierarchy of levels. The top level
of the hierarchy is at the end of the string, reading from left to right.
Thus, the domain name “www.ibm.com” has as its top (or first) level
“.com”, and this is a top level domain name (TLD). The second level
of “www.ibm.com” is “.ibm”; this is called a second-level domain
name (SLD). The third level of “www.ibm.com” is “www” and this is,
of course, a third level domain name (3LD). The hierarchy can be
extended indefinitely, but most domain names in widespread use have
only three levels.34 Each domain name designates a domain,
functionally a set of IP Addresses to which the server for the domain
can point when queried for a name in the domain. Thus, the name
server for Amazon.com can point to the IP Address for
www.amazon.com. One level up, the name server for .com can point
to the IP Address for Amazon.com.
30. For the analogy between IP Addresses and phone numbers, see Positive Software,
Editing DNS Settings <http://www.psoft.net/HSdocumentation/user_nomenu/
editing_dns.html> (accessed Mar. 20, 2003); ValueWeb, What is DNS and How Does it
Work? <http://www.valueweb.com/support/getting-started/dns-faqs.htm> (accessed Mar.
20, 2003); LokBox.net, What is DNS? <http://www.lokboxsoftware.comhelp/html/
DNS/WhatIsDNS.htm> (accessed Mar. 20, 2003).
31. See supra n. 16 (defining information providers in contrast to end users).
32. A number of vendors offer both 800 numbers and domain names. See e.g. <http://
www.getatollfreedomain.com> (accessed Mar. 20, 2003).
33. See DNS.net, DNS Overview and General References <http://www.dns.net/dnsrd/
docs/whatis.html> (accessed Mar. 20, 2003); Request for Comment: 1034, <ftp://ftp.rfc-
editor.org/in-notes/rfc1034.txt> (accessed Feb. 9, 2003); Webopedia, DNS
<http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/DNS.html> (June 24, 2002).
34. The initial description of the domain name system is found in Request for
Comments: 920, authored by Jon Postel and J. Reynolds. See J. Postel & J. Reynolds,
Domain Requirements <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/ rfc920.txt> (accessed Feb. 8, 2003).
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2. Why are Domain Names Important?
Domain names are important for a variety of reasons. At the
most basic level, domain names simply allow applications that use the
Internet to address servers (computers or other devices) on the
Internet. Most end users35 are familiar with Hyper Text Transfer
Protocol (HTTP),36 the application behind the World Wide Web.37
Internet browser programs, such as Internet Explorer, Netscape
Communicator, or Opera, typically include an address bar that allows
the end user to enter a domain name in order to browse to a
particular website—lowering the time (and hence cost) of accessing
websites.38 Another program that uses domain names is Simple Mail
Transfer Protocol or SMTP.39 E-mail programs, such as Outlook or
Eudora allow end users to enter an e-mail address consisting of an e-
mail identifier, such as “billgates,” the “at” symbol, “@,” and a
domain name, such as “microsoft.com.” SMTP uses the domain name
in the e-mail address to route the data packets comprising the e-mail
message to the appropriate computer (mail server40) on the Internet.
Domain names are important because they make it easier (and hence
less costly) to navigate the Internet.
So far, we have described the technical function provided by
domain names. But domain names have acquired another level of
importance that goes beyond the ease of use created by this technical
function. Because of the World Wide Web, web sites (linked
collections of web pages, coded with HTML) are important
communication tools with economic significance. A linguistic
convention has emerged whereby the domain name associated with
the home page of a website becomes the name of the site itself. In the
case of a dotcom—that is, a company that does business primarily on
the Internet—the business itself may be named by the domain name
or part of the domain name. The name of the business Amazon.com,
Inc., is syntactically identical (minus the “Inc.”) to the domain name
that resolves to the Internet Protocol Address which serves up the
35. See supra n. 16 (defining end users in contrast to information providers).
36. See Webopedia, HTTP <http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/H/HTTP.html>
(Aug. 5, 2002).
37. See Webopedia, World Wide Web <http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/W/
World_Wide_Web.html> (Aug. 5, 2002).
38. See e.g. Aspira,  Introduction to the Internet at 4<http://ctc.aspira.org/
PDF%20files/ InternetBasics.pdf> (accessed Apr. 20, 2003).
39. See Webopedia, SMTP <http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/SMTP.html> (Feb.
25, 2003).
40. See Atis, Telecom Glossary 2K, Mailserver <http://www.atis.org/tg2k/
_mailserver.html> (accessed Feb. 28, 2003).
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Amazon.com website. The first term in the name of the business
eBay, Inc., is syntactically identical to the second level domain name
“.eBay”. Even when a company is not a dotcom, its website may
acquire an identity of its own that is significant to the public image of
the company. So, the website “sonystyle.com” is an important public
face of the enterprise, “Sony, Inc.” As is recognized by the institution
of trademark law, names can have economic value, because they are
associated with goodwill and provide reputation information to
consumers about components of value, such as quality and reliability.
A large part of the capitalized market value of Amazon.com, Inc. is
likely constituted by the good will associated with its domain name.41
Thus, domain names have value, both as shortcuts for IP
Addresses and as trade names. The value of such addresses gave rise
to the practice of cybersquatting or registering a domain name that
includes that trademark of an existing commercial enterprise and
then attempting to sell that domain name to the enterprise.42 The
practice of cybersquatting, in turn, led to the adoption of a federal
statute, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA),43
and a system of private arbitrations policies, including ICANN’s
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).44 The economic value
of domain names has also created a secondary market for domain
names that are easy to remember or that are intuitively obvious
names for particular dotcom businesses. “Car.com” and “auto.com”
are obvious candidates for a website that sells a product or service
related to automobiles. If the current registrant of the domain name
does not have a profitable business associated with the name, the
41. As of Dec. 31, 2002, goodwill was carried on Amazon.com at 70.8 million dollars.
See Yahoo!, Yahoo! Finance, multexInvestor, AMZN Balance Sheet
<http://yahoo.multexinvestor.com/IS.aspx?ticker=AMZN&target=%2fstocks%2ffinancial
info%2fstatements%2fbalancesheet%2fquarterly> (accessed Nov. 3, 2003).  However, the
total book value of Amazon.com was 1.99 billion dollars (see id.) as compared to a market
capitalization of 10.7 billion dollars. See Yahoo!, Yahoo! Finance, Quotes & Info, Profile
for Amazon.com Inc. <http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=amzn> (accessed Nov. 3, 2003).
Market capitalization of Amazon.com exceeds book value by more than 8 billion dollars.
Were Amazon.com to lose the rights to the Amazon.com domain name, it seems likely
that Amazon’s stock price (and hence its market capitalization) would drop significantly.
The quantity of the drop, and hence the amount of market capitalization attributable to
the domain name, is quite speculative.
42. See Webopedia, Cybersquatting  <http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/c/
cybersquatting.html> (accessed Nov. 3, 2003).
43. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1129
(1999), available at GigaLaw.com <http://www.gigalaw.com/library/anticybersquattingact-
1999-11-29-p1.html> (accessed Nov. 3, 2003).
44. See ICANN, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy
<http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm> (Aug. 26, 2001).
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registrant might choose to sell it instead. Until recently, someone who
wished to register a domain name like “car” as a second level domain
could only do so in one of three unrestricted gTLDs, “.com,” “.net,”
or “.org.”45
3. How Are Domain Names Created?
A domain name comes into being when it is registered. In order
to explain how this happens, we define four key terms:
• Registrant: An information provider46 who registers a domain
name. Registrants are customers of registration services.
• Registrar: An entity that sells domain name registration service
to registrants. Registrars are middle persons or retailers.
• Registry: An entity that provides domain name service for a
TLD. Registries are the service producers; they deal with the
customers through registrars.
• Domain Name Authority: An entity that provides root service.
The existing Domain Name Authority, ICANN (performing
the IANA functions), controls the creation (or elimination)
of TLDs and contractually sets policies that govern registrars
and registries for most of the gTLDs.47
So, if Alice wishes to register the domain name “alice.com,” she
will enlist the services of a registrar. As the prospective registrant, she
might use DirectNIC by browsing to www.directnic.com.48 Alice will
then check to make sure her preferred domain name is available, and
if it is, she will be offered the opportunity to register the domain
name for a limited period of time, for example, two years, by paying a
fee and providing contact information.49 If Alice completes the
45. The text simplifies somewhat because it ignores the possibility of registering the
domain in one of the ccTLDs, such as .uk or .fr.  Some of these alternatives were
unavailable because the authority responsible for administering the particular ccTLD itself
created a restricted set of second level domains.  Thus, one might be allowed to register
“car.co.uk,” but not “car.uk.”  Other ccTLDs do allow for unrestricted registration of
second level domains.  For example, the ccTLD for the small nation of Tuvalu, allows
unlimited registration of second level domains, but charges a premium price for valuable
names such as .car or .auto.  Each ccTLD authority sets naming policies for its top level
domain.
46. See supra n. 16 (defining information providers in contrast to end users).
47. Presumably the United States government retains full control over the .mil and
.gov TLDs.
48. See <http://www.directnic.com> (accessed Mar. 21, 2003).
49. A registrant’s administrative and technical contacts, as well as the IP Address of
the web server that hosts the domain (or the name server for the second level domain), is
entered into the WhoIs database.  This database is publicly accessible, and provides “an
important resource to Internet users including registrants, registrars, businesses, ISPs,
11
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transaction, she becomes a domain name registrant, and DirectNIC
would be her registrar. The registrar will then provide Alice’s
information to the registry for the .com domain. Registry service for
.com is provided by Verisign, a for-profit corporation headquartered
in Virginia. Verisign will then enter the information for alice.com in
the database (called a zone file50) that comprises the .com registry.
4. How Does the Domain Name System Work?
Up to this point, we have not described the actual operation of
the Domain Name System (DNS). How does a user of the Internet
get name service? That is, when I enter a domain name in the address
bar of my browser, how does that name “resolve” or translate into a
particular Internet Protocol Address? We begin with a simplified
model of the operation of the DNS; we then provide a more complete
description of the actual operation of the system in practice.51
A simplified version of the DNS might operate as illustrated in
Figure 1. Imagine that Ben, an end user, enters the domain name
“www.alice.com” in the address bar of his browser. Suppose Ben is on
an Ethernet network (sometimes called a “Local Area Network” or
LAN – step 1 in the illustration), and that on Ben’s network there is a
server that attaches the network to the Internet, usually through an
ISP (step 2). The server to which Ben’s computer is linked needs to
know where Ben’s data packets should be routed. The top part of the
domain name is .com, so the server on Ben’s network needs to know
where it should look to find the IP Addresses that are associated with
the second level domain names (e.g. Amazon.com, eBay.com) that
end in .com. It can find this information by querying a root server,
that is, a computer that has the root file—a database of the IP
Addresses for the name servers with the zone files for each of the
TLDs.52 There are 13 root servers,53 all of which have “mirror” copies
intellectual property holders, and governmental law enforcement and consumer protection
agencies.”  See <http://www.icann.org/riodejaneiro/whois-topic.htm> (Mar. 11, 2003).
50. See SearchWebServices.com, Definitions: zone file  <http://searchwebservices.
techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci811293,00.html> (accessed Apr. 18, 2002);
Webhosts4Free, Webhosting Glossary: Zone file <http://www.webhosts4free.com/
definitions/zone-file.php> (accessed Mar. 21, 2003); see also Requests for Comments: 882
<ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc882.txt> (accessed Feb. 16, 2003) (“Name servers know
the parts of the domain tree for which they have complete information; these parts are
called ZONEs.”).
51. Throughout the discussion that follows, we will speak of domain names and IP
Addresses, rather than Universal Record Locators (URLs) and web addresses.  URLs and
web addresses are used by the World Wide Web, only one of the many applications that
run on the Internet.
52. See SearchNetworking.com, Definitions: Root Server System <http://
12
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of the root file. The server to which Ben is connected will have a list
of the addresses of the root servers.
Figure 1
Ben’s server will query one of these computers (step 3) and will
receive the IP Address of a name server54 for .com. The name server
for .com has the zone file for .com. The zone file is the database that
correlates second level domain names in .com with IP addresses.55
Ben’s server will then send a query to that name server (step 4),
which in turn will provide him with the IP Address for alice.com.
Ben’s computer will then send a query to the host at alice.com (step
searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid7_gci212922,00.html> (Oct. 23, 2002);
Webopedia, Root Server System  <http:// www.webopedia.com/TERM/R/
root_server_system.html> (June 24, 2002).
53. See Root Server Technical Operations Association  <http://root-servers.org>
(Mar. 6, 2003) (listing 13 root servers, designated a - m).
54. It may be the primary name server (the authoritative name server, for the
domain) or it may be a secondary name server that mirrors the zone file on the primary
server. See Rutgers University, CS352 Fall 2002 DNS Lecture
<http://remus.rutgers.edu/cs352/F02/lectures/dns.pdf> (accessed Mar. 21, 2003)
(distinguishing primary and secondary name servers).  The term “name server” was
introduced in Request for Comments 882 <ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc882.txt>
(accessed Feb. 16, 2003).
55. See supra n. 50.
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5), which will give him the IP Address number for the third level
domain, www.alice.com (step 6). (This is likely, but not necessarily,
the same computer as alice.com).56 Ben’s server now has the
information it needs to make the connection between Ben’s computer
and the computer that hosts the website for www.alice.com.
The simplified (and counterfactual) story told in the previous
two paragraphs will likely strike the reader as involving a substantial
amount of inefficiency. The name server for the .com zone is likely to
have a stable IP Address—that is, the IP Address associated with the
primary and secondary name servers for the zone are not likely to
change, or at least, not likely to change very frequently. Ben’s server
can retain (or cache) that information and automatically send .com
inquiries to the proper name server without querying a root server.
Likewise, Ben is likely to visit certain websites repeatedly. Why
should Ben’s network server query the .com name server every time
he wants to visit popular websites such as amazon.com or ebay.com?
Once again, Ben’s server can cache that information. If Ben is
attached to a network with many users—for example, the networks
that consists of all of Earthlink or AOL’s dial-up customers—it might
be efficient for the network administrator to provide a copy of the
whole .com database locally, refreshing it from time to time.57
Through caching and propagation of the DNS, the frequency with
which Ben’s server makes queries to the name servers can be
substantially reduced. Ben’s server will not query the root unless Ben
enters a domain name that includes a TLD that is not cached locally
or for which the cached address is no longer accurate: we say that the
56. Because the World Wide Web is only one application that uses the Internet, it is
possible that no web page is associated with alice.com.  As of this writing, the World Wide
Web had become such a common application, that most network administrators would
establish a web page addressed by a given second level domain name. See
searchWebServices.com, Definitions: Zone File <http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/
sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci811293,00.html> (Apr. 18, 2002) (stating “a Web zone file should
allow resolution of domains either with or without the three letters www”).
57. The .com zone file is evidently no longer available without a showing of need,
because of abuse. See Posting of Cricket Liu, cricket@acmebw.com, to binds-users@isc.org
<http://www.isc.org/ml-archives/bind-users/1999/01/ msg00109.html> (Jan. 26, 1999).
Verisign now accepts applications for the .com zone file access program. See Global
Registry Services, TLD Zone File Access Program <http://verisign-grs.com/tld/> (accessed
Mar. 21, 2003).  Verisign provides access to other TLD zone files under the same program,
but does not provide access to .org. See Global Registry Services, Announcement:
Important Notice Regarding TLD Zone Access and the Transition of .ORG TLD
<http://verisign-grs.com/tld/announce_121002.html> (Dec. 10, 2002).  The .org zone file is
managed by Public Internet Registry.  See The .ORG Transition, .ORG Zone File
Agreement  <http://www.orgtransition.info/zone_file> (accessed Mar. 21, 2003); see also
Public Interest Registry, Home <http://www.pir.org> (accessed Mar. 21, 2003).
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name does not “resolve.” If Ben enters a second-level domain name
for the .com TLD that is not cached on Ben’s server, then his server
will need to query the .com name server.
In sum, the information that enables the DNS to function is
distributed via caching, and the name servers and root servers are
only queried when local network servers are unable to “resolve” a
domain name. Most domain names will resolve without any need to
query the root. Many domain names will resolve without any need to
query the name server for the TLD in which the domain is located.
The hierarchical nature of the domain name system makes resolution
of names into IP Addresses fairly efficient, thereby minimizing
addressing overhead.
B. Management of the Domain Name and Root Server Systems
In this section, we describe the system by which the domain
name system and the associate root servers are managed. We begin
with ICANN,58 which has primary responsibility for overall
management of the DNS; we then discuss the cooperative system for
management of the root servers.59
1. The Early History of the Domain Name System
Someone must administer and coordinate the addressing system
for the Internet. Early in the history of the Internet,60 each host had
both a name and address.61 Every host had its own copy of the table
or database that correlated names and addresses.62 The Network
Information Center (NIC)63 at SRI64 operated the first name server,
beginning in July of 1982.65 This early incarnation of the name system
lacked domains, and as the Internet grew, the lack of coordination
gave rise to problems. Craig Partridge66 is quoted as saying:
58. See infra pt. I(B)(2) (The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers).
59. See infra pt. I(B)(3) (The Root Servers).
60. See generally Jean Abate, Inventing the Internet  (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology 1999); Katie Hafner & Matthew Lyon, Where Wizards Stay up Late: The
Origins of the Internet (Simon & Schuster 1996).
61. Credit for the idea of naming hosts has been given to Peggy Karp who conceived
of “host mnemonics.” See Ross Wm. Rader, Web Hosting Magazine, Alphabet Soup: The
History of the DNS, <http://www.whmag.com/content/0601/dns/index.asp> (June 2001).
62. See Abate, Inventing the Internet, supra n. 60, at 188-89.
63. See id. at 59, 86-87.
64. See SRI International<http://www.sri.com> (accessed Mar. 21, 2003).
65. See Abate, Inventing the Internet, supra n. 60, at 141, 189.
66. Dr. Craig Partridge is the Chief Scientist at BBN technologies. See BBN
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When we started to get about two thousand hosts, that’s
when things really began to come apart. Instead of having
one big mainframe with twenty thousand people on it,
suddenly we were getting inundated with individual
machines, and everyone wanted [their host] to be named
Frodo.67
The perceived inadequacy of the name system operated by NIC
lead to the development of a new system, called the Domain Name
System (DNS).68 A new approach was suggested by David Mills.69
Further discussion came from Jon Postel and Zaw-Sing Su70 and from
Paul Mockapetris.71 The new DNS was adopted in the mid 1980s.72
The goal of the DNS was to distribute the task of maintaining the
tables that correlated names and numbers. Each domain would have
its own name server, which would maintain the necessary database
(zone file) for its domain. When one host needed to resolve the name
of another, it would query the name server for the appropriate
domain.73
In 1991, Network Solutions Inc. (NSI) began a process that led to
its assumption of operational responsibility for the new DNS.74 Also,
in the early 1990s, the University of Southern California’s
Information Science Institute (ISI) received a contract to perform the
management functions for the DNS, as what is called the Internet
Authority for Names and Addresses (IANA).75 In reality, this formal
Technologies, Dr. Craig Partridge <http://www.ir.bbn.com/~craig/> (accessed February 7,
2004).
67. See Hafner & Lyon, Where Wizards Stay up Late: The Origins of the Internet,
supra n. 60, at 252.
68. See Rader, Alphabet Soup: The History of the DNS, supra n. 61 (stating that
scalability problems led to changes in the naming system).
69. See Request for Comments: 799<ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc799.txt>
(accessed Feb. 16, 2003); Rader, Alphabet Soup: The History of the DNS, supra n. 61.
70. See Request for Comments: 819 <ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc819.txt>
(accessed Feb. 16, 2003); Rader, Alphabet Soup: The History of the DNS, supra n. 61.
71. See Request for Comments: 882 <ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc882.txt>
(accessed Feb. 16, 2003); Request for Comments: 883 <ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-
notes/rfc883.txt> (accessed Feb. 16, 2003); see also Rader, Alphabet Soup: The History of
the DNS, supra n. 61.
72. See Requests for Comments: 881 <ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc881.txt>
(accessed Feb. 16, 2003); Requests for Comments: 920 <ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-
notes/rfc920.txt > (accessed Feb. 16, 2003); Rader, Alphabet Soup: The History of the
DNS, supra n. 61.
73. See Abate, Inventing the Internet, supra n. 60, at 189-190.
74. See Rader, Alphabet Soup: The History of the DNS, supra n. 61.
75. See Posting of Craig Partridge, craig@aland.bbn.com <http://www.postel.org/
pipermail/internet-history/2002-March/000080.html> (Mar. 20, 2002); Posting by Rahmat
M. Samik-Ibrahim, rms46@vlsm.org,  <http://www.postel.org/pipermail/internet-
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relationship represented Jon Postel’s historical role in performing a
variety of functions. It might be more accurate to say that Postel was
the IANA.76
2. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
By 1995, Postel had begun to circulate proposals for a new
structure for managing the DNS.77 Postel proposed that a new entity
might be created to perform these functions.78 Responsibility within
the United States Government for the Internet eventually came to
rest with the Department of Commerce (DOC), and hence that
agency was involved in the process that led to the creation of ICANN
in 1998. The precise nature of the relationship between DOC and
ICANN is murky at the level of legal theory,79 but whatever that
relationship may be, it is formally embodied in a document called a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).80
In general, the MOU states that ICANN and DOC “will jointly
design, develop, and test the mechanisms, methods, and procedures
that should be in place and the steps necessary to transition
management responsibility for DNS functions now performed by, or
on behalf of, the U.S. Government to a private-sector not-for-profit
entity.”81 In particular, the MOU charters ICANN with responsibility
history/2002-March/000077.html> (Mar. 19, 2002).  The first mention of the IANA
acronym in the Requests for Comments is RFC 1174, issued in 1990 by Vint Cerf. See
Request for Comments: 1174 <ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc1174.txt> (accessed
February 16, 2003).  Most queries yield negative results, giving rise to the inference that
most queries are a result of misspellings.  See AS112 Project Home Page<http://as112.net>
(Mar. 16, 2003).
76. See Posting by Rahmat M. Samik-Ibrahim, rms46@vlsm.org
<http://www.postel.org/pipermail/internet-history/2002-March/000079.html> (Mar. 20,
2002); Request for Comments: 2468 <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2468.txt> (updated
Feb. 16, 2003).  Postel began to perform these functions early in the history of the Internet.
See e.g. Request for Comments: 204 <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc204.txt> (accessed
Feb. 16, 2003) (showing that Postel had responsibility for socket numbers, i.e. port
assignments, as early as 1971).
77. See B. Carpenter et al., Proposal for an ISOC Rule in the DNS Name Space
Management <http://dns.vrx.net/news/by_date/old/1995/Nov/isocrfc.html> (Nov. 1995).
78. The entity was initially called “Newco.”  See  Michael E. Heltzer, Government
Relations Program Coordinator, letter to Joe Sims, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue
<http://www.iana.org/comments/29aug1998-04sep1998/msg00054.html> (Sept. 4, 1998);
Rader, Alphabet Soup: The History of the DNS, supra n. 61, at 6.
79. See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 34-36, 50-51 (Oct. 2000).
80. See ICANN, Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of
Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
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for five tasks:
a. Establishment of policy for and direction of the allocation of IP
number blocks;
b. Oversight of the operation of the authoritative root server
system;82
c. Oversight of the policy for determining the circumstances under
which new top level domains would be added to the root
system;
d. Coordination of the assignment of other Internet technical
parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the
Internet; and
e. Other activities necessary to coordinate the specified DNS
management functions, as agreed by the Parties.83
The agreement further specifies a set of principles, including: (1)
the importance of the stable function of the Internet; (2) the
promotion of competition in the provision of DNS services; (3) the
use of private sector, bottom-up policy formation; and (4)
representation of Internet users, both in the U.S. and
internationally.84
ICANN has an organizational structure that is almost baroque in
its complexity. There is a President and Board of Directors. In
addition, there are three Supporting Organizations, each of which
corresponds to one of ICANN’s primary areas of responsibility. The
Address Supporting Organization (ASO) is responsible for
developing bottom-up policy recommendations for the IP addressing
system. The Country Code Names Supporting Organization
(CCNSO) has a similar responsibility for the ccTLDs, as does the
Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) for the gTLDs.
Each of the Supporting Organizations is further substructured into
Constituencies. For example, the GNSO has a Business Users
Constituency and an Intellectual Property Constituency.85
The Board’s selection is even more complex, and the current
scheme reflects the enormous controversy generated by ICANN’s
abortive attempt to select half of its Board through an international
82. The “‘Authoritative Root-Server System’ means the constellation of DNS root-
nameservers specified, from time to time, in the file <ftp://ftp.internic.net/domain/
named.root>.”  See ICANN, .net Registry Agreement  <http://www.icann.org/tlds/
agreements/verisign/registry-agmt-net-25may01.htm> (May 25, 2001).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See ICANN, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
<http://www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm#1> (Dec. 5, 2003).
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election in which the franchise was extended to all of the world’s
Internet users.86 Here is an outline of the current plan:
• The current scheme provides a total of 15 Board Members.
• Eight members of the Board are now selected by a Nominating
Committee.
• Each of the Supporting Organizations (ASO, CCNSO, and
GNSO) selects two Board Members (for a total of six).
• The President, who is selected by the Board, is the final
Member.87
• The Nominating Committee (NOMCOM), which selects a
majority of the Board, itself has a complex structure.88
ICANN’s complex organizational structure reflects the
constellation of interests affected by domain name policy. Registries
and registrars for the gTLDs have a direct economic stake in domain
name policy, as do the operators of the ccTLDs. Because of the
phenomenon of cybersquatting, the owners of trademarks also have a
significant economic stake. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and
network administrators also have interests that are affected by
ICANN. This first group of stakeholders has direct interests in the
DNS; they have powerful economic incentives to participate in the
ICANN process and to attempt to influence the decisions that
ICANN makes in a way that favors their interests.
86. See M. Stuart Lynn, President’s Report: ICANN – The Case for Reform
<http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.htm> (Feb. 24, 2002)
(“Three years of effort have proven that a global online election of ICANN Board
members by an entirely unknown and self-selected membership is not a workable solution
to this problem.”).
87. ICANN Bylaws, supra n. 85, Art. VI, Section 2.
88. The Nominating Committee is composed of various non-voting members and 17
voting members.  Five of these are selected by an At-Large Advisory Committee, two are
selected by the Business users constituency of the GNSO, and 10 are selected, one each by
(i) the gTLD Registry Constituency of the Generic Names Supporting Organization, (ii)
the gTLD Registrars Constituency of the Generic Names Supporting Organization, (iii),
the Council of the Country Code Names Supporting Organization, (iv) the Internet
Service Providers Constituency of the Generic Names Supporting Organization, (v) the
Intellectual Property Constituency of the Generic Names Supporting Organization, (vi)
the Council of the Address Supporting Organization established, (vii) an entity designated
by the Board to represent academic and similar organizations, (viii) consumer and civil
society groups, selected by the Non-commercial Users Constituency of the Generic Names
Supporting Organization, (ix) the Internet Engineering Task Force,  and (x) the ICANN
Technical Liaison Group. See Id.  One of the authors of this Article, Lawrence Solum, has
described the election process as follows: “everyone seems to elect everyone else in an
Ourobus Worm of interlocking Supporting Organizations, Nominating Committee, and
Board.” Lawrence Solum, Blogging from Brazil 7  <http://lsolum.blogspot.com/
2003_03_01_lsolum_archive.html#200053016> (Mar. 27, 2003).
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Of course, domain name policy also affects information
providers and end users of the Internet.89 In some cases, these
interests are substantial. There are some enterprises and individuals
with large inventories of registered domain names. For most
registrants and end users, however, their individual economic stake in
domain name policy is de minimis. This creates what economists call a
collective action problem:90 it simply isn’t worthwhile for either
information providers who are merely individual registrants or end
users of the Internet to participate in the bottom-up ICANN
process.91
Given the focused interests of direct stakeholders on the one
hand and the diffuse interests of the end users and individual domain
name registrants on the other hand, public choice theory predicts that
the outcome of a bottom-up consensus driven process will be policies
that favor the direct stakeholders.92 ICANN attempts to compensate
for this tilt in a variety of ways. One strategy, the direct election of
representatives for the public in worldwide elections, was
89. Id.
90. See Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press
1965).
91. Collective action problems can be overcome.  For example, if members of a group
perceive that other members are cooperating, cooperation may become established as a
norm. See e.g. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=361400> (accessed Mar. 22, 2003).  In
the case of ICANN’s bottom-up, consensus driven policy process, norms of cooperation
have emerged among those who are stakeholders in the ICANN process.  Thus, many
participants in the ICANN process invest significant amounts of time and energy for no
material reward.  Because these stakeholders are members of identifiable communities
and interact on a regular basis, they are able to form communities that overcome the free
rider problems that the bottom-up model faces.  To some extent, the free rider problems
are diminished because some participants in the ICANN process are subsidized by their
employers.  The firms that subsidize participation in the ICANN process may or may not
fully understand that, as a firm, free riding with respect to ICANN is a profit-maximizing
option.  When it comes to individuals who own individual domain names or who simply
use the DNS, it is quite clear that collective action problems are real and create a
substantial barrier to the effective participation of these groups in the bottom-up,
consensus driven ICANN process.  If such an individual were to sign on to one of the
many mailing lists of the various ICANN groups, for example, they would encounter a
large volume of e-mail activity.  Some of the e-mail groups have conflicts that escalate into
so-called flame wars.  Physical attendance at the far-flung meetings of ICANN is
expensive.  For example, the last several ICANN meetings have been held in Carthage
(Tunisia), Montreal (Canada), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Amsterdam (Netherlands),
Shanghai (China), Bucharest (Romania), Accra (Ghana), Marina Del Rey (California),
and Montevideo (Uruguay). See ICANN, Calendar of Events <http://www.icann.org/
calendar.htm> (Mar. 20, 2003).
92. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II, 229-246 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
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unsuccessful.93 The current strategy has four elements. First, ICANN
has created an At-Large Advisory council—without formal decision
making power, but with a charge to represent the public interest.94
Second, consumer groups have representation on the NOMCOM.95
Third, the Non-commercial Users Constituency of the Generic Names
Supporting Organization also serves as a proxy for the interests of the
public at large. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, the collective
action problem—for individual registrants, end-users, and the public
at large—creates an important role for the ICANN Board. The
Board’s obligation to act in the public interest requires the Board to
make an independent evaluation of the results of ICANN consensus-
drive, bottom-up process. If the process has been dominated by
stakeholders, it is the role of the board to insure that the pubic
interest is fairly reflected in ICANN policy.96
ICANN’s organizational culture also reflects a consensus-based
model of decision making.97 This model creates opportunities for
strategic action to block changes in the domain name system. To the
extent that the creation of new gTLDs, for example, might injure the
interests of some stakeholders (e.g. Verisign, which has an economic
stake in the .com gTLD, or trademark owners who would prefer to
limit the opportunities for cybersquatting), it is predictable that those
interests will be able to block or delay changes in policy—given the
requirement that policymaking be based on consensus. In such cases,
action by the Board of Directors, despite the lack of true consensus
among the ICANN community, will be required if ICANN is to act in
the public interest.
3. The Root Servers
The root server system provides the physical infrastructure that
93. See Lynn, President’s Report: ICANN – The Case for Reform, supra n. 86.
94. See ICANN, At-Large Advisory Committee  <http://
www.icann.org/committees/alac/> (Feb. 25, 2003) (discussing ALAC in general and
providing a link to the By-Laws enacting ALAC).
95. See Solum, Blogging from Brazil 7, supra n. 88 (noting that members of the
NOMCOM are designated by an entity designated by the Board to represent academic
and similar organizations and by consumer and civil society groups, selected by the Non-
commercial Users Constituency of the Generic Names Supporting Organization).
96. See infra pt. IV(C)(1) (ICANN’s Mandate to Serve the Public Interest).
97. See generally Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical
Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003) (describing and criticizing ICANN’s
consensus-based decision making process).  An online version is available at
<http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/discourse/ils.pdf> (accessed Mar. 15, 2003).
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allows the root to function.98 Recall that the root consists of servers
and files that contain the addresses of the various TLD name servers
(which in turn hold the zone files for their respective TLDs). The
various root servers are operated by several different entities,
including Verisign, ICANN, and various agencies and organizations
that are part of the United States Government. Root servers are
located in the United States (10), the United Kingdom (1), Japan (1),
and Sweden (1).99 Although Request for Comments100 2870 states
“The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) has become responsible for the operation of the root
servers,”101 the reality is perhaps more complicated. Some of the root
server operators have not signed formal agreements with ICANN,102
98. See Webopedia, Root Server System <http://www.webopedia.com/
TERM/R/root_server_system.html> (June 24, 2002).  The Root Server Technical
Operations Association maintains a website at <http://root-servers.org> (Mar. 6, 2003).
ICANN has a DNS Root Server System Advisory Committee. See ICANN, DNS Root
Server System Advisory Committee <http://www.icann.org/committees/
dns-root/> (Nov. 15, 2002).  The root server system is discussed in Requests for Comments
2870. See Network Working Group, Requests for Comments: 2870
<http://www.icann.org/committees/dns-root/rfc2870.txt> (accessed Feb 16, 2003).
99. See Root Server Technical Operations Association, Root Server Technical
Operations Association Home <http://root-servers.org> (Mar. 6, 2003).
100. A Request for Comments (RFC) is the typical method for providing information
and soliciting public input on matters relating to the Internet.  See RFC Editor <http://rfc-
editor.org> (Mar. 10, 2003).  The RFC series was started by Jon Postel in 1969 as a “set of
technical and organizational notes about the Internet.”  See Request for Comments: 2555
<ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc2555.txt> (Apr. 6, 1999). For instance, Postel issued
RFC 1591 (Mar. 1994) seeking comments on “Domain Name System Structure and
Delegation.”  For a revealing discussing of the RFCs and the role they played in the early
emergence of Internet standards, see Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a
Critical Theory of Cyberspace, supra n. 97, at 784 (recounting origins of RFCs).
Requests for Comments are also issued by federal agencies, often as part of the rule-
making process.  For instance, the Department of Commerce issued an RFC on July 1,
1997, seeking public comments “on the Registration and Administration of Internet
Domain Names.”  See Request for Comments on Internet Domain Names
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/dn5notic.htm> (July 1, 1999).  Responses
to this RFC lead to the formulation of the “green” and “white” papers discussed infra, n.
213.  DOC RFCs use a different nomenclature; they are designated by docket number
(e.g. Docket No. 970613137-7137-01 for the July 1, 1997 document mentioned here).
101. Request for Comments: 2870 <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2870.txt> (accessed
Feb. 16, 2003).
102. Cf. ICANN, DNS Root Server System Advisory Committee
<http://www.icann.org/committees/dns-root/> (Nov. 15, 2002) (“Work is proceeding on
defining appropriate agreements and technical measures to operate the root nameserver
system according to the guidance in RFC 2870. These requirements will be incorporated in
a memorandum of understanding between each operator and ICANN. A model of the
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and for this reason, ICANN’s formal authority over the root server
system is unclear.
Perhaps the best way to view the current root system is as a
voluntary system of cooperation between the United States
Government, ICANN, and the operators of the nongovernmental
root servers—with other entities entering and exiting the system of
cooperation on particular occasions. Although ICANN plays the lead
role in the coordination of DNS policy, the root operators themselves
appear to work out technical issues without direct intervention from
ICANN. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) also plays a
technical role.103 Although authority over the root system is in some
ways murky, as a practical matter the root is responsive to policy
decisions made by ICANN. Even though “ICANN is not, and should
not become, the ‘government of the Internet,’”104 in many respects it
acts as regulator. This is nowhere more apparent than in developing
policy for generic top level domains.
C. Generic Top Level Domains
We begin our discussion of the gTLDs by placing them in the
context of the whole TLD name space. The TLDs are grouped into
three categories: (1) generic, (2) country code, and (3) infrastructure.
Although our primary focus is on gTLD policy, we pause for a
moment to discuss the other two categories.
1. Country Code and Infrastructure TLDs
Culturally and economically, the most significant competitors to
the gTLDs are the ccTLDs.105 Each ccTLD consists of two letters (.uk,
.nz, .fr, etc.). The two letter codes are called “country codes” because
they correspond to the two-letter abbreviations for countries (such as
.dk for Denmark) or external territories (such as .gl for Greenland)
103. See IETF, Domain Name System Operations (dnsop) <http://www.ietf.org/
html.charters/dnsop-charter.html> (Mar. 21, 2003).
104. See On ICANN Governance, Testimony of Nancy J. Victory, Assistant Secretary
for Communications and Information, National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, United States Dept. of Commerce, before the Subcommittee on Science,
Technology and Space, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United
States Senate, June 12, 2002, available at <http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/
testimon/107s/victory0612.htm> (accessed Jan. 4, 2003).
105. Discussion of the relationship between ICANN and the ccTLD operators is
outside the scope of this essay.  A sense of the controversies and conflicts can be gleaned
from Jim Wagner’s article, ISP News, ICANN Pretends to Solve ccTLD Problem
<http://www.isp-planet.com/news/2002/icann_020304.html> (Mar. 4, 2002), and Peter K.
Yu, The Neverending ccTLD Story <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=388980> (accessed Oct. 2, 2003).
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that are included on the International Standards Organization’s list of
standardized abbreviations.106 The ccTLD for the United States is .us
and, compared to the gTLDs such as .com, .us lacks substantial
cultural and economic significance. In this respect, however, the
United States may not be typical. In many other nations, the national
ccTLD demarcates the name space that is most significant to that
nation’s end users of the Internet. In the United Kingdom, for
example, the .uk name space dominates e-commerce. The UK version
of Amazon.com is www.amazon.co.uk.107 In the United Kingdom, as
an example, second level domains operate in a fashion similar to the
gTLDs. For example, co.uk is analogous to .com, and .ac.uk is the
counterpart of .edu. This is not to say that the gTLDs lack
significance outside of the United States. For example, many
international firms use their .com address as the worldwide gateway
to their various national sites. So, for example, one can browse from
www.nikon.com108 to www.nikon.fr109 or from www.sony.com110 to
www.sony.co.jp.111
The third category of TLDs, the infrastructure domains, includes
only one member, the .arpa TLD, briefly discussed in the
accompanying note.112 The .arpa domain supports technical Internet
functions, facilitating the retrieval of key data records used by the
infrastructure of the Internet.113 Following the abbreviation
106. See ICANN, March 2000 ICANN Meeting in Cairo: ccTLD Delegation and
Administration Policies <http://www.icann.org/cairo2000/cctld-topic.htm> (Feb. 16, 2003).
This list, maintained by the International Standards Organization, is called the “ISO 3166-
1 list” and it contained 239 entries as of 2001.  See Deutsches Institut fuer Normung, e.v.,
English Country Names and Code Elements <http://www.din.de/gremien/
nas/nabd/iso3166ma/codlstp1/en_listp1.html> (accessed Mar. 22, 2003).  Policy for the
ccTLDs is summarized in a document denominated “Internet Coordination Policy 1” or
“ICP-1.” See ICANN, ICP-1: Internet Domain Name System Structure and Delegation
(ccTLD Administration and Delegation) <http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-1.htm> (May 7,
1999); see also Request for Comments: 1591, Domain Name System Structure and
Delegation <http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1591.txt> (accessed Feb. 8, 2003); IANA,
CCTLD News Memo #1 <http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-news1.htm> (Oct. 23, 1997).  A
list of current ccTLD domains can be found at: IANA, Root-Zone Whois Information:
Index by TLD Code  <http://www.iana.org/cctld/cctld-whois.htm> (Nov. 26, 2001).
107. See Amazon, Amazon Home <http://www.amazon.co.uk> (accessed Jan. 3, 2003).
108. See Nikon, Nikon Home <http://www.nikon.com> (accessed Jan. 3, 2003).
109. See Nikon, Nikon Home <http://www.nikon.fr/Nikon_Web/site.nsf/noflash.htm>
(accessed Feb. 8, 2003).
110. See Sony, Sony Home <http://www.sony.com> (accessed Jan. 3, 2003).
111. See Sony Japan, Sony Home <http://www.sony.co.jp> (accessed Jan. 3, 2003).
112. “The .arpa domain is the Address and Routing Parameter Area domain and is
designated to be used exclusively for Internet-infrastructure purposes.”  IANA,
Infrastructure Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/arpa-dom/> (Jan. 25, 2003).
113. See Request for Comments 3172: Management Guidelines & Operational
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convention for the other TLDs, we might call .arpa an iTLD (or
perhaps the iTLD).114
2. The Generic TLDs
We now turn to the generic Top Level Domains. We begin by
simply listing and describing the fourteen gTLDs that exist as of this
writing. For each gTLD, we indicate whether registration is restricted
(to some group) or unrestricted (open to all who pay a fee) and the
associated operator or sponsor.
1. .aero—restricted to members of the air-transport industry
and sponsored by Société Internationale de
Télécommunications Aéronautique S.C. (SITA SC).115
2. .biz—restricted to businesses and operated by NeuLevel,
Inc.116
3. .com—unrestricted and operated by Verisign, Inc.117
4. .coop—restricted to cooperative associations and sponsored
by Dot Cooperation LLC.118
5. .edu—restricted to degree-granting educational institutions
of higher education that are accredited by one of the six U.S.
regional accrediting agencies and operated by Educause.119
Requirements for the Address and Routing Parameter Area Domain (“arpa”)
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3172.txt > (accessed Feb. 8, 2003).
114. Because the iTLD .arpa is of interest to technical aspects of Internet policy it is
rarely discussed.  The abbreviation “iTLD” has also been used to designate International
Top Level Domain, but this usage, intended to contrast with the ccTLDs, has been
discontinued in favor of generic Top Level Domain.  See International Ad Hoc
Committee, Final Report of the International Ad Hoc Committee: Recommendations for
Administration and Management of gTLDs <http://www.iahc.org/draft-iahc-recommend-
00.html> (Feb. 4, 1997) (stating “TLDs .com, .org, and .net are currently referred to as
‘international’ but are more appropriately called ‘generic’ (gTLDs)”).
115. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information:
.aero—Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/aero.htm> (Sept. 29, 2003);
.aero, The Domain of Aviation,  All You Need to Know About the .aero Domain
<http://www.nic.aero/> (accessed Mar. 12, 2003).
116. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information: .biz—
Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/biz.htm> (Oct. 5, 2003); .BIZ: The
Internet’s New Home for Business <http:// www.neulevel.biz> (accessed Mar. 12, 2003).
117. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information:
.com—Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/com.htm> (Jan 29, 2003);
Verisign, Naming and Directory Services  <http://www.verisign.com/nds/naming>
(accessed Mar. 12, 2003).
118. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information:
.coop—Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/coop.htm> (Oct. 5, 2003);
.COOP, One member.  One vote.  One Domain. <http://www.cooperative.org> (accessed
Mar. 12,, 2003).
119. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information: .edu—
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6. .gov—restricted to use by the Government of the United
States of America and operated by the US General Services
Administration.120
7. .info—unrestricted and operated by Afilias, Inc.121
8. .int—restricted to organizations established by international
treaties between governments and operated by ICANN.122
9. .mil—restricted to use by the armed forces of the United
States of America and operated by the Department of
Defense Information Center.123
10. .museum—restricted to use by museums and sponsored by
the Museum Domain Management Association.124
11. .name—restricted to use by individuals and operated by
Global Name Registry, Ltd.125
12. .net—unrestricted and operated by Verisign, Inc.126
13. .org—unrestricted127 and operated by Public Internet
Registry.128
Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/edu.htm> (Oct. 5, 2003); Educause,
.edu Administration <http://www.educause.edu/edudomain/> (accessed Mar. 12, 2003).
120. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information: .gov—
Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/gov.htm> (Oct. 16, 2003); GSA
Federal Technology Service, Government Domain Registration and Services
<http://www.nic.gov/> (accessed Oct. 5, 2003).
121. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information: .info—
Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/info.htm> (Feb. 27, 2003); Afilias,
Global Registry Services <http://www.afilias.info/gateway/index_html > (June 27, 2003).
122. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information: .int—
Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/int.htm> (last updatedOct.5, 2003);
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, The .int Domain <http://www.iana .org/int-dom/>
(Nov. 28, 2002).
123. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information: .mil—
Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/mil.htm> (Oct. 5, 2003); Defense
Information Systems Agency, Defense Network Information Center <http://www.nic.mil/>
(accessed Mar. 12, 2003).
124. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information:
.museum—Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/museum.htm> (Oct. 16,
2003); MuseDoma, Welcome to MuseDoma <http://musedoma.museum/> (Oct. 24, 2003).
125. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information:
.name—Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/name.htm> (Oct. 16, 2003);
126. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information: .net—
Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/net.htm> (Oct. 16, 2003); Verisign,
Naming and Directory Services  <http://www.verisign-grs.com> (accessed Mar. 12, 2003).
127. The .org TLD was originally intended for noncommercial entities, but is, in fact,
open to registrations by commercial for-profit enterprises, governments, individuals, and
so forth. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Generic Top-Level Domains
<http://www.iana.org/gtld/gtld.htm> (Feb. 7, 2003).
128. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information: .org—
Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/org.htm> (Feb. 18, 2003); Public
26
University of San Diego Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Art. 1 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_econ/art1
SOLUM2V8-FINAL.DOC 2/9/04  10:06 AM
342 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [25:317
14. .pro—restricted to accredited professionals and operated by
RegistryPro,129 but not yet operational as of this writing.130
The fourteen gTLDs can be categorized in a variety of ways. We
can begin with history, distinguishing the gTLDs by historical period.
The .com, .edu, .gov, .int, .mil, .net, and .org belong to what might be
called the first wave of gTLDs.131 Three of these (.edu, .gov, and .mil)
reflect the original tilt of the Internet toward the United States, where
the Internet originated. The .edu TLD is limited to accredited U.S.
educational institutions, and .gov and .mil are reserved for the use of
the government and armed forces of the U.S. The .int TLD is used
only by International Organizations (IOs) established by treaty. For
the purposes of our analysis, we will set these four TLDs aside.
The remaining three members of the first wave of gTLDs are
.com, .net., and .org. These domains are currently unrestricted.
Anyone can register any combination of Roman letters and Arabic
numerals in these domains—although there are legal restrictions on
the registration of domain names that are identical or substantially
similar to trademarks.132 For these unrestricted gTLDs, the domain
name space was allocated by a rule of first occupation. The first
person to register the second level domain name car.com was
contractually granted the right to renew that registration. At some
point, many persons began to realize that domain names could have
significant economic value, and there was a “land rush” for the easy-
Interest Registry, Home <http://www.pir.org> (accessed Mar. 12, 2003).
129. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Root-Zone Whois Information: .pro—
Top-Level Domain <http://www.iana.org/root-whois/pro.htm> (Oct. 16, 2003);
RegistryPro <http://www.nic.pro/> (accessed Oct. 24, 2003).
130. See Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Generic Top-Level Domains
<http://www.iana.org/gtld/gtld.htm> (Feb. 7, 2003) (stating that .pro is being established).
131. Jon Postel proposed the establishment of .gov, .edu, .com, .mil, and .org in RFC-
920.  See Request for Comments: 920, Domain Requirements <http://www.rfc-editor.org/
rfc/rfc920.txt> (accessed Feb. 8, 2003); see also Abate, Inventing the Internet, supra n. 60, at
190.
132. ICANN’s UDRP requires a registrant to submit to an administrative proceeding
if a third party asserts “(i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) you have no rights
or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) your domain name has been
registered and is being used in bad faith.”  ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, Part 4 <http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm> (Oct. 24,
1999).  Likewise, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act states “[a]ny person
who registers a domain name that consists of the name of another living person, or a name
substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s consent, with the
specific intent to profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to
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to-remember domain names that could be used for e-commerce,
advertising, or other economic activity.
ICANN’s creation was at least in part due to dissatisfaction with
the domain name system. Although the primary focus of the
grumbling was on the monopoly position held by Network Solutions,
Inc. (NSI)—which later was acquired by Verisign—the constricted
number of gTLDs was also of concern. In response to these concerns,
ICANN initiated a process in the fall of 2000, which led to the
creation of seven new gTLDs: .aero, .biz, .coop, .info, .museum,
.name, and .pro. In theory, ICANN could have opened the domain
name space in a variety of ways. ICANN could have chosen an
auction, a lottery, or some internal process similar to the process that
led to the creation of .com, .net, and .org. Instead, ICANN elected to
solicit proposals and select among the proposals on the basis of the
informed discretion of the members of the ICANN Board of
Directors. Applicants were required to pay a $50,000 non-refundable
fee. From the outside, the bases for ICANN’s decisions were not
clear. Unsuccessful applicants were naturally suspicious of the
outcome, speculating that internal politics and backroom deals had
influenced the outcome.133
ICANN conceived of this process as an experiment or test. A
small number of new gTLDs would allow for the collection and
analysis of data and enhance ICANN’s ability to make gTLD policy.
Three years later, the review is still underway and no new gTLDs
have been approved. ICANN’s difficulty in formulating gTLD policy
has led to many criticisms and proposals, as well as to this article.
D. A Roadmap to the Arguments
Our argument will proceed as follows. We begin with an
economic analysis of domain name policy;134 then, Part II establishes
three basic points about the economics of the root: first, the root is an
economically scarce resource;135 second, domain name service is not a
public good;136 and third, networking effects create a natural
monopoly in the root.137 From these three premises, we argue for the
conclusion that ICANN should be guided by two principles in
managing the root: first, ICANN should allow a market to develop in
133. The first and only effort to expand the gTLD name space is further described
below.  See infra pt. IV(A)(1) (ICANN and gTLD Expansion).
134. See infra pt.  II (An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy).
135. See infra pt. II(A) (The Root Source is a Scarce Resource).
136. See infra pt. II(B) (Domain Name Service Is Not a Public Good).
137. See infra pt. II(C) (Networking Effects and the Root Service Monopoly).
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top level domains, and second, ICANN should manage that market so
as to serve the public interest. Our next step is to move from
economic theory to practical experience. Part III compares domain
name policy with telecommunications policy. The experience of the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with allocation of the
broadcast spectrum and the telephone numbering space provides
strong support for a market-based allocation of gTLDs.138 We
integrate theory and practice in Part IV, where we propose a specific
plan for gTLD auctions.139 We then establish that an auction plan
would serve the public interest140 and that an auction is superior to the
alternative mechanisms for expansion of the gTLD name space.141
Finally, in Part V, we explore the mechanisms by which ICANN
could move forward and begin the process of gTLD auctions.142
II. An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy
We begin our analysis of domain name policy with a brief
excursion into economics. Economics cannot answer all of the
questions raised by domain name policy. First, domain name policy
must answer to the discipline of network engineering. A useful
domain name system must work, and the functionality, scalability,
reliability, and stability of the system are determined by the
soundness of its engineering. Second, domain name policy must
answer to public policy. The Internet is a global network of networks,
and Internet policy is answerable to a variety of constituencies,
including national governments, the operators of the ccTLDs,
Internet Service Providers, information providers, end users of the
Internet, and many others. ICANN is a nonprofit corporation
required by law to serve the public interest.143 An economic analysis
of root service can answer some, but not all, of the fundamental
questions that are raised by domain name policy.144
138. See infra pt. III (Comparisons with Telecommunications Policy).
139. See infra pt. IV(B) (Competitive Bidding for new gTLDs).
140. See infra pt. IV(C) (gTLD Auctions Would Serve the Public Interest).
141. See infra pt. IV(D) (gTLD Auctions Have Comparative Advantages over the
Feasible Alternatives).
142. See infra pt. V (Conclusion: The Path to Rational Domain Name Policy).
143. See infra pt. IV(C)(1) (ICANN’s Mandate to Serve the Public Interest).
144. Although our framework in this paper draws heavily on economic ideas, we are
not endorsing the claim that efficiency (or welfare) ought to be the sole criterion for the
evaluation of public policy.  Because our context is the allocation of a scarce resource,
used primarily by firms engaged in market activity, it is appropriate that our primary focus
is on the highest and best use of that resource. The economic concept of efficiency
provides a framework for determining which use is highest and best.  For a variety of
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Nonetheless, an economic analysis of domain name policy has an
important, indeed a crucial role to play. The Internet has been
mythologized, and the image of the Internet as a separate realm,
somehow exempt from legal regulation and the operation of market
forces is still a powerful and compelling ideal in the minds of many.145
Although this romantic picture may have an element of truth, there is
much to be learned by stepping back and looking at root service as an
ordinary service, provided by an ordinary organization, subject to the
familiar laws of supply and demand. How can the provision of that
service be organized so as to provide the greatest benefit of the
public? How can the root be put to its highest and best use?
Our answers to these questions begins with a basic truth about
the DNS: the root is a scarce resource.146 We then demonstrate that
root service is not a “public good” in the economic sense.147 Although
the root is a private good, it is also a natural monopoly because of
networking externalities.148 Finally, we lay out the options available
for allocation of a scarce resource.149
A. The Root Is a Scarce Resource
In this section, we show that root service is a scarce resource in
the economic sense. Before we analyze the root itself, we briefly
examine the concept of economic scarcity and define it in contrast to
engineering scarcity.150 We then demonstrate that the root consists of
two separate resources—the capacity of the root server system151 and
the root name space152—both of which are scarce in the economic
sense. Finally, we show that one of ICANN’s fundamental
commitments with respect to root service—that TLDs shall not be
reasons, however, there may be important uses of the root that would not be selected by
the market.  We argue that to the extent such uses exist, a gTLD auction would provide
the best mechanism for subsidizing these uses. See infra pt. IV(C)(2) (gTLD Auctions
Serve the Public Interest).  In other words, we see economic analysis as an important tool
for analyzing root policy, but we do not believe it is the only important tool. But see Louis
Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961 (2001)(arguing
that welfarism should be the exclusive framework for the evaluation of legal policies).
145. See David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law And Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996).
146. See infra pt. II(A) (The Root Is a Scarce Resource).
147. See infra pt. II(B) (Domain Name Service Is Not a Public Good).
148. See infra pt. II(C) (Networking Effects and the Root Service Monopoly).
149. See infra pt. II(D) (Options for ICANN’s Management of the TLD Space).
150. See infra pt. II(A)(1) (Economic and Engineering Scarcity).
151. See infra pt. II(A) (The Root Server System Is an Economically Scarce
Resource).
152. See infra pt. II(A) (The Root Name Space Is an Economically Scarce Resource).
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allowed to fail and cease to provide name service—creates an
additional and substantial level of artificial scarcity.
1. Economic and Engineering Scarcity
When we say that the root is a scarce resource, we mean that it is
scarce in the economic sense. The term “scarce” can be used in a
different sense, which we call the engineering sense. It is important to
contrast and compare these two different senses of scarcity.
Discussing engineering scarcity and economic scarcity without
carefully distinguishing their different meanings is like comparing
apples and oranges. Our concern is with the economic idea of
scarcity, but much of the discussion of the issue whether the root is a
scarce resource is based on the engineering conception of scarcity.
When network engineers or network administrators approach
the question of scarcity of domain names, they bring a particular
perspective to the table. Does my name server have sufficient
capacity to provide name service for everyone who is on my network?
Is the set of allowable names large enough, so that I can give a name
to everyone who makes a request? Thus, the network administrator
for Widgets, Inc., would ask whether her name server can support all
the third level domains (3LDs) that are in use or likely to be in use.
Perhaps, she needs to support www.widgets.com, ftp.widgets.com,
smpt.widgets.com, and network.widgets.com. From her point of view,
there is no scarcity. Even if she needed to add hundreds or thousands
of 3LDs to her zone file, her name server could handle the work. If
the demand on the name server became too great, she could upgrade
the server and software. No matter how many requests for 3LDs she
gets, she won’t run out of character strings. From the point of view of
the network administrator at Widgets, Inc., there is no scarcity in the
SLD name server system or in the 3LD name space.
We can look at scarcity in the root in exactly the same way that
our hypothetical engineer looks at scarcity in Widget’s SLD. From
the network engineer or network administrator’s perspective, the root
is not a scarce resource. There are currently 14 gTLDs and 243
ccTLDs153 plus one iTLD. This number does not even come close to
taxing the capacity of the root server system. Moreover, if a very large
number of new gTLDs did begin to tax the capacity of the system, it
could simply be reengineered. Nor does the current total of 258 TLDs
exhaust the name space. The theoretical capacity of the name space is
153. See Root-Zone Whois Information Index by TLD Code <http://www.iana.org/
cctld/cctld-whois.htm> (Nov. 26, 2001).
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vast. There are 37 characters in the DNS name set (26 letters, 10
numerals and the “-” (dash) symbol).154 Single-character domain
names are not permitted, but there are 362 or 1,296 two-character
combinations, 37 * 362 or 47,952 three-character combinations, and
372 * 362 or 1,774,224 four-character combinations. If we allow TLD
strings of 5 or more characters, then the number of possible strings is
vast (although not infinite).155 From the engineering perspective, the
root is not a scarce resource.
There is, however, an economic sense of the word “scarcity” that
differs from the engineering sense. Economic scarcity exists whenever
something is costly, even if it is abundant. A network engineer might
say that there is no scarcity of capacity on an Ethernet network if the
engineer has planned for sufficient resources (optical fiber, etc.) to
meet anticipated demand out into the foreseeable future. The same
engineer might say that storage space on the e-mail server is scarce, if
the server is reaching its physical limit. To the economist, both
resources are scarce. The various components that produce capacity
on an Ethernet network all have costs. The optical fiber that created
practical abundance is not free.
2. The Root is a Scarce Resource in the Economic Sense
Is the root a scarce resource in the economic sense? The answer
is yes, for two distinct and independent reasons. First, the root server
system itself is economically scarce.156 Second, the name space is
economically scarce.157 If either one of these two propositions is true,
then root service is a scarce resource from the economic point of
view.
The Root Server System Is an Economically Scarce Resource
The root server system is scarce in the economic sense, because
root service is not free. To provide root service, there must be root
servers (computers that provide root service to the Internet). The
154. The dash cannot be used as the first or last character of a domain name segment.
The “dot” (or period) is a segment separator; it cannot be used in a name.
155. The maximum number of characters in a domain name (including TLD, SLD,
etc.) is 256.  See LIS 525 - Domain Names <http://525.fims.uwo.ca/~craven/525dom.htm>
(accessed Apr. 16, 2003).  Individual components (e.g. SLDs 3LDs) typically have a
maximum of 63 characters, depending on the name server. See <http://new-
website.openmarket.com/intindex/00-06.htm> (accessed Apr. 16, 2003).  Either limit
would allow more domain names than there are particles in the Universe.
156. See infra pt. II(A) (The Root Server System Is an Economically Scarce
Resource).
157. See infra pt. II(A) (The Root Name Space Is an Economically Scarce Resource).
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root servers (i.e. the computers) are not free.158 The software that runs
the root servers is not free—it took human labor to create that
software. The root servers must be maintained, and the labor that
does the maintenance is not free. Therefore, root service is scarce in
the economic sense. This is not altered by the fact that root server
operators donate their hardware and services to the system—the
resources that they are donating are scarce in the economic sense.
This same point can be made by examining the capacity of the
root server system. The precise capacity of the root server system is
not documented and probably the upper limit has not been tested.
We shall assume that a conservative upper limit on the current
capacity of the system is from 1,000 to 10,000 TLDs.159 There is
demand for TLDs, and the supply is, at least temporarily, limited by
the capacity of the root system. It follows from the definition of
economic scarcity that TLDs are scarce, and therefore, if TLDs were
sold (as we suggest they ought to be), they will command a price.
So far our discussion has assumed a static root server system, but
the hardware and software that provide root service is not fixed in
stone; therefore, the potential upper limit on the supply of TLDs is
not inherently static. Even if the existing root server system can only
support thousands of TLDs, a new and improved root server system
might be able to support millions or even billions of TLDs. But this
does not change the fact that root service is a scarce resource in the
economic sense. Upgrading the root server system would be costly.
The fact that additional root service capacity would be costly is
sufficient to establish the conclusion that root service is scarce in the
economic sense.
The Root Name Space Is an Economically Scarce Resource
There is another reason why the root is a scarce resource. The
root name space is itself scarce. Names are simply strings of
characters. If there were no upper limit on the length of a name
string, then the name space as a logical construct would be infinite.
Even if the limit were 10, the number of logically possible names
would be in the quadrillions—so many that there are no conceivable
circumstances under which the supply would be exhausted.160
158. Of course, the owners of the root servers may donate them to the system, but this
does not make them free in the economic sense.  Someone pays for the root servers; they
do not appear out of the ether.
159. Conversation with Andrew McLaughlin, Senior Advisor to ICANN, Mar. 25,
2003.
160. The number of strings is 3710 + 379 + . . . + 371 = 4,942,156,160,540,570 (roughly 5
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Nonetheless, the name space is a scarce economic resource. The
economic scarcity of the root flows from the differential value of
different names. For example, “.com” is more valuable than “.kjd-
7xx9-a,” and this is true despite the fact that either string will do
equally well at the job of connecting an end user to a server on the
net.
There are two reasons to believe that different names have
different values. The first reason is that the market prices different
names differently.161 The second reason is that different names have
different useful characteristics; another way of putting this second
point is to say that different names have different functional
utilities.162
Different Names Have Different Prices
Consider the first point. Different names have different prices.
This can be demonstrated in two ways. First, experience in the SLD
markets demonstrates that different names have different economic
values. ICANN has imposed uniform pricing across strings163 by
contract in the primary market for SLDs registered in .com, .net, and
.org. If you go to a particular registrar, that registrar will charge you
the same price for “auto.com” (if it were available) as for
“7skj989_2.com” (if it were available). There is, however, a secondary
market for domain names in these gTLDs, and on that secondary
market some SLD name strings command much higher prices than
others. For example, in 1997 the SLD “business.com” was sold for
$150,000.00.164 And taste.co.uk was sold for £110,000.165 Moreover,
price differentials are allowed for some ccTLDs. The ccTLD for
Tuvalu (.tv) markets different names at differential prices.166 It is
beyond dispute that different SLDs sell for different prices in both
quadrillion).  That would allow nearly a million domain names per person on Earth.
161. See infra pt. II(A) (Different Names Have Different Prices).
162. See infra pt. II(A) (Different Names Have Different Functional Utilities).
163. Different registrars can compete with each other on the basis of price, but they
cannot charge different prices for different strings.
164. See Nick Wingfield, Domain name fetches record price <http://news
.com.com/2100-1023-200256.html?legacy=cnet> (June 4, 1997).
165. See Name Shop, Name-Shop press bulletin No.1 (Highest price yet for a .co.uk
name?) <http://www.name-shop.com/corp_pres.htm#highest> (Oct. 9, 2000).
166. See .tv, The .tv Corporation, A Verisign Company, www.tv <http://www.tv/en-def-
6cd8f1c15956/cgi-bin/glob.cgi?domain=www.internet.tv> (accessed April 9, 2003) (offering
network.tv for $25,000 per year); see also The .tv Corporation, What is a .tv
<javascript:popLookup(‘/en/care/popup_premium.shtml’,’toolbar=0,location=0,directories
=0,status=0,menubar=0,scrollbars=1,resizable=0,width=520, height=400’> (accessed April
9, 2003).
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the secondary and primary markets.
So far, we have been discussing SLDs. Would there be
differential prices for TLDs if there were a market? That the answer
to this question is “yes,” can be established by two arguments. First,
there is simply no account of the functional differences between SLDs
and TLDs that would predict massive price difference for the former
and no price differences for the latter. Second, a simple thought
experiment establishes that prices would indeed be different.
Imagine, for example, that ICANN conducted an auction for the
following two TLD strings: “.sex” and “.8ki3_d.” We doubt that any
reader believes these two strings would receive equal bids—assuming
the winning bidder was allowed to charge market prices for
registration with their TLD. It is obvious that .sex would command a
relatively high price,167 and the other string would either attract no
bids or bids at a much lower level.168
Different Names Have Different Functional Utilities
There is a good reason why the market prices different strings
differently. Not all names are created equal. Some names are more
useful than others. Why? Because names have semantic and syntactic
properties that affect their usability. We have identified five such
properties, although we suspect that there are more.
Guessability
One reason why some names are more valuable than others has
to do with the way end users interact with the DNS. We have learned
that you frequently can get to a useful domain on the basis of a guess.
Thus, if I want to go to the website for the International Business
Machines Corporation, I am fairly likely to get there by guessing
“www.ibm.com.” If I want to go to a website that provides products,
services, or information relating to automobiles, it is likely that
entering “www.auto.com” or “www.car.com” or “www.automobile.
com” will do the trick.
167. See Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 715, 728  (2003)
(“In the case of Kremen v. Cohen (99 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (9th Cir. 2000)), a federal judge
valued the use of sex.com over the previous five years at $ 65 million”).
168. Of course, there are imaginable scenarios in which the meaningless string would
attract a high price.  For example, if someone devised a use for a TLD that required that
the string almost never be entered by accident, and if only one new TLD would be allowed
into the root, an arbitrary meaningless string might command a high price.  But this
example merely confirms our point, that different TLD name strings will command
different prices in a market.
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The examples in the previous paragraph are SLDs, but the same
thing is likely to be true of TLDs. It is no accident that the new TLDs
created by ICANN all have names that facilitate guessing; an obvious
example is .museum. If the root were expanded and there were many
new TLDs, the guessing that takes place in .com TLD would likely
take place in the root. For this reason, guessable names are likely to
be more valuable than names that cannot be guessed.169
Memorablility
Some names are more memorable than others. For example,
www.amazon.com is not a guessable name for an online book
merchant, but it is a memorable name. Strings that are memorable,
such as .biz or .web, are more valuable than strings that are difficult to
remember. Memorability can be a function of either the syntactic or
semantic properties of string. The string “ZZZ” might be memorable,
although it lacks semantic meaning. Likewise, the string
“perspicaciousness” might be very difficult to remember, even though
it does have semantic meaning. The string “8k” is very short, but
might not be memorable. The string “remember-nine-eleven” might
be memorable although it is quite long by domain name standards.
Branding
Yet another reason for differential utility is branding. Some
strings are more valuable than others because they are more easily
associated with particular firms or brands. Thus, if IBM were to
operate a proprietary TLD, the string .ibm would have greater utility
than .9ks. IBM is a contraction for International Business Machines,
but branding does not depend on semantic meaning. Toyota is an
effective brand name, even though it had no prior semantic meaning
in English.170
It might be argued that branding utility can only create
differential value if cybersquatting is permitted, but this is not the
case. If we assume a perfect mechanism for prevention of
cybersquatting on trademarks, branding will still create differential
value, assuming a limited number of slots for new TLDs. Suppose, for
169. See infra pt. IV(D)(2) (The Taxonomy Alternative).  Guessability is not the only
factor that accounts for the differential value of different strings.  We argue that
guessability does not justify taxonomizing the root below.
170. The Toyota Motor Corporation was originally named “Toyoda,” after its founder
Eiji Toyoda.  It was renamed in 1983 “because of the more propitious Japanese
ideographs involved.” See Ross Finlay, Toyota: Started With British Money
<http://www.carkeys.co.uk/features/FE000247.htm> (July 31, 2001).
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example, that fifty new slots were available. It seems likely that some
multinational corporations (such as IBM, Sony, or Nike) would be
willing to bid for a slot and the string naturally associated with their
brand names, even if no other party would be allowed to bid on that
string.
Meaningfulness
Meaningful strings are strings that have semantic meaning in
some natural language. Thus “air,” “aero,” and “luft”—all are
meaningful strings. All else being equal, meaningful strings are likely
to be more memorable or guessable or brandable, and hence more
valuable. Not all meanings are created equal, however. Some
meaningful strings are likely to have low value, because of negative
connotations. Thus “dour,” “prissy,” and “putrid” are likely to be low
value strings—although they are meaningful, memorable, and
relatively easy to enter. On the other hand, some strings have positive
connotations. Thus, “awesome,” “excellent,” “cool,” or perhaps
“phat” are likely to be higher value strings.
Enterability
Strings that are easy to enter have more value than strings that
are difficulty to enter. Thus “fj” might be a more valuable string than
“zp,” because of the placement of these characters on the standard
qwerty keyboard. Shorter strings are more easily entered than longer
strings, and familiar strings are more easily entered than strange
strings. Because of the pervasive use of QWERTY keyboards, some
strings produce fewer entry errors than others simply because a touch
typist is more likely to strike the keys correctly.
Summary
Undoubtedly our list of factors that create differential functional
utility for strings is incomplete. But guessability, memorability,
branding, meaningfulness and enterability are sufficient to establish
our thesis. Different strings have different functional utilities. When
this functional utility is combined with our prior point about
differential prices, the support for our conclusion is very powerful
indeed. The name space is a scarce resource, because each string is
unique and different strings have different values.
This point is reinforced by comparing the name space with
another resource: land. One might argue that land is not scarce. There
is plenty of unused land. If someone needs land, they could be
allocated a parcel from the unused stock (such as in the Gobi desert
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or Antarctica). But from the fact that the unused supply of land is
enormous, it does not follow that land is not a scarce resource in the
economic sense. Land is valuable. Although some land is so cheap
that it is virtually free, many parcels of land command extremely high
prices. That is because different parcels of land have different
functional utilities, based on a combination of factors, such as
location, flatness, soil quality, and so forth. Although there are
hundreds of millions of acres of unused land, land is a scarce resource
in the economic sense. As with land, so with names.
3. Commitment to Indefinite Service Guarantees to SLD Registrants Produces
Additional Artificial Scarcity
There is yet another reason why the root is a scarce resource.
This reason is subtle and to our knowledge has never been discussed
in the literature, but it has important implications for DNS policy.
The root is artificially scarce because of the assumption that TLDs
should not be allowed to fail.171 By the assumption that TLDs should
not be allowed to fail, we mean that many Internet policy makers
believe that if a TLD proprietor were to fail as a business, the SLD
registrants in the TLD should continue to receive name service
through some backup mechanism. If the failure of the TLD were
caused by mismanagement, then the TLD might simply be sold to
another operator, but the failure of the TLD might also be due to the
business plan and the nature of the string—making it unlikely that
another operator would willingly undertake the obligation of
operating the domain.
We can illustrate the possibility of a “bad string” with an
example. Suppose a nonprofit association created a “.parks” TLD,
and only public park systems were allowed to register SLDs, and only
individual parks or park-related entities were allowed to register
3LDs. Further suppose that this plan failed, because only 95
individual parks were ever registered. (It turned out that the various
governmental organizations that run parks became uninterested in
the plan for “.parks” after they had sent letters of support to
ICANN.) If we are committed to continuity of service, then an entire
TLD would be locked up in perpetuity to serve these 95 3LDs. The
.parks TLD would represent waste, because the TLD slot could be
put to a higher and better use.
171. See Thread initiated by Karl Auerbach, Re: A question re less market, more
community <http://www.icannwatch.org/comments.pl?sid=1252&op=&threshold=1
&commentsort=0&mode=thread&pid=11471#11473> (accessed Apr. 16, 2003).
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If there are only 1,000 to 10,000 slots available, then the
commitment to perpetual service compounds the scarcity of the root
resource. Suppose that ICANN decided that 1,000 slots could be
made available. If all 1000 slots were allocated at one time (call this a
“big-bang” allocation), then it might well be the case that a
substantial number of the 1,000 slots would be dedicated to uses that
would, in the end, turn out to be failures. This is especially likely to be
true, because a “big bang” auction would result in firms making
decisions about what TLDs are economically valuable with very little
information from the market. There are only 14 gTLDs as of this
writing, and current experience with that number provides very little
information about how the market would operate once 1000 gTLDs
were up and running.
This problem of scarcity is even more acute because the most
useful TLD strings are likely to change over time. In 2004, there may
be a need for a .mobile TLD for mobile phones, but in 2010, there
may be an entirely new kind of technology that creates demand for a
new TLD. Given a “big-bang” allocation, all the slots might be taken.
If the 1000 slots were allocated at the rate of 20 per year, new slots
would still be available in 2010.
Of course, if our assumption is incorrect and TLDs are allowed
to fail, then the problem is much less significant. If there is strong
demand for a new TLD in 2010 and all the slots are taken, one slot
could be sold on the secondary market. The new proprietor could
evict the existing SLDs (perhaps with a one-year grace period) and
then substitute a new string for the old string. It is our position that
this is the first-best option. The market should determine whether
new TLDs succeed or fail and hence whether TLD slots are
reallocated.172
Even if we are right about the security issue, ICANN may choose
to elevate consumer protection over economic efficiency by insuring
that failed gTLDs continue to operate. If ICANN chooses to do this,
that has consequences for the scarcity of the root. In particular, a
guarantee of service for the customers of failed gTLDs leads to the
conclusion that the root should not be expanded through a big bang,
but instead should be expanded through annual allocations of some
fraction of the total slot capacity of the root—a second-best
172. A market-based approach would allow consumers to shop based on the long-term
security of the TLD.  For example, .com might be marketed on the basis that as the largest
and oldest commercial gTLD, it is more secure than a newcomer, such as .business.  We
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solution.173
In this section we have attempted to show that root service is a
scarce resource. This conclusion provides a key assumption for
thinking about root allocation. Were the root not scarce, an allocation
mechanism would be unnecessary. Everyone could simply have as
many TLDs as he or she wished. But, since the root is scarce, some
means must be employed to allocate TLDs. We next consider how
both TLDs are and ought to be allocated. Again, economic analysis of
root service is a crucial step in the formulation of rational TLD
policy.
B. Domain Name Service Is Not a Public Good
From the standpoint of neoclassical economics, a good place to
begin an analysis of root allocation and the creation of TLDs is the
question, “Should root service be provided by the market?” One
reason for answering such a question in the negative is that the good
or service in question is a “public good,” which ought to be provided
by government or a public entity. National defense and clean air are
usually considered public goods. Conversely, if root service is a
“private good,” then well-established and uncontroversial economic
theory suggests that it can best be provided by markets.174
The phrase “public good” is ambiguous. In one sense, the public
good is simply whatever is in the interest of the public as a whole; in
this sense, “public good” is a synonym for “common weal.”
Economists use the phrase “public good” in a more restricted and
technical sense. A given good or service is a “pure public good” if,
and only if, it meets the following two criteria: (1) nonrival
consumption, and (2) nonexcludability. By “nonrival consumption,”
economists mean that consumption of the good by one individual
does not limit the availability of the good to any other individual. By
“nonexcludability,” economists mean that the providers of the good
or service are unable to exclude individuals from access to the good.175
Consider the example of national defense. National defense
meets the criterion of nonrival consumption, at least for a broad
range of cases. If the United States has a strong national defense, then
everyone who lives in the United States benefits equally. The security
173. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24
Rev. Econ. Stud. 11 (1956).
174. See Mueller, supra n. 92, at 9; see also Paul Samuelson, Pure Theory of Public
Expenditure, 36 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 387 (1954).
175. See Mueller, supra n. 174, at 11; see also  Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in
Retrospect 580 (5th ed. 1996).
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that I receive from the maintenance of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marines of the United States Armed Forces does not diminish
the security that other residents of the United States receive from
them.176 National defense also meets the criteria of nonexcludability.
It would be difficult or impossible to exclude specific individuals from
that benefit.177 Because national defense meets the two criteria, it
cannot be provided by markets. Suppose a private firm tried to
provide national defense for a monthly charge. Would it be rational
to pay the charge? Because the private firm could not exclude me if I
did not pay the charge, it would be economically rationale for me to
refuse to pay the charge. That is, it would be economically rational for
me to be a free rider. If everyone were economically rational, no one
would pay the charge, and the market, therefore, would fail to
provide national defense. Government can eliminate the free rider
problem by paying for national defense with compulsory taxes.
With this outline of the economic notion of a public good in
place, we turn to our main question: “Is root service a public good?”
In the domain name policy literature, statements are sometimes made
that suggest that the answer to this question is yes.178 For example, the
gTLD-MoU, an effort to establish an informal transnational
agreement on domain name policy states, “the Internet Top Level
Domain (TLD) name space is a public resource and is subject to the
public trust.”179 A similar statement can be found in the Final Report
of the International Ad Hoc Committee: Recommendations for
Administration and Management of gTLDs,180 and in the operating
176. The statements in text are simplifications.  In fact, national defense is not
perfectly nonrivalrous.  Thus, if the United States Armed Forces commit significant
resources to the defense of Hawaii those same resources are not available for defense of
Maine. See, e.g., Larry J. Sechrest, Privateering and National Defense: Naval Warfare for
Private Profit, The Independent Institute, Sept. 2001 <http://www.independent.org/tii/
WorkingPapers/Sechrest6.html>  (accessed Feb. 7, 2004). For the purposes of illustration,
however, the simplified account in text is adequate.
177. Once again, the account in text is simplified.  Regions or communities could be
excluded from national defense.  For example, if Hawaiians refused to contribute to a
voluntary national defense scheme, then the military could stop protecting Hawaii.  Again,
the simplified account in text is adequate for illustrative purposes.
178. See Joseph Liu, Legitimacy and Authority in Internet Coordination: A Domain
Name Case Study, 74 Ind. L.J. 587, 604 (1999).
179. Establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding on the Generic Top Level
Domain Name Space of The Internet Domain Name System (gTLD-MoU), “Section 2.-
Principles”  <http://www.gtld-mou.org/gTLD-MoU.html> (Feb. 28, 1997).
180. See International Ad Hoc Committee, Final Report of the International Ad Hoc
Committee: Recommendations for Administration and Management of gTLDs
<http://www.gtld-mou.org/draft-iahc-recommend-00.html> (Feb. 4, 1997) (“The Internet
top level domain space is a public resource and is subject to the public trust.”).
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principles of the Government Advisory Committee to ICANN.181
Typically, these statements are not supported by analysis or reasoning
of any kind; for this reason, it is difficult to discern what these
statements mean.182 Indeed, as part of the process that eventually lead
to the creation of ICANN, the Department of Commerce of the
United States Government received comments on both sides of the
question whether the name space should be viewed as a public
resource.183 Moreover, those who participate in domain name policy
discussions are frequently woefully ignorant of even the most basic
economic concepts.184
We believe that this issue can be clarified by adopting the
following conceptual distinction. We shall reserve the use of the term
“public good” for those goods or services that meet the technical
economic definition of a public good. We shall use the term “public
resource” for a good or service that is owned or controlled by
government—whether or not the resource is a public good.
Given this distinction, root service is clearly not a public good in
the economic sense. This conclusion can be established by examining
two different perspectives—those of end users and TLD proprietors.
First, we look at root service from the point of view of end users185 of
the Internet who want to locate a given computer or server by
entering a domain name in an application; from this first perspective
domain name service does look like a public good. Second, we look at
181. See The National Office for the Information Economy, Operating Principles
<http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/international/gac/docs/Operating_Principles-
English.htm> (May 25, 1999) (“The Internet naming and addressing system is a public
resource that must be managed in the interests of the global Internet community.”); see
also ICANN, GAC Statements Concerning ccTLDs  <http://www.icann.org/cctlds/gac-
statements-concerning-cctlds-16dec01.htm> (accessed Dec. 16, 2001); ICANN, Opinion of
the Governmental Advisory Committee on New Generic Top Level Domains
<http://www.icann.org/committees/gac/new-tld-opinion-16nov00.htm> (Nov. 16, 2000).
182. Milton Mueller made this point forcefully. See Posting of Milton Mueller,
mueller@syr.edu, to wg-c@dnso.org <http://www.dnso.org/wgroups/wg-c/Arc00/
msg00639.html> (Aug. 7, 1999).
183. See Summary of Comments: Appendix A, Registration and Administration of
Internet Domain Names, <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/
DNSComments_SUM.htm> (accessed Mar. 22, 2003).
184. An especially egregious example is the statement of Barbara Dooley at hearings
held by subcommittees of the Science Committee of the United States House of
Representatives.  Ms. Dooley asserted that the name space was not a public good, because
(unlike the broadcast spectrum), the name space did not involve a scarce resource. See
Barbara Dooley, Executive Director, Commercial Internet Exchange Association (CIX),
House of Representatives, Improving Technical Management of Internet Names and
Addresses  <http://www.house.gov/science/dooley_03-31.htm> (accessed Mar. 22, 2003).
185. See supra n. 16 (defining end user in contrast to information providers).
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root service from the point of view of proprietors of TLD registries,
who want users to be able to locate the name server for their TLD by
entering its domain name in an application.186
Suppose that you are using the World Wide Web and that you
wish to browse to Amazon.com website by using the domain name
“www.amazon.com.” Does your consumption of root service rival
that of other users? In theory the answer to this question might be
“yes,” because root servers have a limited physical capacity. Your
query might be bounced, because all of the root servers might be
utilized to capacity. In practice, this is unlikely to occur, because of
the distributed nature of the DNS. Given that the root file is cached
at numerous locations, users rarely need to access the root server to
resolve a TLD. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of queries that
reach the root servers are misspellings of TLDs, e.g. .c0m or .cpm is
entered for .com.187 For all practical purposes, my consumption of root
service does not rival yours.
Likewise, the architecture of the Internet does not facilitate
excludability. Although the root servers could be password protected
and a fee could be charged for access, users could easily locate the IP
Address for a given TLD name server without paying the fee—
precisely because that information is cached and made publicly
available at innumerable locations on the Internet. Of course, further
alterations could be made to exclude free riders from access to the
database of domain names, but because that database is not subject to
intellectual property protection,188 excludability will be difficult to
maintain. In other words, from the user’s perspective, domain name
service appears to be a public good. However appearances, in this
case, are deceiving.
From the proprietor’s perspective, it becomes clear that root
service is not a public good. First, root service to the proprietors of
TLD registries is rivalrous. If the root points to a name server (or
186. Note that we are using the terms “browser” and “proprietor” in a stipulated sense
and these terms can be and are used differently in other writing about the Internet.
187. See Vint Cert, Oral Remark at ICANN Meeting at Amsterdam.  (there are a
substantial number of queries to the root servers). See e.g. Internet Software Consortium,
F.root-servers.net <http://www.isc.org/services/public/F-root-server.html> (accessed Mar.
22, 2003) (indicating the root server F receives 282 million queries per day).
188. The United States Supreme Court has indicated that facts are not protected by
the copyright laws. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991) (denying copyright protection to phone book).  The European Union does provide
intellectual property protection for data bases. See generally FindLaw, European Union
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system of parallel name servers) operated by Verisign to provide
name service for the .com TLD, then it cannot also point to a name
server (or system) operated by a different registry for the .com
TLD.189 For name service to work, each domain name must resolve to
a unique IP Address. This in turn requires that each second level
domain must be identified by a unique (or coordinated set of) first
level domain name server(s). If Verisign operates the name server for
.com, then no one else can operate that same name server for a given
root. Hence, in the economic sense, root service, as well as other
name services, is rivalrous.
Second, root service to the proprietors of TLD registries is
excludable. Any given TLD can either be included or excluded from
the root. Thus, the operator of the root can sell root service to TLD
registries. If the proprietor of a given TLD registry refuses to pay,
then the operator of the root can simply eliminate the TLD from the
root or point to a name server operated by a rival registry proprietor.
Hence, root service is excludable in the economic sense. By
extension, all levels of name service are similarly excludable.
What are the implications of the conclusion that root service is a
private and not a public good? At this stage, we will set aside the
question whether there can be competition for root service.190 Given
that root service is a private good, it could be provided efficiently by
firms (that is, profit seeking entities, such as for-profit corporations).
Private firms could sell root service. This could be accomplished
through a variety of pricing mechanisms. As we have already
discussed, it would be difficult to sell root service directly to users and
therefore root service providers would be more likely to sell root
service to the proprietors of TLDs. Root service would be one of the
factors (costs) of operating a TLD, and hence would be incorporated
into the price the TLD operators charge to registrants of Second
Level Domains (SLDs), assuming the TLD proprietor was in the SLD
189. The discussion in text is simplified.  A root server could direct different users to
different TLDs based on information provided by the query.  Something like this happens
with second level domain servers and third level domains.  Different users will be directed
to different web pages by entering “http://www.cnn.com” because the name server at
cnn.com can differentiate between users.  However, all users who enter “http://cnn.com”
are directed to the same page.  This point was made to the authors by David Steele in a
telephonic conference call on February 14, 2003.  This point, however, does not alter the
main conclusion reached in text.  Root service would still be rivalrous, even if the root
differentiated among users, because whatever criteria could be used to differentiate
queries, a given TLD must lead to the same domain for users who are identically situated
with respect to the criteria.
190. See infra pt. II(C) (Networking Effects and the Root Service Monopoly).
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business.191 What price would be charged? If there were competition
in the market for root service, the price would equal the costs of root
service (including, of course, the cost of capital in the form of interest
to lenders and dividends or share price appreciation for equity
holders). Given that the cost of providing root service is relatively
low,192 the price would be low.
Another question concerns what economists call “metering.”
Would root service providers charge every gTLD operator a flat fee
or would such providers attempt to meter the usage of root service
associated with each TLD proprietor and charge based on metered
usage? Of course, the price could be a combination of a flat fee (a
connection charge) and a metered fee. Direct metering is possible,
because each query to the root can be logged. Indirect metering is
another option; for example, TLD proprietors could be charged on
the basis of the number of registrations—assuming that registrations
correlate strongly with the demand for root service.
Why should private goods be provided by markets? At a
fundamental level, the answer to this question lies in the Pareto
Principle:193 given the possibility of improving the welfare of one
individual without harming anyone, the Pareto Principle requires that
we take the action that results in the improvement. A market
transaction, where individual X and individual Y voluntarily
exchange some good or service G for payment M, is required by the
Pareto Principle, unless the transaction results in an externality—that
is, a cost or harm to some third party, Z. Markets both allow Pareto-
efficient transactions, and give incentives for all such transactions to
take place. In a market, the purchaser who derives the greatest
benefit from a good or service will be willing to pay the highest price.
For this reason, markets put resources to their highest and best use.
In the context of domain name policy, the point is that a market
191. Some TLD operators might not sell SLDs.  For example, if .ibm were a TLD,
then International Business Machines might use .ibm for its own purposes and not offer
any other entities registrations in .ibm.  In that case, the cost of .ibm would be passed on to
the purchasers of IBM products.
192. ICANN provides the IANA functions for the entire Internet for only a few
million dollars per year. See  IANA, Progress Report on Performance of IANA Functions
<http://www.iana.org/periodic-reports/progress-report-may-jul00.htm> (May-July 2000).
As of this writing, we have yet to determine the actual cost of the IANA functions.
193. There are actually two Pareto Principles, Strong Pareto and Weak Pareto.  Strong
Pareto requires actions that improve the welfare of every person.  Weak Pareto requires
actions that improve the welfare of at least one person but do not make any person worse
off..  See e.g. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and
the Pareto Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 173, 176-77 (2000).
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will allow the root to be put to its highest and best economic use.
Unless a particular TLD would create a negative externality—a harm
to the root itself or Internet users—the Pareto Principle says that
TLD should be created. This is the economic version of what has
been called Cerf’s Principle: a string should enter the root if it will do
no harm.194 Economists would extend this principle: a TLD string or
slot should be freely exchangeable, unless its exchangeability would
harm some third party.
C. Networking Effects and the Root Service Monopoly
The story we have told so far has made an important
assumption—that there could be more than one firm that provides
root service.195 From the technological point of view, there is no
barrier to the creation of alternative roots. ICANN could operate one
root system, and one or more other entities could operate competing
roots. In fact, there are alternative root services.196
However, the alternative roots provide service to only a tiny
fraction of Internet users.197 Why? In the paragraphs that follow, we
194. The principle is named after Vinton Cerf. See gTLD-auctions.net, gTLD-
auctions.net <http://gtld-auctions.net/> (April 5, 2003) (According to Cerf’s Principle, “a
new TLD should be allowed in the root so long as it does no harm.”); Lawrence Solum,
Cerf’s Principle: A String Should Enter the Root if It Does No Harm, ICANN Watch
<http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=03/03/27/1849224&mode=thread> (Mar. 27,
2003).  Cerf’s principle is a corollary of Karl Auerbach’s “First Law of the Internet,” which
states:
“Every person shall be free to use the Internet in any way that is privately
beneficial without being publicly detrimental.  The burden of demonstrating
public detriment shall be on those who wish to prevent the private use.  Such a
demonstration shall require clear and convincing evidence of public detriment.
The public detriment must be of such degree and extent as to justify the
suppression of the private activity.”
Karl Auerbach, First Law of the Internet, ICANN Watch <http://www.icannwatch.org/
comments.pl?sid=1242&cid=11389> (Mar. 27, 2003).
195. See David Post, Some thoughts on Stuart Lynn's 'Authoritative Root' Discussion
Draft, ICANN Watch <http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=01/06/01/095409> (June
1, 2001); ICANN, ICP-3: A Unique, Authoritative Root for the DNS
<http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-3.htm> (July 9, 2001); ICANN, Keeping the Internet a
Reliable Global Public Resource: Response to New.net ‘Policy Paper,’
<http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-3-background/response-to-new.net-09jul01.htm> (July 9,
2001); Internet Architecture Board, RFC Editor, IAB Technical Comment on the Unique
DNS Root, Request for Comments: 2826,  <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2826.txt> (May
2000).
196. See CNET News.com, Rogue Domains Revolt <http://news.com.com/2100-1023-
275957.html?tag=rn> (Mar. 4, 1997).
197. See id. (quoting Karl Denninger as stating that names in alternative roots, “are
recognized at present by only about one-half of one percent of the Internet.”); see also
Open Root Server Confederation, Openness is a Key Aspect of the ORSC
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will demonstrate that the economics of root service strongly favor a
single root. The arguments that we make do not depend on technical
considerations. Even assuming that multiple roots were technically
feasible, the marketplace would result in a single root (or perhaps a
dominant root, with a tiny fraction of purchased domain names
residing in alternative roots). Our demonstration is based on two
ideas: (1) the economic notion of networking effects, and (2) the cost
structure of root service providers. As we show, these two factors
would inevitably lead a system that began with competing alternative
roots to evolve into a system with a single root. The same factors
prevent a system with a single root from evolving into a system with
multiple roots.
First, consider “networking effects” or “networking
externalities” terms we are using in a technical economic sense.198 The
value of root service increases with the number of users of the service.
A single root with many users is more valuable than a single root with
few users. Given any arbitrary number of users, root service is more
valuable if all of the users patronize the same root, and as a
consequence, root service is less valuable if the same users divide
their patronage among two or more competing roots. Second,
consider the cost structure of root service providers. Much of the cost
of operating a root is fixed. Although a root with more customers in
theory requires more server capacity, given the distributed nature of
the DNS, the marginal costs of serving additional customers are
relatively small as a share of total costs. Given these two factors
(networking effects and a high ratio of fixed to marginal costs),
rational TLD proprietors will choose to purchase root service from
the market leader. This is because the market leader provides a more
valuable service at a lower cost. ISP’s will point toward the market
leader’s root server, because the market leader’s root service is more
valuable to the ISP’s customers than is the root service provided by
<http://www.open-rsc.org/draft/v5/v5.1/openness/> (accessed Mar. 22, 2003).  The Open
Root Server Confederation (ORSC) proposed an open root.  TLDs could be added by an
entity the met the membership qualifications of the federation, e.g. the ability to operate a
name server that could handle anticipated traffic. See id.  Thus, they essentially proposed a
rule of first occupation for the TLD space.
198. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 479 (1998); see e.g., Oz Shy, The Economics of Network
Industries 1-6 (2001); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An
Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 133 (1994); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424 (1985)
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other root service providers. Both the networking and cost effects
become more and more pronounced as the market share of the
market leader becomes larger and larger. For this reason we would
expect the market to lead to a single firm providing root service, i.e.
root service will be provided by a monopolist.199
The way that networking effects operate with respect to root
service can be illustrated by performing a thought experiment.
Imagine that the root became fragmented. If there were many
competing roots, and many competing sets of TLDs, then different
users would reach different destinations by entering the same domain
name. ICANN’s root presumably would result in www.amazon.com
being resolved to the IP Address of the e-commerce retailer in
Seattle, Washington. An alternate root might result in the same
domain name being resolved to a tour operator in Brazil. Different
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) would point requests for root
service to different root servers. As a result, individuals would get
different results for the same domain name when they moved from
one ISP (at home) to another (at work or at an Internet café). As
fragmentation increases, the value of domain names decreases.200 If I
am an Internet user, I am less likely to invest in memorizing or
memorializing “www.amazon.com” if it doesn’t reliably get me to the
website I am seeking. If I am a website proprietor, I am less likely to
invest in publicizing a domain name if users will frequently be
directed to another proprietor’s website when they enter the string of
characters that I am advertising.
Networking effects can be observed in many contexts other than
the domain name system. The World Wide Web itself is more
valuable because it has many users. Likewise, a single integrated
world wide telephone system is more valuable than would be a series
of competing systems, each of which has users who could not make
connections to users of the competitor’s systems. Microsoft Office
dominates the market for word processing and spreadsheets in part
because there is an advantage to using the same word processing and
spreadsheet programs as do many other users. Users have a greater
incentive to invest in learning program specific skills if it is likely that
those skills will be transportable to other locations, workplaces, and
199. See Froomkin, supra n. 97, at 840 (arguing that alternate roots are feasible, but “if
too few people use the alternative root, it remains unable to grow.”).
200. This conclusion would hold even if ISPs or third-party vendors provided a service
that aggregated alternate roots, giving users a menu of the alternate destinations for a
given domain name.  The extra step, choosing among the alternative resolutions, increases
the time required (and hence the cost) of the aggregated alternative root services.
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so forth. Collaboration is less costly if the collaborators use the same
program.
So far, we have been discussing economic theory. The actual
story of the emergence of ICANN’s root service monopoly is
somewhat different. Because the Internet emerged from a
government research project, only one entity provided root service
early in the history of the Internet. That entity (IANA, i.e. Jon
Postel) received a government subsidy for the provision of root
service. That is, one entity provided root service for free. It is hardly
surprising that no effective competitor to ICANN has emerged. By
the time the government subsidy for root service ended and ICANN
began charging TLD proprietors, ICANN was already an effective
monopolist. Given networking effects and the cost structure of root
service, there were very substantial barriers to the entry of
competitors.
What is surprising is that any alternative root service providers
exist at all. What explains the emergence of these failed attempts to
compete with ICANN? The most obvious explanation is ICANN’s
restriction on the TLD space. In particular, ICANN has taken a very
cautious approach to the creation of new gTLDs. Firms that desired
to enter the market as registries (operators of top level domains)
were required by ICANN to pay a $50,000 fee to submit an
application, with no realistic basis for estimating the probability of
success and no clear criteria on the basis of which their application
would be accepted or rejected. Even so, ICANN received forty-four
qualifying applications, of which seven were ultimately accepted.201
Establishing an alternative root is an alternative route to the
establishment of a new gTLD. Because an alternative root can be a
superset of the root administered by ICANN, firms establishing an
alternative root had some hope of overcoming the networking effects
and cost structure that tend to reinforce ICANN’s monopoly.
Profit-maximizing firms with monopolies will (in the absence of
price regulation) extract monopoly rents. That is, they will charge
rents that exceed their costs. Unless the monopolist can successfully
engage in price discrimination, monopoly rents will be inefficient. The
201. Forty-seven entities submitted applications, some with dozens or hundreds of
proposed new TLD strings.  Three of the submitters failed to meet qualifying criteria,
leaving forty-four valid applications. See ICANN, TLD Applications Lodged
<http://www.icann.org/tlds/tld-applications-lodged-02Oct00.htm> (Oct. 10, 2000).  The
accepted applications were for .aero, see supra n. 115; .biz, see supra n. 116, .coop; see
supra n. 118; .info, see supra n. 121; .museum, see supra n. 124; .name, see supra n. 125;
.pro, see supra n. 129.
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monopoly rent raises the price of the monopoly good, and as a result,
some consumers of the good who would have paid the market price
will not consume the good. In the case of domain names, however,
price discrimination is a real possibility.202 For example, the monopoly
proprietor of the root could auction TLDs. If a firm wished to
become the proprietor of the .biz TLD, the monopolist could auction
.biz. In cases where no bidder possesses monopsony power,203 the
auction price should provide a monopoly rent to the root-service
proprietor and also insure that the TLD goes to its highest and best
economic use.
There are, moreover, limits on the rent that a monopoly
proprietor of the root could charge. Most obviously, the monopolist
could not charge a rent in excess of the value of the TLD to potential
purchasers. There are additional limits. At bottom, the Internet is a
communications system, and as such, it competes with other systems.
If the proprietor of a root charged too much for root service, end
users and information providers would use alternative
communications systems, e.g. telephone, broadcast, direct mail, and
so forth.
So far, we have assumed that the proprietor of the root is a
profit-maximizing firm and will charge monopoly rents. Does ICANN
profit-maximize? An adequate account of the institutional economics
of nonprofit corporations is far beyond the scope of this essay.204
202. In fact, the proprietor of the .tv ccTLD does engage in price discrimination for
SLDs, setting higher prices for domain names that are easy to remember and intuitively
associated with potential e-commerce business models.  See .tv, Premium Name Showcase
<http://www.tv/en-def-a0c6a3d7bc33/cgi-bin/premium_search.cgi> (accessed Mar. 22,
2003) (“Premium names are generic words and phrases, and one-, two-, and  three-
character .tv domain names that are registered at prices higher than the standard annual
fee.”).
203. There may well be cases in which one bidder will possess monopsony power.  For
example, the owner of a trademark may have a legal monopoly over use of the mark.  For
this reason, it may be that a TLD name that is identical or substantially similar to a
trademark may have a legal right to exclude others from acting as proprietors of their
TLD.
204. A classical approach to the institutional economics of the nonprofit firm would
suggest that the managers of the firm (the Board of Directors, President of ICANN, and
General Counsel) would seek to maximize their individual utilities.  ICANN directors
receive no direct monetary compensation beyond expenses.  Nor is the monetary
compensation for ICANN’s top management extraordinarily high by nonprofit standards.
There is no evidence of rent-seeking behavior by the ICANN management (bribery).
Rather, members of the ICANN board and management appear to derive utility from
their participation in the ICANN process.  But even if ICANN is not a profit-maximizer,
there are powerful incentives for ICANN to increase its revenues.  The ability of ICANN
to carry out its responsibilities under the MOU would be compromised if ICANN lacked
sufficient revenues to pay its staff and other expenses.  ICANN staff members will seek
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Rather, we suggest the following tentative hypotheses about ICANN.
First, ICANN does not maximize profits in the way that for-profit
firms do. That is, ICANN does not seek to maximize its revenues
from root service. Indeed, ICANN continues to provide root service
to ccTLD operators who refuse to pay ICANN any fee at all. ICANN,
as a nonprofit corporation operates the root in the public interest; as
a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of the State of
California, it therefore must have a “public or charitable purpose.”205
The obligation to act in the public interest is, however, abstract
and vague. This is true both as a matter of political philosophy and as
a matter of law. As a matter of political philosophy, the nature of the
public interest is, at the very least, contested. That is, whatever the
ultimate resolution of philosophical debates about what counts as the
public interest, as a practical matter this is a question of which we are
unlikely to see a strong social consensus in a modern pluralist
democracy.206 As a matter of law, the obligation to act in the public
interest underdetermines ICANN’s actions. Undoubtedly, ICANN
could make DNS policy in a variety of ways without endangering its
status under California law, but there is one thing that ICANN cannot
do given its legal status: ICANN cannot operate the DNS so as to
maximize its own profits or so as to confer a private benefit on the
various stakeholders that participate in the ICANN process.
D. Options for ICANN’s Management of the TLD Space
So far, we have provided an outline of the economics of
ICANN’s root service monopoly. Although some aspects of our
account are tentative and other elements may be controversial, we
believe several points should be beyond controversy. Among these
points are: (1) root service is not a public good in the economic sense;
(2) root service is a natural monopoly because of networking effects
and cost structure; (3) top level domains are economically scarce.
Given these three conclusions, what options are available to ICANN
for administration of the TLD space?
In the sections that follow, we will discuss these options in
increased compensation, and ICANN will need to pay competitive wages to avoid losing
staff members to other nonprofits, government, and the private sector.  ICANN insiders
may seek to increase their status, power, and influence within the ICANN community, and
ICANN’s revenues may directly or indirectly affect ICANN’s relative importance.
205. Cal. Corp. Code § 5111; see also infra pt. IV(C)(1) (ICANN’s Mandate to Serve
the Public Interest).
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greater depth. At this stage we will simply list some of the
alternatives, providing a brief description for each.
1. A Static Root—the first alternative is simply to freeze the root,
allowing no new slots and no changes in the names of the current
slots. A minor variation would be to freeze the number of slots, but
allow the slots to be traded on a secondary market, giving new
proprietors the right to change the name associated with the slot.
2. Rule of First Occupation—the second alternative is a rule of
first occupation, with or without a fee. New gTLDs could be
registered on a first-come, first-serve basis. Each registrant could be
charged an annual or one-time fee that would cover the cost of adding
the new gTLD to the root and providing root service for the new
gTLD.
3. Case-by-Case Public Interest Assessment—a third option is the
so-called “beauty contest” approach. ICANN could allow applicants
to come forward with applications for new gTLDs, either in batches,
on an annual-basis, or even on an always-open basis. The ICANN
board or some subunit of ICANN could then evaluate each proposal,
either on its own merits or in comparison with competing proposals.
4. Lotteries—A fourth option is to conduct a lottery. For
example, each individual or each eligible firm could receive an equal
chance in a drawing for gTLD slots.
5. Auctions—the final alternative is to conduct gTLD auctions,
with or without a fee that covers the cost of root service. We discuss
the various auction possibilities in detail below.207
These options can be mixed and matched in various ways, but
fundamentally, ICANN only has these five choices open to it. So long
as ICANN does not operate TLDs itself, ICANN must allocate the
scarce root resource through some mechanism. One option (number 1
above) is to waste the root resource by refusing to expand the number
of TLD slots. If ICANN rejects this option, then it must allocate the
new slots. There are only so many ways this can be done. In the end
they boil down to four: auctions, lotteries, queues, and beauty
contests—or hybrids of these four.
There is one final dimension of the choice set open to ICANN
for making DNS policy. Any of the above options could be combined
with technical certification or technical monitoring of registry
operators.208 Operation of a registry (the back end) is not identical
207. See Part IV(B) (Competitive Bidding for new gTLDs).
208. See e.g. Business Constituency, Business Constituency Position Paper, A
Differentiated Expansion of the Names Space <http://www.bizconst.org/
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with management of a TLD (the front end). Registry operation (at
least for the purposes of this paper) is simply performance of the
technical functions that enable stable and reliable operation of the
name server containing the zone file for the TLD.209 This function can
be contracted to a certified registry operator by the firm or
organization that sets the registration policies for the TLD. In the
alternative, ICANN could simply monitor registry operation and
disqualify operators who create problems. Yet another alternative is
for ICANN to disqualify TLD managers whose registry operators fail
to meet technical standards. The point is that there is no requirement
that the front end manager and the back end operator be the same
entity. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that the most
efficient organizational form for new gTLDs would separate these
functions.
Having completed our sketch of the economics of DNS policy at
the level of theory, we now move to the realm of practical experience.
Fortunately, DNS policy does not need to be made in a vacuum.
There is a rich history of telecommunications regulation in the United
States. That history is the topic of the next Part of this Article.
III. Comparisons with Telecommunications Policy
In Part II, we provided an abstract analysis of domain name
policy from an economic perspective. Here, in Part III, we extend and
deepen that analysis by drawing upon lessons learned in the context
of telecommunications policy.
A. Introduction to Telecommunications Regulation
In the United States, an independent federal agency, under the
direction of Congress, is charged with developing and implementing
policies governing the major telecommunications industries. These
include broadcast radio and television, wireline and wireless
telephony, and video distribution via cable, wireless, and satellite.
One might wonder why the Federal Communications Commission
positions/Differentiatednamespace.doc> (Dec. 2002).
209. In most cases, gTLD proprietors also operate their respective registries, but they
need not, such as.org.  The original registry agreement with Verisign for operation of the
.org gTLD expired at the end of 2002.  Public Interest Registry, a non-profit corporation
created by the Internet Society, was designated by ICANN as the successor operator of
.org.  However, technical (back-end) operations are provided by Afilias, Inc.  See ICANN,
Materials on .org Reassignment <http://www.icann.org/tlds/org> (accessed Oct. 4, 2003);
Afilas, Public Interest Registry Assumes Control of .ORG Domain Name Registry
<http://www.afilias.info/news/press_releases/pr_articles/2003-01-02> (Jan. 2, 2003).
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(“FCC”) does not likewise have jurisdiction, at least in the US, over
perhaps the most significant telecommunications industry - the
Internet.210 The FCC’s authority does extend over those elements that
comprise the Internet “backbone” and connectivity, i.e., the wireline
infrastructure and the wires, cables, or wireless frequencies Internet
users employ to connect to the backbone.211 But the agency does not
regulate those elements of the Internet which comprise its functions
or value. Thus, the fundamental components of the Internet’s
functionality—the computers, servers, content, architecture,
protocols, users, and Internet service providers—are not regulated by
the FCC or any other governmental body.212
This is not an oversight. Deliberate federal policies during the
Clinton administration were intended to leave the Internet mostly in
private hands and unregulated.213 As explained by Ira Magaziner,
210. This is not to say there haven’t been proposals to put the Internet under FCC
jurisdiction. See e.g. David B. Nash, Orderly Expansion Of The International Top-Level
Domains: Concurrent Trademark Users Need A Way Out Of The Internet Trademark
Quagmire, 15 John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 521, 543 (1997).
211. The FCC shares jurisdiction with the National Telecommunications Information
Administration (NTIA), an agency of the Department of Commerce (DOC).  The NTIA
advises the President on telecommunications policy.  It also has authority over that part of
the spectrum used by the federal government.  See U.S. Dept. of Com., National
Telecommunications and Information Administration Facts <http://www.ntia.doc.
gov/ntiahome/ntiafacts.htm> (accessed Oct. 4, 2003).
212. Some commentators believe the FCC clearly has jurisdiction over the Internet,
but has refrained from exercising it for policy reasons.  See e.g. Joseph P. Liu, Legitimacy
and Authority in Internet Coordination: A Domain Name Case Study, 74 Ind. L.J. 587, 621
n. 157 (1999).
213. Perhaps most instrumental in this regard were the “white” and “green” papers
issued by NTIA.  “[A]s part of the Clinton Administration’s Framework for Global
Electronic Commerce” on July 1, 1997, “the President directed the Secretary of Commerce
to privatize the domain name system (DNS) . . . .”  On Jan. 30, 1998, NTIA issued a
request for comments (dubbed the “green paper”) on its design to privatize the
management of Internet names and addresses “in a manner that allows for the
development of robust competition and facilitates global participation in Internet
management.”  See NTIA, A Proposal to Improve Technical Management of Internet
Names and Addresses: Discussion Draft <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/
domainname/dnsdrft.htm> (Jan. 30, 1998).  NTIA responded to the 650 comments
received with its “white paper,” issued June 5, 1998, containing a revised “Statement of
Policy”.  See NTIA, Statement of Policy <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/
domainname/6_5_98dns.htm> (June 5, 1998).  This recommended the creation of a private
corporation for the administration of the DNS, and culminated in a Memorandum of
Understanding Between DOC and ICANN.  See NTIA, Memorandum of Understanding
Between NTIA the Department of Commerce and ICANN <http://www.ntia.doc.gov
/ntiahome/domainname/icann.htm> (accessed Oct. 4, 2003).  Additional background
documents can be found at NTIA, Background Documents <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/domainname/background.htm> (accessed Oct. 4, 2003).  For a critique of the
“government’s lack of transparency in its privatization decisions,” see Jay P. Kesan &
54
University of San Diego Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Art. 1 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_econ/art1
SOLUM2V8-FINAL.DOC 2/9/04  10:06 AM
370 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [25:317
President Clinton’s senior policy advisor, “almost two-thirds of the
real growth of the U.S. economy [during the mid- and late 1990s]
[came] from the Internet economy.” Privatization, in the view of the
White House, was essential to foster this growth and its
transformative effect on the global economy.214 Thus, while the
Internet was developed under the auspices and support of the US
military, the Department of Commerce, and several funding agencies,
post-natal government involvement is mostly noted by its absence.215
Regulating the Internet would be a daunting task, and it is not
obvious that it would even be feasible for national agencies to
regulate effectively.216 National regulation would likely retard the
growth of the Internet, and create more controversy than consensus.
Indeed, the few ad hoc regulations that do apply uniquely to the
Internet, usually relating to content such as child pornography, spam,
or trademarks, have either been unconstitutional, ineffective, or
supplemented by private regulation.
While we generally oppose any regime of national government
regulation of the Internet, we believe that it both illuminating and
instructive to examine regulatory policies in other
telecommunications industries as a basis for the formulation and
evaluation of Internet policy. There are two principle reasons for
doing so. First, the interminable struggle over telecommunication
Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame On You—Fool Us Twice Shame On Us: What We Can
Learn From The Privatizations Of The Internet Backbone Network And The Domain
Name System, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 89, 94 (2001).
214. See Ira Magaziner, At The Crossroads Of Law And Technology: Keynote Address,
October 23, 1999, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1165, 1168-73 (2000); see also National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, Statement of Policy: Management
of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 F.R. 31741, 31744 (1998) (stating that “the U.S.
continues to believe, as do most commenters, that neither national governments acting as
sovereigns nor intergovernmental organizations acting as representatives of governments
should participate in management of Internet names and addresses”).
215. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000) (“It is the policy of the United States to preserve
the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”).
216. Several observers have argued that attempts at national regulation would
inevitably fail.  See e.g. Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 715,
757-58 (2003).  In contrast, Richard Hill suggests that a “mix of national and international
(via ITU) [regulation] that has worked for all other modes of telecoms” could also work
for the Internet.  Ltr. From Richard Hill, Counselor, Intl. Telecomm. Union (ITU),
Standardization Sector (ITU-T), to Karl M. Manheim, Prof. of Law, & Lawrence B.
Solum, Prof. of Law  (July 25, 2003) (copy on file with authors).  See also Clarifications on
ITU and ICANN Reform <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/tsb-director/itut-icann/
clarifications.html#notes> (Aug. 21, 2002) (stating that “the ITU believes that all of the
world’s governments would have to be involved if a mandate  to ‘make decisions that have
public policy implications’ were to be agreed”).
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policies elsewhere reinforces the wisdom of leaving the Internet
mostly unregulated. Second, those analogous policies have undergone
rigorous examination, both for their theoretical soundness and
practical efficacy. There is much to be learned from what scholars,
regulators, courts and the industries themselves have to say about
various policies and principles in telecommunications law.217
Aside from the Internet, the two most dominant
telecommunications industries, both in the US and worldwide, are
broadcast and telephony. Examining these industries allows for
comparative analysis of Internet policies, especially those involved in
access to the name space. In many ways, the DNS system resembles
the radio spectrum because scarcity limits access, thereby requiring a
licensing scheme.218 Scarcity also creates value and markets, which
may in turn influence policy formation.
The DNS and IP Address systems also bear similarity to the
telephone name and number spaces. Regulation of the latter is
accomplished by such familiar conventions as country codes (e.g., 1
for North America), area codes, three-digit prefixes and four-digit
suffixes. But resulting value in telephone numbers has lead to
ancillary regulation such as information and public safety protocols
(411 and 911, respectively) and number portability requirements.
It is to these industries and regulatory policies we now turn, after
which we will return to a discussion of the Internet name space and
regulation of gTLDs.219
B. Two Fundamental Comparisons: Broadcast and Telephone
The Internet is both similar to and different from other
communications technologies. In this section, we compare Internet
regulation to regulation of the radio spectrum (using broadcast
licensing as an example) and to regulation of the telephone system
(using telephone number assignment as an example).
217. Others have also written about the parallels between ICANN and the FCC,
perhaps most notably Jonathan Weinberg at Wayne State University School of Law.  Prof.
Weinberg was also co-chair of ICANN’s Working Group C on Generic Top-Level
Domains.  See ICANN, Report (Part One) of Working Group C (NEW gTLDs) Presented
to Names Council <http://www.icann.org/dnso/wgc-report-21mar00.htm> (Mar. 21, 2000).
218. We do not intend to take a position on the controversial question whether there is
true scarcity in spectrum, given current broadcasting technologies.  Whatever the current
status of that issue, the historical evolution of broadcast regulation was based on a premise
of spectrum scarcity.
219. This subsection is mainly descriptive; it lays the foundation for some basic
policies.  Later sections will be more normative; we will critique those policies and
examine their relevance to the development of Internet policy.
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1. Broadcast Licensing
Use of the radio spectrum has been subject to a regulatory
licensing scheme since shortly after the first commercial applications
of radio emerged.220 Licensing is premised on the theory that the
spectrum is “a valuable and limited public resource.”221 Whether it is
also a public good, as we have used that term, depends on which good
and whose consumption is analyzed. Several different interactions
and groups of users are involved in the commercial broadcast
industry: broadcasters (station owners), listeners and viewers,
program content suppliers, and advertisers. The first two groups are
most instructive for present purposes.222 As we next show, the
frequencies used for transmission (analogous to domain names) are
private goods, while the information contained within the
transmissions (analogous to web content) are public goods.
The spectrum is an intangible construct. It is a convenient way to
describe the physical transport of energy using electromagnetic
waves. It is a means of information delivery, not a commodity or
resource that can be “used up” in any physical sense. Yet, in
economic terms, the spectrum can support only so many channels of
information at any one time. The number of channels is dependent on
220. See Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (1912).  The first
federal law concerning radio transmission was the Wireless Ship Act of 1910, Pub. L. No.
61-262, ch. 379, 36 Stat. 629 (1910).
221. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl.  Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973);
see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984) (describing the
spectrum as a “scarce and valuable national resource”).  Public ownership of the spectrum
was assumed as far back as the Radio Act of 1912.  The precept was reiterated in the
Communications Act of 1934, which provides the current framework for
telecommunications regulation in the United States.  See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (“It is the
purpose of this chapter, among other things, to maintain the control of the United States
over all the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but
not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time. . . . . “).  The notion that
the spectrum is public property has not gone unchallenged.  See e.g. Milton Mueller,
Property Rights In Radio Communication: The Key To The Reform of
Telecommunications Regulation, Cato Institute, June 3, 1982 (“[C]haracterization of the
electromagnetic spectrum [as a public resource] is fallacious and misleading. The spectrum
is not a ‘natural resource’; it does not even exist independently of specific transmitters and
receivers. . . There is no ‘spectrum,’ then; there are only transmitters and receivers of
electromagnetic energy.”).
222. Both content suppliers (e.g. studios, record companies) and advertisers market
“private goods” to broadcasters as well as to other communications and non-
communications industries.  By virtue of copyright and licensing, consumption of
programming by broadcasters is usually rivalrous and exclusive.  Advertising is also
rivalrous and exclusive, but in the opposite direction.  Advertising spots consume
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the state of technology and on social preferences such as clarity of
reception and privacy concerns. Since this article is about economic
and welfare policies, not about engineering, we will assume there is a
limited supply of useful spectrum which can be “consumed” by use.223
If there were no limit on supply, there would be no need to develop
allocation policies. In the case of radio frequencies there is a limit,
albeit more of an artificial than technological nature. In either case,
limited supply creates scarcity; scarcity creates a need for allocation.
The question at hand is whether scarce communication resources
should be allocated by government regulation or by the market.
Broadcasters “consume” spectrum in order to deliver
information and services to others. In economic terms, spectrum
resembles a private good because it is rivalrous; i.e., use by one
consumer (broadcaster) diminishes the supply for others.224 If
broadcaster A transmits on a frequency of 101 MHz, that frequency is
no longer available for others (in the same geographic region and at
the same time),225 at least not without rendering both signals
worthless. That is because multiple signals on the same frequency will
interfere with one another;226 receiving devices will be unable to
223. Recent technological advances seriously undermine the notion of spectrum
scarcity, at least in the physical or engineering sense.  As interference and simultaneous
use problems get worked out by advanced technology, many of the regulatory precepts
that have sustained FCC licensing for nearly a century need to be reexamined.  See  Stuart
Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment Violation, 52
Duke L.J. 1 (2002).  But, for the same reasons that domain names are scarce, despite
unlimited engineering capacity, radio licenses are scarce even if the concept of spectrum
scarcity is no longer valid in a physical sense.
224. We refer to “consumption” of the spectrum in economic not physical terms.
While transmission itself does not deplete the supply of spectrum (an infinite number of
transmissions can occur simultaneously on the same frequency), it does impede multiple
use to transmit information.  “It is the phenomenon of interference that gives rise to
scarcity in radio communication.”  Mueller, Property Rights In Radio Communication,
supra n. 221.
225. The radio spectrum can be described in three dimensions: frequency, geography
and time.  If any one of these differs between transmitters, interference should not arise.
Thus, there are many ways that frequencies can be “re-used” by multiple parties, the most
common of which is geographic separation of limited-range transmitters.  Time division
(akin to time-sharing of condominiums) is another.  Although this was employed mostly in
the early days of radio, this practice can still be found, especially for AM broadcasts.  See
Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L.
& Econ. 133, 147-48 (1990).  AM signals travel further at night, so secondary licenses yield
to clear-channel licenses on the same frequency either by not transmitting or reducing
power at night.
226. Radio signals on the same frequency combine to produce undesired modulation,
which confuse reception devices.  In signal terminology, interference causes information
loss in most of the technologies commonly used.
58
University of San Diego Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Art. 1 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_econ/art1
SOLUM2V8-FINAL.DOC 2/9/04  10:06 AM
374 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [25:317
distinguish the signals and produce meaningful video or audio.227
Indeed, it was the unregulated cacophony of voices transmitting on
same or nearby frequencies in the 1920s that lead to the well-known
“tragedy of the commons,” rendering the radio spectrum mostly
unusable.228
The rivalrous nature of the spectrum arises only if there is a
limited supply.229 If there were no upper or lower limit on frequencies
usable for transmitting information, an infinite number of
broadcasters could operate simultaneously, so long as there was
compatibility between transmission and reception devices. We know
there is a lower limit on frequencies–something near to zero cycles
per second - but there may not be an upper limit.230 Consumer
electronics devices operating in the gigahertz range (billions of cycles
per second) are now commonplace; the terahertz range (trillions of
cycles per second) is not far behind.231 Using current technologies, we
could allocate at least a million broadcast channels of 10 KHz each
(the bandwidth of AM broadcast licenses) in every metropolitan
area.232 That’s more than enough to fully eliminate “spectrum
scarcity.” Indeed, the FCC could give every person in the United
227. This is only partially true.  Modern technologies such as multiplexing and phase
discrimination permit multiple simultaneous uses of the same frequency for separate
transmissions.  For clarity, however, we will assume that only a single signal can be
transmitted locally at any one time on a particular frequency.  Even multiplexing has a
finite capability, so a more accurate treatment would merely move the analysis one step
further into the physical description that follows.  For a discussion of how multiplexing
affects the scarcity rationale, see Gerald R. Faulhaber & David Farber, Spectrum
Management: Property Rights, Markets, and the Commons, 2002 Proc. Telecomm. Pol’y
Res. Conf. (forthcoming) <http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/faulhabe/
SPECTRUM_MANAGEMENTv51.pdf> (accessed Nov. 15, 2003).
228. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1969).
229. Information capacity of the radio spectrum is determined by Shannon’s
algorithm.  See  Michael P. Frank, Thesis <www.cise.ufl.edu/~mpf/papers/Frank/Frank-
94/ftp/ps/Thesis.ps> (accessed Mar.18, 2003).
230. Quantum physics imposes both upper and lower limits on wavelength and
accordingly on frequency.  But these can be disregarded for present purposes.
231. Terahertz transmissions are already in use for laser and other optical
communications.  See e.g. Ed Gerstner, Filling the Terahertz Gap and Rüdeger Köhler et
al., Terahertz Semiconducting-heterstructure Laser, <http://www.tqc.iu.edu/News/
THz_laser.htm> (Feb. 16, 2001). At least one company is working on terahertz and sub-
terahertz radios.  See Endwave, News Release, Endwave’s Doug Lockie to Lead
Workshop at the Broadband Wireless World Forum (Feb. 16, 2001),
<http://www.endwave.com/News_PR021601.html> (Nov. 6, 2002)
232. 1,000,000 times 10KHz equals 10 Gigahertz of bandwidth.  Leaving adjacent
channels empty to avoid interference, 20 GHz of total bandwidth would be needed.  This
is less than is currently used by the various categories of radio devices.  The FCC currently
regulates radio transmissions in frequencies as high as 200 GHz.  See 47 CFR § 15.255.
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States his or her own broadcast license.233
Of course this would never happen. First, there are competing
uses for the frequencies, such as other broadcast needs, public safety,
and wireless telephony. Second, and more importantly, “spectrum
scarcity” is not altogether a bad thing. Scarcity created by regulation
gives rise to excludability, which creates value; it turns what might
otherwise be a public good into a private good. Accordingly, scarcity
is not a problem for the radio industry, it is an opportunity. So as to
preserve vested positions, early proposals to expand the AM band
(only 5% of usable spectrum had been allocated to broadcast), and
eliminate scarcity, were rejected as “dangerous” “pernicious,” and
“fatuous.”234 The history of spectrum allocation in this country is one
of favoring powerful constituencies by giving them exclusive rights to
generate monopoly rents.
However, to the extent scarcity promotes innovation and
investment,235 its preservation may be justified by public policy, if not
by necessity.236 Herein lies one lesson that broadcast can offer for
regulating the domain name space: not all scarcity follows the model
of a scarce physical resource, such as land or water. Scarcity can be a
function of architectural decisions and engineering. Because
excludability can be created by legal regulation, a legal regime can
create economic scarcity.237 Whether to enforce scarcity, and to what
extent, depends on the social benefit of having fewer rather than
233. Assuming a 100 mile separation between licenses for the same and adjacent
frequencies (to avoid interference), and assuming uniform geographic distribution, more
than 4,000 licenses could be issued in the US for each frequency.  That yields 400 million
separate licenses.  In actuality, at the end of fiscal year 2002, there were 4,804 AM
broadcast stations in the United States.  See Federal Communications Commission News,
Broadcast Station Totals as of September 30, 2002 <http://www.fcc.gov/mb/
bureau_chief/fy2002st.doc> (Nov. 6, 2002).
234. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, supra n.
225, at 154-55.
235. Licensees of scarce frequencies can enhance their value by innovating new
technologies that allow a greater number of uses or users per channel.
236. Scarcity also justifies heavy regulation to promote “the public interest.”  Indeed,
scarcity is the basic premise of the Communications Act of 1934.  See Glen O. Robinson,
The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A
Legislative History of the Communications Act of 1934 (Max Paglin ed., Oxford U.
Press1989).  Scarcity is also the rationale for content regulation on the airwaves.  See
Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity, supra n. 223, at 38-45.
237. So, for example, the patent laws can create economic scarcity in licenses for
patented inventions or the copyright laws can create economic scarcity in copyrighted
writings.  Although consumption of information itself is nonrivalrous (my copying a book
does not deprive you of your ability to copy the same book), legal exclusion (e.g. a legal
prohibition on copying) results is the tangible embodiment of the information (e.g. the
book itself) becoming the relevant scarce economic good.
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greater numbers of users. This in turn depends on an economic and
social welfare analysis of the good or service. We will return to this
analysis below.238 But one thing is certain: scarcity in frequencies, as in
domain names, is intentional and cannot be justified on technical
grounds.239
The rivalrous nature of the radio spectrum arises from the
interaction of physics and regulation. Two signals at the same
frequency can interfere—that is physics. The FCC historically
allocated spectrum by granting licenses to broadcast within a band or
range of frequencies—that is regulation. Excludability also arises
from a combination of physics and regulation. The law can grant an
exclusive license to broadcast at a particular frequency in a specified
geographic region. Physics makes it possible to detect violators, and
limits the geographic range of particular broadcasters—at least in
certain parts of the spectrum. Regulation is required, because
broadcaster A’s transmission on 101 MHz does not by itself prevent
broadcaster B from using the same frequency. Indeed, it is nearly
impossible to exclude access to the spectrum for transmission through
technological means.240 So exclusion requires some legal regime, and
the current regime is licensing.241 It is a regime that is sometimes
difficult to enforce, as evidenced by the proliferation of “pirate” radio
stations broadcasting at various times, often from off-shore locations
transmitting to coastal and border areas.242 However, because of the
large investments typically necessary to erect studio and transmission
238. See infra pt.  IV(A) (A Proposed Model for Expansion of the Name Space).
239. For a discussion of the history of spectrum scarcity, see generally Hazlett, supra n.
225, at 133-35.
240. The Soviet Union tried this by “broadcasting noise, programming, or any other
source of interference on the same frequency as a signal. During the Cold War, this
technology was used by the Soviet government to prevent American radio signals from
reaching its citizens.”  See  Maggie Parsons, United States International Broadcasting
Services During the Cold War, <http://iml.jou.ufl.edu/projects/Spring2000/Parsons/
cold.htm> (accessed Mar. 26, 2003).
241. Section 301 of the Communications Act of 1934 states: “No person shall use or
operate any apparatus for the transmission of energy or communications or signals by
radio [except under a license] .  . .granted under the provisions of this chapter.”  47 U.S.C.
§ 301 (2001).  Any person convicted of violating § 301 shall “be punished . . . by a fine of
not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year.” 47 U.S.C. §
501 (2001).
242. See e.g. Pirate Radio Central <http://www.blackcatsystems.com/radio/
pirate.html> (accessed Feb. 24, 2003); The Free Radio Network, <http://www.frn.net>
(accessed Oct. 27, 2002); The Offshore Radio Guide <http://www.offshore-radio.de/
index.html> (accessed Feb. 24, 2003); alt.radio.pirate Newsgroup FAQs  <www.faqs.org/
faqs/by-newsgroup/alt/alt.radio.pirate.html> (accessed June 23, 1998).
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facilities, illegal unlicensed broadcasts are rare.243
As shown above, without exclusion, the spectrum is potentially
worthless—interference might prevent anyone from making use of
the resource. Accordingly, spectrum policy in the United States turns
a public good (nonrivalrous use of technologically unlimited, and not
easily excludable frequencies) into a private good. Both spectrum
scarcity and exclusion are artifacts of regulatory policy.244
Licensing policy requires an elaborate bureaucracy (and
compliant courts) to implement and enforce. The Media Bureau
(formerly Mass Media Bureau) processed roughly 5,000 license
applications in 1999.245 The bureau receives a good portion of the
FCC’s annual appropriations, which totaled 278 million dollars for
fiscal year 2003.246 These are considerable public resources devoted to
the preservation and regulation of private goods.
Unlike the frequencies used for transmission, the content of
broadcasts is a classic public good. Over-the-air radio and television
signals are both nonrivalrous and nonexcludable—or at least were
before the advent of encryption technologies. They are nonrivalrous
because consumption (reception) by any number of listeners or
viewers does not degrade the signal or deplete its content. Broadcast
signals are ordinarily nonexcludable, because it is difficult to keep
243. This discussion applies only to the licensed portions of the spectrum.  Many bands
(called “public frequencies”) are unlicensed.  These bands are carved out of the general
licensing scheme to enable short range devices such as cordless phones and television
remote controls.  Lately, public frequencies have been put to other telecommunications
uses such as IEEE standard 802.11, commonly referred to as “WiFi.”  Some of these
operate over longer ranges and congested areas of the spectrum.  The ability of otherwise
competing and interfering uses to coexist on public frequencies is a consequence of
technological advance.  The relevance of these public frequencies to the formation of
access policies will be explored later, but for the time being, it is useful to observe that
radio transmissions are generally prohibited unless licensed.
244. Spectrum policies are constantly under review and subject to debate.  In fact, a
recent FCC report discussed a possible spectrum policy that would abandon the current
regulatory and exclusivity model in favor of a “commons” or “open access” model.  See
Fed. Commun. Comm. Spectrum Policy Taskforce, Report of the Spectrum Rights and
Responsibilities Working Group, <http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/files/SRRWGFinalReport.pdf>
(accessed Nov. 15, 2002).
245. See Federal Communications Commission  Before the Subcomm. On Commerce,
Justice, State, and the Judiciary, Comm. on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, on the FCC
Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Estimates  (statement of William E. Kennard, Chairman, Fed.
Commun. Comm. <http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statements/2000/stwek022.
html> (accessed Oct. 2003).
246. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget-Executive Office of the President, Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 2003 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/fy2003/pdf/app31.pdf.> (accessed Oct. 2003).  Much of this is offset by the recent
practice of auctioning broadcast and other licenses.
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non-paying listeners and viewers from enjoying the broadcast.247 Of
course, both analog and digital signals can be encrypted as a means to
charge for access,248 but the FCC generally discourages such
practice.249 This is what keeps over-the-air broadcasts “free.” Indeed,
the provision of free radio and television content is a basic tenet of
FCC policy and drives many of its decisions, such as the requirement
that television tuners be capable of receiving digital over-the-air
signals by 2007, despite the fact that most Americans receive their
home video signals via subscription service (cable or satellite) that
bypass TV tuners entirely.250
In analyzing licensing and domain name policies from an
economic or public policy perspective, it is important to focus on the
right commodity and corresponding facet of the industry. It is not
consumption of broadcast content that is relevant here. Thus, the fact
that from their perspectives, listeners and viewers are consuming a
public good is immaterial. Rather, it is the consumption of
frequencies by broadcasters that is the relevant transaction and
frames the debate. Correspondingly, consumption of web content by
Internet users (a public good) is not what drives gTLD policy-making.
Rather, it is the consumption of gTLDs within the domain name
space (a private good) that matters. Thus, we focus on allocation of
spectrum and gTLDs, not on user access to transmitted information.
247. It is harder to license radio reception than it is to license broadcast, but not
impossible.  In England, for instance, owners of television sets pay a user fee that supports
public broadcasting (BBC).  Unlicensed receiving devices are detected by roving trucks
that analyze electromagnetic field characteristics as they pass homes and other structures.
See BBC, New Generation  of Television Detector Vans Hit the Streets <http://
www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/2003/06_june/24/licensing-detector.vans.html>
(June 24, 2003).
248. These are technological means of creating excludability.  For example, broadcast
signals could be encrypted and the limited-duration decryption keys could be sold to
customers.  A similar system is used to create excludability by cable operators (who find
encryption and set-top decryption devices less expensive than physically cutting the cable
link to particular locations).
249. Direct viewer payment for television programs (“pay TV”) first started in the
1920s and experienced a resurgence in the 1970s.  See Megan Mullen, Pay Television,
<http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/P/htmlP/paytelevisio/paytelevisio.htm> (accessed
Feb. 25, 2003). Currently the FCC permits subscription-based television only for ancillary
broadcasts on a digital license.  See 47 C.F.R. § 73.642 (2002).
250. Fewer than 10 percent of American households obtain their television signals by
free over-the-air reception.  See  The Examiner, Digital TV, that’s an order
<http://www.examiner.com/headlines/default.jsp?story=n.digital.0809w> (Aug. 9, 2002).
Approximately 82 percent subscribe to a multichannel service such as cable or satellite.
See J.D. Power and Associates, J.D. Power and Associates Reports: Satellite TV Grows in
Consumer Popularity, Cable Service Sees Slight Decline.  <http://www.jdpa.com/
studies_jdpower/pressrelease.asp?StudyID=654> (Sept. 5, 2002).
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Although the distinction between providers and end users is an
important one for economic and policy analysis, it is a distinction
often overlooked. Indeed, the Supreme Court has gotten it wrong. In
Reno v. ACLU,251 the Court invalidated the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 as infringing on Internet users’ free speech rights. It
distinguished the broadcast industry, where speech restrictions had
been upheld partly on a theory of spectrum scarcity. “[U]nlike the
conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized regulation of
the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a
‘scarce’ expressive commodity . . . as many as 40 million people use
the Internet today.”252 This statement253 mixes apples and oranges.
Spectrum scarcity in broadcast refers to the limited number of
providers that can operate simultaneously, not the number of persons
who can receive transmissions. Comparing broadcast providers with
Internet end users misses the scarcity point entirely.254 It also confuses
private and public goods.255
As suppliers of a good or service, broadcasters are analogous to
registrants and information providers. The former consume spectrum,
while the latter consume domain names, and IP addresses.256 In the
case of spectrum, economic scarcity results from engineering
decisions and regulatory policy. In the case of domain names, scarcity
results from precisely the same factors plus the networking effects
251. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
252. Id. at 870.
253. Because this statement does not provide an essential supporting reason for the
holding in Reno, it is obiter dictum.
254. The Court might have compared use of the spectrum by broadcast providers with
use of the DNS by Internet providers.  Had it said the former was scarce because of the
limited number of simultaneous broadcasts feasible on allocated spectrum, but the latter
was not due to the greater number of unique domain names available, we would
nonetheless take issue with the Court’s conclusion.  But at least it would have been
speaking of comparable commodities.  Instead, the Court compared broadcast providers
with Internet end users.  The former consume scarce resources; the latter do not.
255. There is a way in which consumption of information content on the Internet is
rivalrous.  Internet users consume bandwidth.  Although there is enormous capacity, it is
not unlimited.  Hence congestion occurs.  In most instances, internet usage is not metered,
leading to the potential of misallocation and waste.  Thomas Hazlett gives this gross
example: “the brain surgeon cannot read the life-or-death CT-scan because the Internet
backbone is clogged with junk e-mail.”  Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the
Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald
Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 335,
491 (2001).  Issues concerning bandwidth allocation and quality of service are simply
outside the scope of our inquiry in this Article.
256.  For an excellent background discussion of IP Address allocation, see John C.
Klensin, A Policy Look at IPv6: A Tutorial Paper <http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-t/com2/
infodocs/015.html> (accessed Dec. 12, 2003).
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that create a natural monopoly in a single authoritative root.257 In the
case of IP addresses, scarcity is dictated by the communications
protocol, TCP/IP, which limits the number of possible IP addresses.
In none of these cases is scarcity the inevitable result of physical
limitations.258
Whether spectrum scarcity is a bane or benefit, some mechanism
must be devised for allocating access. As it turns out, this has been
the most complex and contentious element of telecommunications
policy for nearly a century. At the international level, frequency use
has required treaties because radio signals do not respect national
borders. At the domestic level, allocation policies have involved each
of the three branches of the federal government. And within the
economy of telecommunications, scarcity has played an important
role in innovation, investment decisions, and prosperity. Indeed, rapid
flux in bandwidth capacity (a corollary of spectrum scarcity) has both
created and broken industries.
Our concern here, however, is how the FCC has managed
spectrum scarcity. The history of spectrum management, as well as
current licensing policies, can be instructive to the analogous
managerial role of ICANN when it comes to gTLD policies. We will
return to this after a brief discussion of another telecommunications
industry – telephony.
2. Wireline Telephony
As with broadcast use of the spectrum, whether the telephone
system comprises a private or a public good depends on whose use
and what aspect is being analyzed. In this section we conclude, as we
did above for broadcast rights, that telephone number assignments
are private goods. At one level, this is easy to see. Consumption of
telephone numbers is rivalrous; if consumer A has a particular
number, it cannot also be assigned to consumer B. Consumers are
also excluded from telephone services or the network entirely, unless
they pay for required goods and services. However, there are
differences between the spectrum and modern telephone networks
that require further analysis before we conclude that both provide
points of comparison for the domain name system.
The physical infrastructure that comprises the Public Switched
257. See supra pt. II(C) (Networking Effects and the Root Service Monopoly).
258. A similar comparison can be made of listeners/viewers and Internet users.  From
the perspective of each, the telecommunication service is a public good.  Consumption is
non rivalrous and non excludable, at least without using some technological filter.
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Telephone Network (PSTN), and forms the backbone of wireline
telephone services, differs from the radio spectrum (the backbone for
radio transmissions) in at least two relevant respects. First, even with
limited technology, there need be no interference from simultaneous
wireline uses. An unlimited amount of wire can be laid and an
unlimited number of conversations can occur. The commercial history
of the telephone industry shows that whenever new demand arose,
telephone companies simply laid more cable.259 Still, wireline is scarce
in the economic sense. Expansion of the wireline infrastructure
consumes physical resources (such as copper and silicon) and requires
human labor. Thus, wireline (the medium for old-fashioned telephone
communication) is scarce in a different sense than spectrum (the
medium for broadcast communication), but they are both scarce.
Second, the PSTN is entirely privately owned. Whereas the radio
spectrum was early conceived as “public property,” thereby imposing
public trust obligations on its users, telephone lines are created and
maintained by private for-profit entities.260 Telephone companies
(“telcos”) do provide an economic benefit to the public because of
the social and economic intercourse that depends on them. In this
sense, telcos are “public utilities” similar to energy and transportation
companies, and they are commonly regulated for the same ends (and
often by the same agencies – state public utilities commissions).261 The
common goals are fair, non-discriminatory and universal service to all
who seek access.262
In this sense, the Internet more closely resembles the telephone
system than broadcast because the most basic communications layer
is privately owned. Indeed, there is substantial overlap since the
259. See ITSMA, e-services: delivering the promise of e-business
<http://www.itsma.com/News/itsmainthenews/1218SER_ITS.pdf> (accessed Oct. 2003).
260. This wasn’t always the case.  The Electric Telegraph to the Pacific Act (1860)
authorized a contract to construct a government telegraph system to “be open to the use
of all citizens of the United States during the term of the said contract, on payment of the
regular charges for transmission of dispatches.” Pub. L. No. 137-138 § 1, 12 Stat. 41, 42
(1860).  Nor was private ownership common among countries establishing national
telephone networks during the first half of the 20th Century.  State-owned post, telephone
and telecommunication organizations were the rule.  See Francis Fukuyama & Caroline S.
Wagner, Information and Biological Revolutions: Global Governance Challenges—
Summary of a Study Group  <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1139/MR1139.
chap3.pdf.> (2000).
261. Samuel Morse may have first suggested that telegraph systems be considered
“public utilities.” See Regulation and Deregulation of Telecommunications <http://media.
colorado.edu/telecom/paper.htm> (accessed Feb. 25, 2003).
262. Similarly, to the extent telcos are monopolies, they are price regulated as are
other public utility monopolies such as natural gas.
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Internet backbone is mostly owned by the large telcos.263 However,
for the purpose of evaluating domain name policies, the relevant
analogy is not to the physical transmission layer of the telephone
system; instead, we focus on the analogy between IP addresses and
domain names on one hand and the telephone numbering system on
the other hand.
In contrast to the privately owned wireline backbone, the
telephone numbering system is often said to be a “public resource.”
As with the spectrum, the telephone number system is, in a sense, a
mathematical construct.264 Because it might seem that no one can
“own” a number or a wavelength, they are perceived as “belonging”
to the public at large.265 However, even if this view is valid in the
abstract, it does not mean that telephone numbers are public goods.
The public resource that is the telephone numbering system is, in
economic terms, a private good when it comes to telephone number
services: i.e., assigning individual numbers. Because these points are
important when comparing them to the domain name system and
263. See Nancy Weil, Who Owns the Internet  <http:www.e-gateway.net/infoarea/
news/news.cfm?nid=407> (Mar. 3, 2000)  (discussing ownership by ATT, GTE, Global
Crossing, Qwest, and PSINet).
264. There is, however, a difference.  Whereas electromagnetic frequencies are not
artificial in the sense that the broadcast spectrum involves natural properties of
electromagnetic radiation, the telephone numbering system is artificial, in the sense that it
was created by the design of the wireline infrastructure.  Scientists could measure signals
at various frequencies, even if Marconi had never invented radio broadcasting, but there
would be no equivalent phenomenon (no natural telephone numbers) to investigate if Bell
had not invented the telephone.
Moreover, the way in which the spectrum is used for communication is a function of
the devices that utilize the natural properties of electromagnetic radiation to communicate
information over a distance.  Thus, broadcasts can use either amplitude modulation (AM)
or frequency modulation (FM).  More recently, devices that utilize tiny slides of a wide
band of the spectrum (spread spectrum) have become familiar to consumers in the form of
cordless phones that use gigahertz frequencies.  Even more advanced devices can
opportunistically hop between various frequencies to utilize less noisy portions of the
spectrum to communicate a signal.  Because the way the spectrum is used to communicate
is entirely a product of the technology of communication devices, the particular form in
which the spectrum is allocated is a product of engineering—just as the telephone
numbering system is the product of engineering.
265. It would have been possible for broadcast spectrum to have been allocated on the
basis of a rule of first occupation.  It might have been possible for the broadcast
communication to have developed based solely on technological solutions to the problem
of signal interference.  Or it is possible that without regulation, a private regime of
cooperation would have emerged.  These possibilities never materialized.  Instead, it was
assumed that the broadcast spectrum belongs to the public at large—as a public resource.
A similar assumption has been made with respect to the telephone numbering system,
which is treated by FCC regulation as a public resource.  See In the Matter of
Administration of the North American Numbering Plan, 11 FCC Rcd 2588, 2591 (F.C.C.
1995) (neither carriers nor subscribers “own” their telephone numbers).
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domain names, let us explore them further.
As with the domain name system and the broadcast spectrum,
the telephone numbering system looks like a public good from the
point of view of the end user making a phone call. Although multiple
users may not be able to simultaneously connect to the same phone
number without receiving a busy signal, Ben’s use of a particular
string of numbers to reach Alice’s phone does not preclude Cathy
from using the same string for the same purpose. Consumption of the
numbering system by end users is nonrivalrous. Although one might
attempt to charge a separate fee for use of phone numbers, there
would be no economic point in doing so. Indeed, the whole point of
having a phone number is that everyone with access to the system can
reach your phone if you pay the listing fee. The numbering system
could be viewed as nonexcludable.266 Moreover, once Ben has a phone
number, he can give the number away and (like other information) it
can be copied or distributed. When we dial a phone number, the
numbering system might appear to be a public good.
From the point of view of subscribers, however, telephone
numbers are private goods. If Ben’s telephone number is
1.800.555.1212, then that cannot also be Alice’s number. Ben’s
consumption of the number precludes Alice’s use. Therefore,
telephone numbering service is rivalrous. Numbering service is also
excludable. If Ben doesn’t pay his telephone bill, then his telco can
suspend his number and exclude him from the system. Because
telephone numbering service meets the economic criteria of rival
consumption and excludability, numbering service is a private good.
Given an interconnected wireline network, there can only be one
numbering system for that network. Like IP Address numbers,
telephone numbers perform a routing function.267 There must be a
unique number for each phone on the system for routing to take
place. There could, of course, be multiple wireline networks, but if
those networks are to interconnect, then each phone on the
interconnected network must have a unique identifier. Somehow,
266. Because of the nature of the telephone system, even persons making a call can be
excluded from the numbering system if they refuse to pay a fee.  Because, however, there
is no reason to separate out the fee for use of the wire from the fee for use of the
numbering system, users may not perceive that they in fact are charged for both.  The
routing functions, however, do not operate in a similar fashion.  See International
Telecommunications Union, A policy look at IPv6: Tutorial Paper <http://www.itu.int/
itudoc/itu-t/com2/infodocs/015.html> (Apr. 18, 2002).
267. See generally United States Department of Transportation, Call Routing and Its
Implications for 511 <http://www.its.dot.gov/511/PDF/Call_Routing.pdf> (accessed Feb. 7,
2004) (describing the routing of telephone calls on PSTN and wireless networks).
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there must be a system for allocating unique identifying numbers to
each phone on the network. Given the way telephony works, there
simply cannot be competing numbering services.268 Accordingly, there
must be a single authority that creates the equivalent of numbering
domains and authorities within each domain that allocate numbers to
firms operating within the domain. The authority must then allocate
telephone numbers; the allocation method could be first occupation,
geographic classification, a lottery, an auction, or some other method.
Like the Internet, the telephone numbering system is
international. At the top level of the system are the country codes
(analogous to the ccTLDs). These are assigned by the International
Direct Distance Dialing (IDDD) system. The United States, Canada
and some Caribbean nations are part of the North American
Numbering Plan (NANP). The IDDD code for NANP countries is 1.
Within the NANP, telephone numbers consist of a region or access
code (3-digit area code), a central office or exchange prefix (3 digits),
followed by a 4-digit station number.269 Thus, a unique 11-digit string
is assigned to each end-user device on the PSTN.270
Since the country code “1” is the same for all telephones within
the NANP, the addition of this digit does not increase the supply of
available unique numbers within the domain. The number of
available numbers within the NANP is 1010, or 10 billion, assuming
each digit 0-9 is usable at each location on the 10-digit string. The
assumption is false - for instance there are no area codes or exchange
268. Of course, it might be technologically possible to create competing systems that
translate numbers entered by consumers into different routing numbers actually used by
the system.  Such a system would be analogous to the role the DNS plays with respect to
IP Addresses.  Individual consumers could then purchase numbers from firms that
provided these second-order numbers.  But for reasons we have already explored with
respect to the DNS, we would expect that users would converge on a single second-order
numbering system.  See supra pt. II(C) (Networking Effects and the Root Service
Monopoly).
269. The numbers take the form NXX-NXX-XXXX, where N is any digit 2-9 and X is
any digit 0-9.  The first string constitutes the Numbering Plan Area (NPA), and the 3 digits
representing those areas are referred to either as Numbering Plan Area codes or area
codes.  The second string is the Central Switching Office Designation.  The last string is
the Subscriber Line Identifier. See LincMad, Future Expansion of the NANP
<http://www.lincmad.com/future.html> (July 9, 2001).
270. Most U.S. telephone numbers from the 1920s through the mid1950s contained
between two and five digits, the first two of which often corresponded to place names (as
in the 1960 movie classic “Butterfield 8”). See <http://movies.yahoo.com/shop?d=hv&id=
1800042806&cf=info&intl=us> (accessed Feb. 7, 2004).  These gave way by 1980 to a
seven-digit “all number calling” (ANC) system.  See Ted Byfield, DNS: A Short History
and a Short Future <http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_3/byfield> (accessed Feb. 25,
2003).  The ten-digit scheme was adopted by AT&T in 1947.  Now, telephone numbers
convey both network routing and billing information.
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prefixes beginning with 0 or 1271 - but there are still several billion
possible telephone numbers.272 Approximately 500 million numbers
are currently in use in the United States so there should be ample
supply,273 but there isn’t.
Instead, scarcity in telephone numbers is a perennial problem.
This is most apparent within individual area codes, where the
arithmetic supply of phone numbers is 107, or 10 million, per area.
The actual supply is less, both because some numbers are reserved274
and because telcos acquire numbers in large blocks which limits their
availability to customers.275 Even a full ten million numbers are
inadequate in major metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles and New
York, especially given the explosion of multiple lines for fax
machines, modems, pagers and cellular telephones.276 Given that
reality, the division and proliferation of area codes is now a common
271. However, the FCC is considering whether to allow this.  See Second Report And
Order, In the Matter of Number Resource Optimization, FCC 00-429, (Dec. 7, 2000), ¶¶
100-106; 14 F.C.C. Rec. 10322, 10376, ¶ 123.  There are other exclusions such as Easily
Recognizable Codes (ERC) – an area code or exchange where the last two digits are the
same, e.g. 411.  See  NANPA, NPA Information: Area Codes,  <http://www.nanpa.com/
area_codes/index.html> (accessed Apr. 2, 2003).
272. See Industry Numbering Committee (INC), North American Numbering Plan
(NANP) Expansion Reference Document, <http://www.atis.org/pub/clc/inc/nanpe/
02072930.doc> (accessed Aug. 16, 2002).  Approximately 600 area codes are available with
slightly less than 8 million numbers per area.
273. See FCC, Number Resource Utilization in the United States as of December 31,
2001, Aug. 2002 <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/
IAD/utilizationdec2001.pdf> (Aug. 2002).  A total of 1.2 billion numbers are in use,
reserved, or available.  Id. at 13.
274. The numbers 5, 7 and 9 are also often reserved for special use because they have
no vowels associated with them on the keypad.  See Byfield, supra n. 270.
275. See  H.R. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Area Code Exhaustion: What are the
Solutions?, Before the Subcomm. On Telecomm. and the Internet,  107th Cong. (Test. of
Loretta Lynch, President, California Pub. Util. Commn)  <http://energycommerce.house.
gov/107/hearings/06262002Hearing606/Lynch1023.htm> (June 26, 2002) (Telephone
companies receive numbers in blocks of 10,000, even when they have only 500 customers).
276. A typical telephone “power user” might have 5 unique numbers, or more,
corresponding to a primary home line for voice calls, a secondary home line for fax and
modem, a dedicated business line, a paging number, and a number for her cell phone.
Unified messaging services such as voice mail and electronic fax, as well as intelligent
transportation systems (e.g. “OnStar”), ATM and credit card machines, also use telephone
numbers.  Mobile telephones are probably the greatest single cause of growing number
scarcity.  The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) estimates that sometime in
2001 the worldwide subscription base for mobile numbers exceeded that for wireline
numbers.  Each class has over 1 billion users, with mobile telephony growing by roughly
200 million per year.  See Jino Kim, Scare Resources: Spectrum Management & Numbering
Issues,  ITU Regional Regulatory Seminar <http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Events/
Seminars/2002/china/pdf/39-doc9-1-jinokim.pdf.> (Aug. 2002).
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phenomenon.277 The number of area codes nationwide doubled
between 1991 and 1999.278 It took only two years, however, for the
number of area codes to double in California, from 13 in 1997 to 25 in
1999. Indeed, when Los Angeles’ 213 area code was split to form the
323 area code, the latter was immediately found in “jeopardy” of
exhausting its supply of numbers.279 An “exhaust study” by the North
American Numbering Plan Administrator (NANPA) in 1999
estimated that the supply of available telephone numbers will be
exhausted as early as 2006 and no later than 2012.280
The FCC has responded to these projections.281 In 1999 it issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to address the Matter of
Number Resource Optimization.282 Among the proposed solutions for
277. The same has occurred for non-geographically based (“standard industrial
classification” or SIC) access codes.  Toll free “800” numbers were exhausted several years
ago and new access codes were then authorized by the 800 Number Administration
Committee, an industry consortium: 866, 877, and 888.  Future additions will likely include
855, 844, 833, and 822.  The FCC has grappled with the problem of duplicating “vanity”
numbers; e.g., would the owner of 1-800-FLOWERS have the right to new SIC numbers in
the form of 1-8xx-FLOWERS?  See In the Matter of Toll Free Service Access Codes, 13
F.C.C. Rec 9058 (Mar. 31, 1998) (hereinafter Toll Free Service Access Codes).
278. There are 310 geographic area codes currently in use in the United States, 13 non-
geographic codes, and 12 geographic codes are pending.  See NPA, NPA Information:
Area Codes, <http://www.nanpa.com/area_codes> (accessed Mar. 18, 2003).
279. “An area code jeopardy situation exists when the forecasted demand for
numbering resources exceeds the known supply during the planning and implementation
interval for relief in the form of the introduction of a new area code.”  In the Matter of
Numbering Resource Optimization, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket 99-200,
14 F.C.C.R. 10322, 10325 n.5 (F.C.C. May 27, 1999) [hereinafter Numbering Resource
Optimization] (quoting Central Office Code (NXX) Assignment Guidelines) INC 95-
0407-008 (rev. Apr. 26, 1999) at § 13.0 (CO Code Guidelines) <https://www.atis.org
/atis/docstore/doc_display.asp?ID=1245> (accessed Nov. 16, 2003)) <http://hraunfoss.
fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-99-122A1.pdf> (accessed Nov. 16, 2003).
280. See North American Numbering Plan Exhaust Study, Lockheed Martin CIS, at 2-
1  <http://www.nanpa.com/pdf/NANP_Exhaust_Study.pdf> (Apr. 20, 1999).
281. The FCC maintains a web site on “Numbering Resources.”  See Federal
Communications Commission, Numbering Resources <http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/
tapd/numbering/> (Feb. 26, 2003).
282. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra n. 279.  The FCC has issued several
“Reports And Orders,” as well as “Further Notices Of Proposed Rule Making.”  The most
recent (“Third Order on Reconsideration”) was issued on March 13, 2002.  See FCC 02-73.
Another solution the FCC could pursue is full implementation of Recommendation E.164,
“The International Public Telecommunication Numbering Plan,” developed by the ITU
Standardization Sector (ITU-T) in 1997.  See International Telecommunications Union,
List of ITU-L Recommendation E.164 Assigned Country Codes <http://www.itu.int/
itudoc/itu-t/ob-lists/icc/e164_717.html> (Jun. 23, 2003).  The FCC requires its NANP
Administrator to be conversant with E.164 (see 47 CFR 52.113), but apparently does not
require its implementation.  The ITU proposal not only vastly increases the number of
telephone numbers, by using a 15-digit string (compared to 11 for the NANP), it structures
the telecommunications system into international networks and global and national
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which it sought comments were: expansion of the number supply (by
increasing the number of digits), more efficient allocation of the
existing supply (such as number pooling and portability), and
implementing a pricing mechanism for number allocation and use.
Although the FCC has yet to adopt a market-based allocation system,
it appears it will do so shortly and has sought additional comments on
implementation.283 “The impetus for establishing a market-based
numbering resource allocation system was our belief that the lack of
efficiency in carrier utilization of numbers may be in part due to the
failure of existing allocation rules to recognize the economic value of
numbers.”284
What is the “economic value of [telephone] numbers” and why is
that relevant to domain name policy? At first blush, the analogy
should be between NANP numbers and IP numbers, not between
telephone numbers and domain names. We agree that exhaustion of
the NANP number space, and FCC responses, are highly relevant to
IP number policies (an issue beyond the scope of this paper). But
telephone numbering policy, especially the “economic value of
numbers,” also provides a relevant point of comparison for evaluating
ICANN’s domain name regime.
The economic value of telephone numbers has three dimensions.
The first is in having a number at all. The economic and social value
of being connected to the PSTN is so well recognized that an
elaborate subsidy scheme (“Universal Service”) has been created to
make telephone service affordable to all Americans.285 The parallel
services.  Some telcos have already begun replacing switches in anticipation of E.164
implementation.  See International Numbering Plans, Homepage <http://www.
numberingplans.com> (accessed Dec. 17, 2003) (describing telephone numbering plans
worldwide)
283. See Second Report And Order, supra n. 271, at 407 (“we seek comment on
whether and how a market-based number allocation system should be implemented.
Proper implementation of this system should encourage the efficient use of numbering
resources by carriers as well as be competitively neutral, especially towards small
businesses.  The system’s benefits (i.e., more efficient use of numbers) should outweigh
carriers’ concerns over costs. We believe that alternatives to this system (i.e., allocating
numbers for free) would not promote the efficient use of numbers as effectively.
Commenters are encouraged to propose ways to implement such a system so as to
minimize any unfavorable impact on small entities”).
284. Id. at 372.
285. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 254 (Universal Service); id. § 254(b)(3) (“[c]onsumers in
all regions of the Nation, including low-income consumers and those in rural, insular and
high cost areas, should have access to telecommunications and information services,
including interexchange services and advanced telecommunications and information
services that are reasonably comparable to the services provided in urban areas at rates
that are reasonably comparable to rates charged for similar services in urban areas”).
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here is in having an IP address.
The second dimension of value in telephone numbers is in
preferred area codes and prefixes. In many communities with split or
overlay area codes, certain codes are more desired than others (e.g.,
212 in New York, 310 on Los Angeles’ Westside). The same is true of
some SIC codes, such as 800 (compared to 866 or 877). Thus, long
before the NANPA runs out of 10-digit numbers, it will run out of
preferred ones.
But the greatest value in telephone numbers is found in their
linguistic association. In this respect, the telephone number space is
also its name space. At one level, the telephone name space
comprises the various telephone directories and databases in use by
local telcos around the globe.286 There are surely economic values in
that space, as companies vie for descriptive listings or early placement
(e.g., “Saab Independent Repair,” “AAA Pest Control”). But with
telephone addressing, there is a ready translation between certain
names and numbers – so-called “vanity” numbers.287 Thus, 1-800-356-
9377 resolves into 1-800-FLOWERS” and 1-800-937-8529 resolves
into 1-800-WESTLAW. Both have considerable value288 (and the
latter is trademarked). In the telephone system, resolution of
numbers occurs in two places: in directories and on the telephone
keypad. Because of their mnemonic association, telephone numbers
have been commoditized and trade on a secondary market.289 Some
exploit that market to extort value from trademark holders and
others. The practice of “number brokering” bears striking similarity
286. “A name space is any bounded area in which a given name can be resolved. Name
resolution is the process of translating a name into some object or information that the
name represents. A telephone book forms a name space in which the names of telephone
subscribers can be resolved to telephone numbers.”  MSDN, Active Directory Core
Concepts: Namespace <http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/
netdir/ad/namespace.asp> (accessed Mar. 4, 2003).
287. “[A] vanity number is a telephone number for which the letters associated with
the number’s digits on a telephone handset spell a name or word of value to the number
holder. . .[including] any numbers in which the holders have a particular interest, be it
economic, commercial, or otherwise.”  In the Matter of Toll Free Service Access Codes,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket 95-155, 10 F.C.C. Rec. 13692, 13701-02
(F.C.C. Oct. 5, 1995).
288. See generally Diana Lock, Toll-Free Vanity Telephone Numbers: Structuring a
Trademark Registration and Dispute Settlement Regime, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 371, 373-75 (1999)
(stating that “vanity numbers often represent good will investments” and make it easy for
customers to contact a company).
289. See id. at 375.  Domain names have similarly been described as “a mnemonic
locator for a numerical address.”  Interview with David Post, PuntoNet  <http://
puntonet.netfirms.com/it/enin2511gallegospeterspost.htm> (accessed Feb. 22, 2003).
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to cybersquatting.290
Market allocation of telephone numbers, as a policy shift at the
FCC, is obviously relevant to Internet name space policies.291 Earlier
we concluded that frequency allocation policies in the broadcast
industry also provided a point of comparison. In the next section we
take a closer look at the FCC’s newly constructed market approaches
to frequency, number and name space allocation in broadcast and
telephony. These are not ad hoc decisions; rather they are the
culmination of decades of experience, litigation, and scholarly study.
ICANN would be well advised to undertake a serious review of FCC
experience with spectrum allocation and telephone numbering policy
as ICANN moves forward to develop in its effort to formulate policy
for the DNS.
C. Allocation and Regulation of Name and Number Spaces by the
FCC
The broadcast and telephone industries are heavily regulated by
the FCC; the former through licensing, the latter through public
utility-type regulation.292 In each instance, the commodities under
regulation (frequencies and telephone numbers) are scarce. The
FCC’s various approaches, historically and currently, to allocating
these goods is highly instructive for managing other scarce
telecommunications goods such as TLDs and IP addresses.293 It seems
290. See Lock, supra n. 288, at 375.
291. There have also been proposals to map telephone numbers to URLs.  The
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has developed a protocol (E.164 Number
Mapping, or “ENUM”) that uses DNS-based architecture for telephone number URLs.
ENUM is designed to promote convergence between traditional telephone networks and
IP networks. Three new gTLDs are proposed for .tel, .fax, and .modem.  See IETF,
Network Working Group, Request for Comments 2806: URLs for Telephone Calls
<http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2806.txt> (April 2000).  ICANN has been following the issue.
See ICANN, ICANN Meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil <http://www.icann.org/
riodejaneiro> (accessed Dec. 17, 2003) (links to various presentations and tutorials on
ENUM given at the Spring 2003 ICANN Meeting, Mar. 25, 2003).  So too has the ITU.
See International Telecommunication Union, ENUM <http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/enum>
(Feb. 25, 2003).
292. That portion of the telephone industry that is intrastate is also regulated by state
public utility commissions.  There is substantial overlap with federal regulation.  This
requires both cooperation (e.g. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 47 U.S.C.
§ 410; 47 C.F.R. 0.91) and jurisdictional “separation” (e.g. allocation of intra- and
interstate costs, 47 U.S.C. § 225; 47 C.F.R. 36.1).  For clarity, this section will focus only on
the FCC.
293. See Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN, Internet Stability, and New Top Level Domains,
in Communications Policy and Information Technology: Promises, Problems, Prospects
(Lorrie Cranor & Shane Greenstein eds., MIT Press 2002) (“And as with the FCC,
ICANN’s regulatory imperative has flowed largely from scarcity – in this case, the scarcity
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the FCC has tried, at one time or another, every conceivable
allocation method. If some of those allocation methods turned out to
be inefficient or inequitable, ICANN should be very cautious about
employing the same methods for the DNS. In other words, ICANN
ought not to “recapitulate the FCC.”294
In this section we briefly trace the history of licensing and
telephone number regulation, exploring along the way the
assumptions and policy choices made by regulators. We will then
discuss why “quasi-deregulation” has been adopted by the agency and
what form it takes. As it turns out, market economics and other social
welfare theories have played an important role in the development of
FCC allocation policies. They should be examined in formulating
gTLD allocation policies as well.
1. The Road to Market Allocation of Spectrum
The Radio Act of 1912295 was our nation’s first effort at spectrum
management,296 declaring it illegal to “use or operate any apparatus
for radio communication as a means of commercial intercourse
among the several States . . . except under and in accordance with a
license, revocable for cause, in that behalf granted by the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor.” The Act did not specify criteria for licensing
nor, apparently, did it authorize the Secretary to promulgate his
own.297 In an early case, the Court of Appeals ruled that Secretary
Hoover had no power to deny licenses, but only empowered to assign
frequencies.298 This was followed by a district court decision that a
station’s use of a frequency not assigned to it was not a violation of
of generic top level domains in the ICANN root. The scarcity of top level domains is not a
technological artifact, though, as with broadcast licensing; rather, ICANN is maintaining it
as a policy matter”).
294. See id. (quoting e-mail message from Harold Feld, Associate Director, Media
Access Project, “ICANN recapitulates the FCC, and does it badly” (Feb. 21, 2001).
Michael Froomkin has similarly stated, “Instead of engaging in standards work, ICANN is
engaged in recapitulating the early procedural errors of federal administrative agencies
such as the Federal Communications Commission.”  A. Michael Froomkin, Form And
Substance In Cyberspace, 6 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 93, 120 (2002).
295. Pub. L. No. 62-264, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302.
296. Earlier laws were in the nature of technology forcing. See e.g. The Ship Act of
1910, Pub. L. No. 61-262, ch. 379, 36 Stat. 629.
297. License applications consisted of a postcard request.  See Mark Goodman, The
Radio Act of 1927 as a Product of Progressivism, Media Hist. Monographs, 1998-1999
<http://www.scripps.ohiou.edu/mediahistory/mhmjour2-2.htm> (accessed Dec. 17, 2003).
298. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“The only
discretionary act is in selecting a wave length, within the limitations prescribed in the
statute, which, in his judgment, will result in the least possible interference.”).
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the Radio Act.299 This was reiterated by a 1926 Attorney General
opinion.300 In response, Secretary Hoover abandoned all effort to
regulate the spectrum, instead urging that stations “regulate
themselves.”301 A “tower of Babel” ensued.302
In the void created by federal incompetence, both the market
and the courts responded to restore some semblance of order on the
airwaves. Stations did agree amongst themselves on transmission
times and frequencies and a healthy market developed in broadcast
rights.303 More importantly, perhaps, a state court decision in 1926
upheld a tort claim by Chicago station WGN against a “wave jumper”
that was broadcasting so close to WGN’s frequency as to cause
interference. The decision was the first to recognize “a particular
right or easement in and to the use of [a] wave length.”304
Just as a common law of broadcast property rights (based on first
occupation) began to develop, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927
and created the Federal Radio Commission (FRC).305 Salient
provisions of the Act confirmed public ownership of the airwaves and
specified merit-based free licenses, in exchange for which
broadcasters would provide public service. Congress rejected
alternative allocation schemes such as first occupation, lottery and
auction. Rather, applicants would be evaluated on the basis of “public
interest, convenience and necessity.”306 In cases of competing
applications, administrators would hold comparative hearings. The
notion of government control through licensing flowed from the
antecedent principle of public ownership of the spectrum, “an idée
fixe in the debates of Congress.”307
One of the FRC’s first decisions was to keep the broadcast band
at its current size rather than to expand it to accommodate all existing
broadcasters. Scarcity was codified. Licensing criteria and
broadcasting standards quickly followed. The former favored wealthy
299. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (E.D. Ill. 1926).
300. See 35 Ops. Atty. Gen. 126 (1926).
301. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
302. See Goodman, supra n. 297 (citing N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1926, at sec. xx, 18:1—”the
radio signal almost anywhere on the dial sounded like ‘the whistle of the peanut stand’”).
303. Hazlett, supra n. 225, at 143-47.
304. Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station, Circuit Court, Cook County, Ill (1926)
(unpublished, reprinted in part in Hazlett, supra n. 225, at 149-51).
305. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
306. This was the standard then in use for other public utilities.  See Stuart M.
Benjamin et al., Telecommunications Law and Policy 17 (Carolina Ac. Press, 2001).
307. Id. (quoting Note, Federal Control of Radio Broadcasting, 39 Yale L.J. 244, 250
(1929)).
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applicants with superior technical capability and broadcast
experience. The latter favored middle-of-the road programming.
Broadcasts by socialist stations,308 unconventional columnists,309 social
critics,310 evolutionists,311 and fringe candidates312 were forced off the
air. As the Commission stated, there was “not room in the broadcast
band for every school of thought, religious, political, social and
economic, each to have its separate . . . mouth piece in the ether.”313
Despite the prohibition of censorship in the 1927 Act,314 both the FRC
and the Court of Appeals effectively adopted policies and
interpretations of the statute that had the effect of nullifying this
prohibition. This regime was the product of a statutory mandate to
promote “the public interest.”315 The underlying justification for the
rationing of licenses was spectrum scarcity, but spectrum-scarcity was
itself the product of the regulatory regime. Just as the advent of the
printing press a half-millennium before prompted the Licensing
Act,316 discovery of radio waves as a means of communication lead to
licensing of spectrum use. In both cases, what was really being
licensed was the right to speak.317
308. See FRC, Second Annual Report 156 (1928) (decision of Aug. 22, 1928 involving
radio station WEVD).
309. See Benjamin et al., supra n. 306, at 22 (citing KFKB Broad. v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670
(D.C. Cir. 1931)).
310. See id. at 21 (citing Trinity Methodist Church v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.
1932)).
311. See Goodman, supra n. 297.
312. See id.
313. Benjamin et al., supra n. 306, at 20 (citing FRC, Third Annual Report at 32).  As
The Literary Digest recommended, licenses should be issued only to “high types”
providing “well-rounded” programming.  See Goodman, supra n. 297 (citing “To Kill Off
Broadcasting ‘Pirates,’”  The Literary Digest, 13-14 (May 7, 1927)).
314. “Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the licensing
authority the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by
any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
licensing authority which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communications. No person within the jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communications.”  Radio Act of
1927, Section 29.  See also id., Section 18 (no censorship of candidate broadcasts).
315. For a thorough discussion of forces influencing the 1927 Act, see Goodman, supra
n. 297.
316. 14 Car. 2, ch. 33,  § 5, reprinted in 5 Statutes Of The Realm 428, 430 (1814).  The
Licensing Act was preceded by several other censorship laws, such as the Star Chamber
Decree of 1586.  See L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce, Monopolizing The Law: The Scope
Of Copyright Protection For Law Reports And Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. Rev.
719, 785 (1989).
317. See generally Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (reprint ed. 1984);
Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment
Violation, 52 Duke L.J. 1, 38-41 (2002).
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In 1934, the Radio Act was supplanted by the Communications
Act318 and the FRC was replaced by the FCC. This transition was
accompanied by minimal changes in broadcast licensing policies and
standards. In fact, the ownership and licensing precepts established in
1927 remained mostly intact for seventy years. Those precepts were:
a) public ownership of the airwaves, b) short term licensing, c) free
rent to broadcasters, and d) monopoly rents by broadcasters. In other
words, a select few—the entrenched stakeholders—were given rights
worth billions of dollars.319 The value of broadcast licenses typically
derived from two sources: advertising revenue (income) and sale of
licenses (the capitalized value of the expected future income
stream).320 Prior to the grandfathering of digital licenses to television
broadcasters in 1996, the estimated opportunity cost to taxpayers of
free licensing was as high as $100 billion or more.321 The granting of
free digital licenses to existing television broadcast license holders has
resulted in an additional wealth transfer to entrenched stake holders
of $70 billion or more.322
In addition, the broadcast licensing regime imposes direct costs
on government. The FCC’s budget is approximately one-quarter-
billion dollars annually.323 This cost is high because ad-hoc license
evaluation and even systematic spectrum decision making both
require substantial expertise and staff resources. Moreover, given the
economic rents that can be realized by those who are awarded
licenses, it is not surprising that there is substantial competition. In
the case of broadcast licenses, that means holding expensive
318. Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.
319. “The great irony in Congress’s declaration that the electromagnetic spectrum is
the possession of the people is that access to the spectrum is almost completely closed to
the public. The spectrum is locked away in blocks of bandwidth licensed to a privileged
few through methods that are too complex and expensive for all but major corporations or
the politically connected to bear (an extraordinary number of broadcast licenses are held
by former members of Congress).”  Arthur De Vany, Implementing a Market-Based
Spectrum Policy, 41 J.L. & ECON. 627, 641 (1998).
320. Technically, licenses cannot be sold; instead they are “transferred” along with the
sale of broadcast station.  See 47 U.S.C. § 310 (d) (2003).
321. See Letter from Robert M. Pepper, Chief, Office of Plans and Policy (FCC), to
Sen. Lieberman (May 5, 1995) (estimating value of the analog channels to be returned at
the end of the transition to DTV from 20 to 132 billion dollars).  See also Hazlett, supra n.
225, at 136 (estimating value of spectrum licenses at over $1 billion per year).
322. See id. (digital TV spectrum worth between 11 and 70 billion dollars); Editorial,
The Great Digital Giveaway, Multinational Monitor (May 1997).
323. While license applicants and holders pay user fees to the FCC, they do not cover
the agency’s administrative costs.  See Memorandum, Congressional Budget Office, Two
Approaches For Increasing Spectrum Fees <ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/10xx/doc1047/specfees.pdf>
(Nov. 1998).
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“comparative hearings” (dubbed “beauty contests”) and hearings on
“petitions to deny” license renewal.324 It might all be worth it if
licensees were truly fulfilling their public trust responsibilities and
promoting the “public interest, convenience and necessity.” But the
failure of the broadcast industry on this score is so well known that
further argument on this point is unnecessary.
Suffice to say that it was official government policy for most of
the twentieth century to give away public property and convert public
goods into private ones. Early stakeholders were the beneficiaries.
Radio stations sell in the hundred million dollar range,325 and
television stations are priced in the multi-hundred million dollar
range.326 Networks cost more – roughly $20 billion.327 Should not the
federal treasury be getting some of this windfall?
Most economists think so, and have repeatedly told the FCC.
One of the earliest critics of spectrum allocation policy was Ronald
Coase, the noted British economist (later at the University of
Chicago).328 In testimony before the FCC in 1959, Coase argued for a
system of competitive bidding (auctions) for licenses.
[U]se of the pricing mechanisms . . . would avoid the need
for much of the costly and time-consuming procedures
involved in the assignment of frequencies by the
Commission. It would rule out inefficient use of frequencies
by bringing any proposal for the use of such frequencies up
against the test of the market, with its precise monetary
measures of cost and benefit. . . And it would avoid that
324. See 47 U.S.C. § 309.
325. See Inside Radio, News & Analysis <http://media.radcity.net/ZMST/
StalkingtheMostValuableFM.pdf> (accessed Mar. 5, 2003).
326. See J.W. Smith, Economic Democracy: The Political Struggle for the 21st Century
(2nd ed. 2002) (“In major markets, a typical station and license worth $10 million in 1959
was worth $400 to $500 million by 1987.”) (quoting Bernard D. Nossiter, The F.C.C.’s Big
Giveaway Show, The Nation (Oct. 26, 1985).  San Francisco station KRON sold in 1998
for what may be the highest amount ever paid for a TV station—$823 million.  See Jeff
Kearns, The Story At 11, Metro, Silicon Valley’s Weekly Newspaper,
<http://www.metroactive.com/papers/metro/12.06.01/cover/kntv-0149.html> (Dec. 6-12,
2001).
327. In 1995 Walt Disney Co. acquired Capital Cities/ABC for $19 billion, at the time
the second-highest price ever paid for a U.S. company.  See Nick Louth (Reuters), MCI
says it's in talks for merger/British Telecom eyes giant buyout, Houston Chronicle
(Business) 1 (Nov. 2, 1996), available at 1996 WL 11573868 (comparing MCI / BT merger
to the other largest to-date mergers involving U.S. companies); Steve McClellan,
Megamedia's Megadeal, Broadcasting & Cable 14 (Aug. 7, 1995); Jay Sherman, News,
Sports, Entertainment ... and Innovation, Television Week 26 (May 19, 2003).
328. Auctioning had been advocated as early as congressional negotiations on the 1927
Act.  See Hazlett, supra n. 225, at 143-47; id. at 137 (citing Leo Herzel, “Public Interest”
and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 802-16 (1951)).
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arbitrary enrichment of private operators of radio and
television stations which inevitably follows from the present
system. We sometimes hear denunciations of giveaways and
their corrupting influence. You, gentlemen, are
administering what must be one of the biggest giveaways of
all.329
Coase refined his reasoning in his now famous theory (“Coase
theorem”) that, in the absence of transaction costs, efficiency of
resource allocation is independent of how a property right is initially
assigned. As applied to broadcast, it holds that initial license
allocation would have little effect on who gets to use the spectrum.
Licensees and aspirants would “agree themselves around” the FCC’s
initial distribution of rights and effectuate a license transfer whenever
it was to their mutual advantage.330 In most cases, the market would
achieve Coasian optimality by reposing broadcast rights with whoever
was willing to pay most for them.331 For this and other writings on the
institutional structure of the economy Coase won the Nobel Prize in
economics in 1991.332
In short (assuming the constraint of forced scarcity), federal
licensing policy had little influence on the actual use of the airwaves,
only on who received windfalls.333 As Thomas Hazlett describes it,
federal policy went through two epochs corresponding to different
theories of spectrum regulation. These were the “chaos theory” (self-
329. Ronald Coase, Why Not Use the Pricing System in the Broadcast Industry?
Testimony before the FCC, December, 1959 (reprinted in 4 Study of Radio & T.V.
Broadcasting, No. 12782 (1959)); see 3 Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications
Commission, 2 J.L. & Econ. 1, 17-35 (1959).
330. See id.
331. But see Evan Kwerel, Auctioning Spectrum Rights, Paper to the Federal
Communications Commission (Feb. 20, 2001) (secondary market in licenses is “still
inferior to auctions. Sequential, after-market negotiations may not assign licenses to the
parties that value them the most highly, or may take years to do so because of high
transaction costs and strategic bargaining. For example, a license winner may act as a
holdout when another party seeks to acquire the license in the after-market. This ‘holdout
problem’ may be particularly severe when a party is attempting to acquire multiple
licenses held by numerous other entities.”). Evan Kwerel & Walt Strack, Auctioning
Spectrum Rights <http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/papersAndStudies/aucspec.pdf>
(Feb. 20, 2001).
332. See Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges
Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for
1991  <http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1991/press.html> (Oct. 15, 1991).
333. See Pool, supra n. 317, at 139-40 (“Under existing practice the original licensees
make a windfall profit by selling the license to someone else. . . .  If the market . . . had
been pushed one level further back and the government had offered spectrum rights for
lease or sale at a price reflecting market value, any windfall would have gone to the public,
not to politically favored individuals.”).
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regulation by the industry prior to 1927), and the “error theory”
(licensing per “public interest” standard after 1927).334 Neither
produced desirable effects.
A third era in licensing – lottery – began with experimental trials
in the 1980s. After being inundated with thousands of applications for
new cellular and Personal Communications Service (PCS) licenses,
each requiring comparative hearing, the FCC lobbied Congress for
lottery authority. It came in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1981.335 Lotteries were quickly extended to new classes of broadcast
service – Low-Power Television (LPTV) and Low-Power FM radio
(LPFM), in part.336 The hope was that random selection would speed
up licensing and deployment of these new services. That hope faded
quickly.
Although cheaper to administer, lotteries proved to be an
inefficient means of awarding licenses. Lottery applications were easy
to submit. Applicants did not need to provide detailed credentials, as
they would in the case of comparative hearings. Nor would they need
to conduct market studies and ascertain the need or value of service,
as they would if they had to amortize the cost of a license obtained at
market price. So applications came in by the hundreds of thousands.337
Winners would often “flip” or resell their licenses to larger entities at
substantial profit “without ever delivering service to a single
customer.”338 Some licenses won at lottery were resold in short order
for tens of millions of dollars.339 The windfalls continued, as per the
Coase Theorem. But the transaction costs were high, including the
cost of delay in getting licenses to firms that could actually use them.
334. See Hazlett, supra n. 225, at 138-43.
335. Lotteries were authorized by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, 736-37 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (2001)).
336. See In the Matter of Creation of a Low Power Radio Service, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, MM Docket 99-25, ¶ 103 <http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/
Notices/1999/fcc99006.txt> (Feb. 3, 1999).
337. See Peter Cramton, Spectrum Auctions, Handbook of Telecommunications
Economics, 4 (Feb. 2001) (reporting that the FCC received over 400,000 applications for
cellular licenses).
338. Antoinette C. Bush & Marc S. Martin, The FCC’s Minority Ownership Policies
From Broadcasting to PCS, 48 Fed. Comm. L. J. 423, 426 (1996).
339. See Brian M. Rowland, Minority Preferences In Federal Communications
Commission Licensing Practices and Procedures <http://www.brianrowland.com/articles/
Minority_Preferences_FCC_Lisencing.htm> (accessed Feb. 23, 2000) (citing In the Matter
of Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act Competitive Bidding,
Notice of Rulemaking, PP Docket 93-253, 8 F.C.C.R. 7635, 7641 (1993) (“lottery winners
of the rural licenses for Columbia County, Wisconsin, sold for $62.3 million in 1990, 165
days after [being awarded]”).
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“One estimation of social cost for the ten-year delay in licensing of
cellular providers [by lottery] was 2 percent of Gross National
Product (GNP).”340 By 1985, the FCC indicated its desire to eliminate
the lottery system.
“The long policy march to FCC license auctions”341 reached its
destination during the Clinton administration. The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993342 authorized the FCC to use competitive
bidding to assign radio licenses in non-broadcast bands (e.g., wireless
telephony).343 A vigorous and successful auction regime took hold.344
A 1997 report by the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) found
that “by most assessments, the FCC auctions have assigned licenses to
use the spectrum in an economically efficient way.”345 CBO also
estimated that spectrum auctions would “yield $27.0 billion in receipts
to the federal Treasury” in the first five years of license sales.346
Beyond 1998, however, auction revenue would tail off substantially,
producing only an estimated $6.0 billion in the following five years.347
However, if the FCC’s auction authority were expanded, for instance
to include broadcast frequencies, projected revenues would jump to
more than $30 billion. These funds would surely help narrow the
budget deficit.348
340. Brian C. Fritts, Private Property, Economic Efficiency, and Spectrum Policy in the
Wake of the C Block Auction, 51 Fed. Com. L.J. 850, 854 (1999).
341. Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did
FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J. L. & Econ. 529, 530 (1998).
342. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312, August 6, 1993.
343. The Act listed several objectives to be attained through auctions, including: rapid
deployment of new technologies; avoiding excessive concentration of licenses by
disseminating them among a wide variety of applicants; and efficient use of the spectrum.
See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j).
344. The first spectrum auction, conducted in July 1994, was for the “C Block” in the
PCS band.  It netted $650,306,674 in revenue.  See Federal Communications Commission,
Auction 1: Nationwide Narrowband (PCS) <http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/01> (July 25,
2003).
345. Congressional Budget Office, Where Do We Go From Here? The FCC Auctions
And The Future Of Radio Spectrum Management at 17   <ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/0xx/
doc9/fccauct.pdf> (April 1997); see also Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday’s Heresy,
Today’s Orthodoxy, Tomorrow’s Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum
Access, 41 J.L. & Econ. 765 (1998) (“The auction paradigm for spectrum allocation has
moved from heresy to orthodoxy”).
346. Congressional Budget Office, supra n. 345, at Preface.
347. See id. at 29.
348. Since that report the spectrum market has become exceptionally volatile, not just
in the US but worldwide, and some auction winners have defaulted.  Accordingly, the
CBO has revised its estimates on several occasions.  See e.g. Congressional Budget Office,
The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2001-2010, at 92, 117-20 <ftp://ftp.cbo.gov
/18xx/doc1820/e&b0100.pdf> (accessed Dec. 17, 2003).
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Later that year, Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act of
1997.349 It expanded the FCC’s auction mandate to include new
broadcast licenses.350 To be sure, very few “new” broadcast licenses
are issued these days (the consequence of spectrum scarcity), and will
not be until analog licenses are reclaimed as part of the transition to
digital television.351 But auctions are now underway for broadcast as
well as most other commercial uses of the spectrum.352 Competitive
bidding is the fourth and latest era of license allocation policy.353 By
all accounts, the FCC’s experience with auctions has validated
economic theory favoring auctions as the allocation method yielding
the highest and best use of the spectrum.354
349. Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251.
350. See id. § 3002 (“[i]f . . . mutually exclusive applications are accepted for any initial
license or construction permit, then, except as provided in paragraph (2), the Commission
shall grant the license or permit to a qualified applicant through a system of competitive
bidding that meets the requirements of this subsection.”).
351. Full-power television broadcasters were each entitled to a second license, to be
used for digital broadcasts, during the decade-long transition from analog to digital
television.  When the transition is complete, sometime after 2006, broadcasters must
return their analog licenses.  However, analog channels will be auctioned off for future use
even before they are reclaimed by the FCC.  See id. § 3003.
352. Four license categories are exempt from competitive bidding: public safety; digital
television for incumbent licensees; non-commercial educational and public broadcast; and
international satellite.  See 47 U.S.C. § 309(k) (renewal of broadcast licenses); 47 U.S.C. §
765f (orbital satellite slots and spectrum).  See generally Federal Communications
Commission, About Auctions: Introduction <http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/
about/index.html> (Sept. 12, 2001).  In addition, large swaths of the spectrum are reserved
for governmental use (mostly military).  Proposals are underway to open some of this
valuable spectrum to auction, not just to generate revenue, but to also promote
conservation and innovation.
353. The FCC maintains an auction website which contains public notices, procedures,
schedules of pending auctions, and results of completed ones.  See id.
354. The experience in Europe has been somewhat different.  Recent auctions for new
“third generation” (3G) wireless telephone frequency licenses have had mixed results,
sometimes leading to company failure and excessive pricing.  Much of this is due, we
believe, to three factors: (1) inconsistent allocation methods among countries in the
European Union (EU), making it difficult for national companies to compete in other
markets; (2) poor auction design; and (3) lack of experience in an incipient industry (3G),
resulting in inaccurate market models and overbidding by auction participants.  See Owen
M. Kendler, Auction Theory Can Complement Competition Law: Preventing Collusion In
Europe’s 3g Spectrum Allocation, 23 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 153 (2002) (discussing flaws in
EU 3G auctions).
We do not believe these problems have plagued spectrum auctions in the U.S. or are
likely to arise with domain name auctions.  See Cramton, supra n. 337, at 2 (“In
comparison with other countries, the FCC auctions represent the state-of-the-art in
spectrum auction design and implementation. . .The FCC’s leadership in spectrum
auctions has had positive consequences worldwide. Many countries wisely have imitated
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One aspect of spectrum management that deserves mention is
the “service rules” that determine permissible uses for each
frequency. Before the FCC can assign licenses it must first devise a
“band plan,” which involves allocating a set of frequencies for a
particular radio service. Thus, the region between 535 and 1705 KHz
is designated as the AM band, the region between 88.0 and 108.0
MHz is designated as the FM band, and so on. Within each band only
the specified use is allowed.355 Band plans are based on technical
needs (matching frequencies to compatible uses) and predicted
demand for bandwidth.356
For example, until recently, usage of the 470-806 MHz band was
limited to UHF-TV. Therein lies a problem. The UHF band is 336
MHz wide and can accommodate 28 stations in every TV market
(four times as many as the VHF band). That may have been
appropriate when the FCC established the band in the 1960s,
anticipating rapid growth in broadcast TV. But an emerging
technology – cable – interrupted that plan, and UHF has languished.
Changing the band use means evicting incumbent UHF stations and
paying them to relocate.357 Central planning of frequency use can be
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that spectrum auctions in Europe have left a bitter taste
for some, not the least of whom is the European Parliament.  Clause 11 of its “Resolution
on the Commission Communication” regarding the 1999 EU Regulatory Framework for
Electronic Communications states the Parliament “is concerned to note that the
Commission does not discourage spectrum auctions, since auctions tend to raise license
fees above their economic value, raise consumer tariffs and hamper the introduction of
new services”) (quoted in Michael Libertus, The EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic
Communications and the Commissions Proposal for a Decision on a Regulatory
Framework for Radio Spectrum Policy in the Community: Concerns of and Consequences
for Public Broadcasters in the EU, 6 Int’l J. Comm. L. & Pol’y 1, 7 (Winter 2000/2001)).
355. For a complete chart of all bands, see U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Frequency
Allocations: The Radio Spectrum <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf> (Mar.
1996).
356. Under the Slepian-Wolf theorem of information transfer frequency partitioning is
optimal only when the bandwidth of each band is proportional to its power at each
receiver.  See D. Slepian & J.K. Wolf, Noiseless Coding of Correlated Information Sources,
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, (July 1973); See Thomas M. Cover, Comments
on Broadcast Channels <http://yreka.stanford.edu/~cover/papers/cover_98.pdf> (Oct.
1998).
357. The lower 700 MHz band (UHF channels 52-59) and upper 700 MHz band
(channels 60-69) are being converted from television to 3G wireless use.  But the process is
so cumbersome that auctions for these frequencies have been postponed several times.
“This reallocation process necessarily consumes substantial public and private resources,
reduces certainty for users of spectrum, discourages investment, and delays the
introduction of new services. This process also discourages innovation because it requires
entrepreneurs to disclose their ideas to the public well in advance of their introduction,
severely diminishing the competitive advantage from being first to market.”  Gregory L.
Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy To Promote The
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very inefficient.358
Shortly after its embrace of market allocation of licenses, the
FCC began to explore changes in spectrum policy that would let the
market also decide the highest and best use of bands. In 1999, the
Commission issued a major policy statement in a “Spectrum Plan for
the New Millennium.”359 The new policies included spectrum
flexibility – “relaxed service rules, which would allow licensees
greater freedom in determining the specific services to be offered.”360
No longer would each frequency be tied to a pre-determined use,
often confining it to outmoded technologies. If a PCS provider valued
a vacant channel in the 700 MHz band more than a broadcaster, and
interference problems were worked out, why should that channel be
limited to broadcast use? Band flexibility promotes technological and
allocative efficiency.361 Under this approach, the market would not
only determine license assignment (who gets what frequency), but
also what service would provide the highest and best use of the
frequency.362
Perhaps auctions are too good to be true. They return billions of
dollars to the US treasury, they increase allocative efficiency,
promote innovation and new technologies, reduce bureaucratic
overhead and political patronage. Surely, they must undermine some
important goals of our nation’s telecommunications policy, such as
serving the public interest.363 Indeed, if the quid pro quo for free
Public Interest, 50 Fed. Comm. L.J. 87, 92-93 (1997).
358. Because of fragmentation of the spectrum, the FCC has been asked to hold “band
restructuring auctions” which would allow aggregation of bands for emerging uses.  See
Evan Kwerel & John Williams, FCC Office of Plans and Policy,  A Proposal for a Rapid
Transition to Market Allocation of Spectrum (OPP Working Paper Series #38, at 23) (Nov.
2002).
359. In the Matter of Principles for Reallocation of Spectrum to Encourage the
Development of Telecommunications Technologies for the New Millennium, Policy
Statement 14 F.C.C. Rec. 19868, F.C.C. 99-354 (1999).
360. Id. at 19870.  Other changes in spectrum policy included promoting the use of new
technologies, streamlined assignment, fostering an active secondary market in licenses,
and making more spectrum available for current and emerging services.
361. See Rosston & Steinberg, supra n. 357, at 99.
362. “Dynamic bands” also respond to technological change in a way that “static
bands” cannot.  Thus, for instance, deployment of the next generation of “smart” radios
(e.g. software defined and cognitive radios), requires flexibility in frequency allocation.
363. Apparently, this is the view in Europe.  A 2000/2001 review on “The EU
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications” noted that public interest
considerations play a vital role in frequency assignment. Libertus, The EU Regulatory
Framework, supra n. 354, at 4 (“frequency auctions, or the introduction of a secondary
market, cannot be transferred to the broadcasting sector [because] it does not account for
the fact that, especially in broadcasting, public interest objectives such as pluralism,
cultural diversity and access to services orientated on public welfare must be considered”).
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broadcast licenses was public interest programming, then licenses
bought at market price must not be so constrained. Except that is not
the case. One doesn’t have to denigrate the quality of public interest
programming over the past 75 years to appreciate that many
industries are imbued with public interest obligations. Moreover, to
the extent license requirements such as children’s and public affairs
programming lessen profitability, that fact would simply be reflected
in the prices paid at auction.364
A more serious objection to auctioning off the spectrum is that it
creates a property rights regime, turning the public airwaves into
private property. Once licenses and the spectrum rights they
represent are deemed property, the argument goes, government loses
control over such things as ownership, transferability, use and
content. Indeed, many of the early advocates of spectrum auctions,
such as Herzel and Coase, also favored property rights in frequencies.
Here the consequences are significant. If broadcasters owned their
pieces of spectrum, content requirements such as “equal time” and
the “fairness doctrine” might constitute forced speech, thus violating
the First Amendment.365 Private property also connotes free
alienability, quiet enjoyment, the right to use for productive purposes,
and the right to exclude others. Each of these “sticks” in the “bundle
of rights” that constitute property is currently regulated by the FCC,
although increasingly less so in an era of deregulation. Perhaps the
most controversial of these sticks is exclusivity. In an era of advanced
technologies (such as “ultra-wideband,” “agile” and “software-
defined radio”), which can share the spectrum without causing
interference, a property rights approach might preclude compatible
uses or foster rent-seeking by owners, neither of which leads to
efficient use of the spectrum.366
The debate over property rights in the spectrum is an exciting
one for economists and legal philosophers, but resolution of these
issues is not required for a pragmatic assessment of market allocation
364. For a more thorough discussion of this point and other consequences of auctions,
see Kwerel, supra n. 331, at 3-6.
365. Compare Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (broadcasters’
First Amendment rights not compromised by content regulation when operating in scarce
public spectrum) with P. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Commn, 475 U.S. 1 (1986)
(government may not usurp utility company’s private property to carry message with
which it disagreed).
366. See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics Of Wireless Communications, 16 Harv. J.L.
& Tech., 25, 32-33 & 48 (2002).  See also  FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force, Report of the
Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities Working Group  <http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/files/
SRRWGFinalReport.pdf> (Nov. 15, 2002).
86
University of San Diego Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Art. 1 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_econ/art1
SOLUM2V8-FINAL.DOC 2/9/04  10:06 AM
402 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [25:317
of the spectrum. First, legal rights associated with property ownership
do not derive from natural law; they are defined by the state and can
take whatever form Congress decides to give them.367 Purchasers at
auction currently take their licenses with a well-defined statutory
preclusion of ownership rights.368 Thus, licenses purchased from the
FCC contain a whole host of restrictions that are inimical to a pure
property rights regime.369
Second, in terms of content regulation, the Supreme Court has
moved away from any sharp distinction between public and private
property. Thus, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,370 the Court upheld a
prohibition on indecent broadcasts without once mentioning the Red
Lion justification of scarcity or public spectrum. Nor did the Court
give any greater scrutiny to cable must-carry rules in Turner
Broadcasting v. FCC,371 because the cable system was privately owned.
To the extent a public-private distinction is still important in
telecommunications, it is based on who has access to the speech,
rather than who owns the channel of communication.372 In sum, we
believe the public interest can be promoted, and reasonable
regulation of licensees will be upheld (and unreasonable ones struck
down), whether or not licenses are bought at auction or are obtained
at zero cost.373
The final objection to spectrum auctions is that only wealthy
applicants can afford to buy licenses; poor, small-business and
minority applicants are shut out. This is a serious concern, especially
given our nation’s commitment to “diversity” on the airwaves.374 Of
367. See U. S. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); Lucas v. So. Car. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (scope of property rights is determined by “background
principles” in state law).
368. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2001).
369. It is for this reason, perhaps, that the debate over property rights in spectrum is so
vibrant.  See e.g. Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society, March 1, 2003
Conference on Spectrum Policy, Property or Commons?  <http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu
/spectrum> (accessed Oct. 4, 2003).
370. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
371. 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (content-neutral must-carry requirements for cable did not
violate cable company’s first amendment rights).
372. See e.g. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (Child Online Protection Act
violated first amendment rights of Internet users); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v.
F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989) (“The private commercial telephone communications at
issue here are substantially different from the public radio broadcast at issue in Pacifica.”).
373. It has never been suggested that regulations validly applied to free licenses are
somehow suspect when applied to broadcasters who obtain their licenses in the secondary
market at substantial cost.
374. See e.g. 47 U.S.C. § 257 (2003) (“In carrying out subsection (a) [identifying and
eliminating . . . market entry barriers for entrepreneurs and other small businesses], the
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course, the “beauty contest” method of spectrum assignment was
hardly a model of allocational equity, given that most broadcast
licenses are held by some of the largest corporations and
conglomerates in America.375 Indeed, the FCC’s licensing scheme
created substantial barriers to entry by women and minority
broadcasters, leading to a homogenized industry.376 The agency
eventually tried to overcome this with various affirmative action
measures.377 When most of those efforts were declared
unconstitutional,378 the corporate dominated demographic seemed as
entrenched as ever.379
It may seem counter-intuitive, but many hailed the advent of
auctions as a way to level the playing field and diversify license
ownership. Former FCC Chairman Reed Hunt claimed that one of
the first spectrum auctions (for PCS) was “the greatest single
opportunity ever made fairly available to small businesses, women
and minorities. For the first time in our nation’s history, the federal
government is creating opportunities in a new industry in which all
Americans will have a fair chance to compete from day one.”380 While
seemingly Pollyannaish, there are several reasons why Hundt was at
Commission shall seek to promote the policies and purposes of this chapter favoring
diversity of media voices, vigorous economic competition, technological advancement, and
promotion of the public interest, convenience, and necessity”); 47 U.S.C. § 396 (“it
furthers the general welfare to encourage public telecommunications services which will
be responsive to the interests of people both in particular localities and throughout the
United States, which will constitute an expression of diversity and excellence”); and 47
U.S.C. § 548 (development of competition and diversity in video programming
distribution).
375. Lawrence J. White, “Propertyzing” The Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It’s
Important, And How To Begin, at 26 <http://www.stern.nyu.edu/eco/wkpapers/
workingpapers00/00-08White.pdf> (Oct. 20, 2000) (stating that “the FCC stewardship and
licensing system has in fact meant severe limitations on general access to spectrum use,
and the limitations have favored rich individuals and sizable companies”).
376. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 553 (1990) (“In 1971, minorities
owned only 10 of the approximately 7,500 radio stations in the country and none of the
more than 1,000 television stations”). See also supra, pt. III(C)(1) (The Road to Market
Allocation of Spectrum).
377. See e.g. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding minority
preference policies in license grants).
378. Metro Broadcasting was overruled by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995).  See also Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(invalidating FCC equal employment opportunity program designed for women and
minorities).
379. Citizens’ Commn on Civil Rights, Seven Biennial Report & Mark Lloyd, The
Progress and Proposals for a Civil Rights Agenda in the Communications Policy Arena,
293, 299-300 (2002).
380. See FCC Report No.DC-2621, Commission Adopts Competitive Bidding
Procedures For Broadband PCS (PP Docket Action No. 93-253) (June 29, 1994).
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least partially right. First, as new spectrum was opened up and made
available on neutral grounds, entities not embedded with the agency
realized opportunities foreclosed to them under the prior regime.
Second, expansion of the spectrum helped disaggregate the enormous
concentration of media and license ownership that prevailed under
the old system. Concentration is the largest threat to diversity.381
Recall that in theory according to the Coase theorem, and as
observed in practice, ownership of a private good (such as a radio
license) ultimately rests with the party most highly valuing it,
irrespective of allocation method. That’s how the rich and powerful
wound up controlling the spectrum in the first place. Auctions hardly
created or exacerbated that problem.
Finally, the FCC could accomplish through auctions that which
had been denied to it by the use of regulatory preferences. Through
the use of bidding credits, the agency was able to foster license
acquisition by small businesses, thereby indirectly promoting
viewpoint, ethnic and gender diversity, as well as spurring
competition.382 Indeed, Congress mandated that it do so: in designing
auctions, “the Commission shall include safeguards to protect the
public interest in the use of the spectrum and shall seek to promote
[specified] purposes.”383 Among those purposes were:
“promoting economic opportunity and competition and
ensuring that new and innovative technologies are readily
accessible to the American people by avoiding excessive
concentration of licenses and by disseminating licenses
among a wide variety of applicants, including small
businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses
owned by members of minority groups and women.”384
In other words, the use of spectrum auctions does not preclude
381. See Mark N. Cooper, Equality In The Information Age: Inequality In The Digital
Society: Why The Digital Divide Deserves All The Attention It Gets, 20 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L.J. 73, 113-14 (2002).  See also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 401(“Congress does not abridge
freedom of speech or press by legislation directly or indirectly multiplying the voices and
views presented to the public through time sharing, fairness doctrines, or other devices
which limit or dissipate the power of those who sit astride the channels of communication
with the general public.”).
382. See e.g. Fifth Report and Order, In the Matter of Implementation of Section
309(j) of the Communications Act—Competitive Bidding, 9 F.C.C. Rec. 5532 (June 29,
1994); 47 C.F.R. § 24.709(a)(1) (1998) (bidding credit for small business).
383. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3) (2003).
384. Id.  Auction preferences for women and minorities were abandoned after
Adarand.  But the FCC hoped to accomplish those diversity goals indirectly through
correlation with the small business credits that remained.  See Fritts, supra n. 340, at 861.
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the FCC from implementing social policy goals. Even where an
auction is designed solely to maximize revenue, to the exclusion of
other factors, it will produce revenue that can subsidize other less-
profitable uses of the resource, This is precisely what we propose
below for gTLD auctions.385 The bottom line is that auctions do not
subvert Congress’ goal of promoting competition, localism and
diversity. They may help advance it. But, expecting an allocation
method alone to achieve these salutary goals is a mistake. We need
only look at 70 years of FCC “beauty contests” to confirm that.
2. Market Allocation of Telephone Numbers
Telephone numbers are in short supply.386 One obvious solution
to that problem is to create more. This is easily accomplished
(conceptually) by adding one or more digits to the current 10-digit
string in the North American Numbering Plan. Of course this would
be very expensive; cost estimates range between $50 and $150
billion,387 and could take a decade or more to implement.388 Everything
from switches to routers, customer equipment, telephone books and
databases would have to be upgraded. Current assignments of
numbers to businesses and individuals would be disrupted. Stake-
holder entitlements to such things as vanity numbers would have to
be mediated.389 The last time the FCC faced a similar problem, it
opted not to change the familiar string.390 Expansion is likely
inevitable, but the FCC is holding off as long as possible.391
Another solution to short-term number scarcity is to more
efficiently allocate and manage the existing supply. Accordingly, the
385. See supra pt. IV (A Proposed Model for Expansion of the Name Space).
386. See supra pt. III(B)(2) (Wireline Telephony).
387. See Numbering Resource Optimization, supra n. 279, FCC 99-122, at 5, n. 8
(“Preliminary estimates place the cost of NANP expansion between 50 and 150 billion
dollars”).
388. See id. at 15-16.
389. See e.g. Toll Free Service Access Codes, supra n. 277 (adopting rules on the
assignment of vanity numbers); Lock, supra n. 288.
390. The last time the length of telephone numbers was changed was in the early 1960s
with adoption of All Number Calling.  This change, which included replacing some 2-digit
exchanges with three digit Central Office codes, standardized number strings across the
US. See David H. Bench, North American Numbering Plan (NANP) Expansion Reference
Document at 7 <http://www.atis.org/pub/clc/inc/nanpe/nanpe248.doc> (Jan. 2002).
391. Detailed studies looking at scope and transition are underway to determine when
expansion will be necessary. Expansion should not be done frequently.  Accordingly, one
proposal is to add 2 digits to the dialing string, which would yield nearly 800 billion
numbers in the NANP.  See e.g. Industry Numbering Committee, supra n. 272, at 33.
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FCC has made “numbering resource optimization” a high priority.392
In a series of orders over the past few years, the Commission has
adopted several administrative and technical measures designed to
increase allocation and utilization efficiencies. Among these are:
eliminating number reserves, decreasing block allocations, number
portability, number pooling among telcos, and “anti-hoarding”
standards. Other measures are under active review.
The most controversial, and likely most effective, mechanism for
conserving numbers is to raise the price. Currently, telephone
numbers are free. They are distributed to telcos at zero cost on a
demand basis. Zero pricing has lead to gross allocative inefficiencies,
as there is no disincentive for warehousing, waste or underutilization.
All the costs of consumption are externalized. For example, “unified
messaging services,” such as voicemail and e-fax services, obtain vast
pools of numbers for free and provide value-added services to
customers often for free or below-market cost. Because of zero
pricing at the wholesale and retail levels, these resources are used
inefficiently, “potential[ly] . . . stranding millions of numbers.”393
Responding to this and similar problems, the FCC has stated its belief
that “a market-based approach is the most pro-competitive, least
intrusive way of ensuring that numbering resources are efficiently
allocated.”
Auctions provide a market-based approach aimed at optimizing
the use of the scarce resource.394 If auctions were implemented,
telephone companies would be required to pay for, rather than obtain
for free, allocated number blocks. Although the FCC is still seeking
comments on how best to implement competitive bidding, this is
likely the next step in managing the scarce telephone number space.395
These auctions will be different from spectrum auctions in a
significant respect. The FCC’s goal is to “increase the efficiency of
392. See  FCC 99-122.
393. See Reply Comments Of The Maine Public Utilities Commission, In the Matter of
Numbering Resource Optimization, 7-8, CC Docket 99-200 <http://www.nrri.ohio-
state.edu/nida/DocumentFiles/fnprm-reply.doc> (Jun, 9, 2000); see also Federal
Communications Commission, Implementation of Number Conservation Methods
Authorized by the Federal Communications Commission, Order No. 23, 454, at 8-9
<http://www.puc.state.nh.us/orders/2000ords/23454t.pdf> (May 1, 2000) .
394. In part, this is because auctions are the best way to determine market price.  See
Second Report And Order, supra n. 271, at 373 (“regulators are incapable of setting the
‘economically correct’ prices”) (quoting industry comments).
395. Auctioning telephone numbers was proposed by the Clinton Administration in its
1996 and 1997 budgets, estimating that an auction of new toll-free 888 numbers would
raise $700 million over three years.  Industry opposition to the proposal prompted
Congress to reject it.  See Lock, supra n. 288, at 389, n. 94.
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numbering resource usage, and not to raise additional funds.”396 Thus,
there may well be offsets to other telco fees and contributions, such as
to the Universal Service Fund. Notwithstanding, the industry has
reacted negatively to the FCC’s pricing proposal, forcing the agency
to explain its reasoning in detail.397 It has yet to convince the industry,
and yet to implement the proposals. But it will.
One problem facing the agency is how to treat the advantages of
incumbency. The dominant theme of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act is competition. Toward that end, Congress enacted a number of
measures designed to ease entry into local exchange markets. Market
pricing of telephone numbers could impede these efforts. Incumbent
local exchange companies (ILECs) can exploit their natural
monopolies to extract monopoly rents from customers (hence the
drive to open those markets). In addition to being well-financed,
ILECs often have large stockpiles of available numbers (which gives
rise to the scarcity problem in the first place). If existing numbers are
grandfathered, and competitor local exchange companies (CLECs)
have to buy their numbers at auction, they may be doubly
disadvantaged and unable to compete. The FCC is not insensitive to
this problem and is working on “competitively neutral” pricing
mechanisms.398 Among these is a proposal to reject grandfathering
and apply market pricing to the embedded number base.399
The purpose of this Part has been two-fold. First, we established
substantial symmetry in economic terms between two traditional
telecommunication industries and the Internet, focusing on scarcity
and private good characteristics of the spectrum and the telephone
name and number space on the one hand and the domain name space
on the other. Second, we explored the various models that have been
used by the FCC over the years for allocating scarce resources. Both
with broadcast and telephony, the FCC came late to realize that
allocative efficiency could best be accomplished through a market
pricing mechanism – the auction. The fundamental lesson to be
learned from the history of the FCC is that auctions are superior to
comparative “beauty contest” hearings (broadcast licenses) and rules-
of-first occupation (telephone numbers).
The next step is to apply this lesson to the Internet. As we show
396. Second Report And Order, supra n. 271, at 372.
397. Spectrum auctions were mandated by statute, relieving the FCC from having to
create a record in support of market allocation of radio licenses. See supra n. 349.
398. See Second Report And Order, supra n. 271, at 373.
399. See id. at 375.
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in Part IV, adopting a competitive bidding model for allocation of
generic top level domains both promotes efficient use of the name
space and enhances its economic value. Since domain names are
private goods, even if one conceptualizes the name space itself as a
public resource,400 market allocation is likely the most economically
efficient and stable mechanism. No degree of social engineering by
ICANN, under the banner of promoting the “public interest” in the
DNS system, can come close. The only reason for retaining the
present pace of free-form review of gTLD applications is to maintain
the status quo. And the only reason to do that is to preserve
monopoly privileges of incumbency.
IV. A Proposed Model for Expansion of the Name Space
As its name implies, ICANN’s principle function is to regulate
the name and number spaces of the Internet. Although the
organization strives to govern by consensus,401 there has never been
agreement on how these spaces should be regulated. Indeed, other
than ICANN governance itself, no other issue has generated more
controversy and proposals for reform.402 Whole organizations exist
toward that end.403 Yet, “little progress has been made because of
both an extremely complex political environment and the economic
interests of the parties involved in the multi-billion dollar business of
selling domain names.”404
It will take considerable effort to reform name space regulation.
The problem is not unique to the Internet. We have seen other
telecommunications industries go through similar upheavals. Our
hope is that it will not take decades or longer, as it did with broadcast
and telephony, to arrive at efficient allocation and utilization
mechanisms. In this section we propose a model that has proved
effective elsewhere – competitive bidding for scarce private goods.
We think this could break the logjams that have characterized
400. For an excellent exposition of this point, see Chander, supra n. 216, at 756-58.
401. See e.g. ICANN, ICANN Meetings in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil <http://www.icann.org
/riodejaneiro> (accessed Mar. 18, 2003) (“ICANN encourages broad participation in its
bottom-up consensus-development process.”) .
402. See e.g. ICANN, Overview of the DNS Controversy <http://www.rkey.com/dns/
overview.html>  (accessed Mar. 18, 2003).
403. “The generic top level domain memorandum of understanding is the international
framework in which policies for the administration and enhancement of the Internet’s
global Domain Name System (DNS) are developed and deployed.”  See e.g. gTLD-MoU,
Welcome to the gTLD-MoU Web Site  <http://www.gtld-mou.org> (Aug. 12, 1999).
404. gTLD-MoU Policy Oversight Committee, Read This First! <http://www.gtld-
mou.org/> (accessed Aug. 12, 1999).
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the addition of new gTLDs to the root. A paradigm shift is required
to make this work. ICANN has to stop treating the name space as a
public good – requiring strict regulation in the public interest. Once it
recognizes that domain names are private goods, and allows market
allocation, a more efficient system of name space management should
emerge.
A. Treating Scarce Name Space as a Public Good – An Example of
Regulatory Failure
Root service—the computer system that allows translation of
URLs into computer-identifying IP numbers—is a natural
monopoly.405 The Internet would be fundamentally different, and
likely a great deal less useful, if unifying control were absent. The
monopoly characteristic of root service means, among other things,
that entry into the root is tightly controlled. In Milton Mueller’s
terms, ICANN “rules the root.”406 In doing so, it endows and regulates
a private good – the name space. Yet, it treats it as if it were a classic
public good.
The domain name space has been declared a public resource.407
And so it is, in the same way that the spectrum and the telephone
numbering system are public resources. All three are mathematical
constructs – addressing protocols – that require social buy-in to be
practical. It is difficult to conceive of these constructs as reducible to
private ownership, just as it would be to think of owning integers.
Yet, the notion of public resource is not synonymous with “public
good” as economists use that term. The distinction between public
and private goods helps in policy analysis of regulatory structures.
Public goods are not efficiently allocated by markets; hence they
require government or government-like regulation. Private goods, on
the other hand, are susceptible to market regulation, which is much
more likely to achieve optimum efficiency in resource allocation.408
We demonstrate these points by first recounting ICANN’s
experiences with gTLD expansion, and second by looking at the
405. This is because of networking effects and a high ratio of fixed to marginal costs.
See supra pt. II(C) (Networking Effects and the Root Service Monopoly).
406. See Milton Mueller, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of
Cyberspace, 163-184 (2002) (discussing ICANN and namespace regulation).
407. See e.g. Opinion of the Governmental Advisory Committee on New Generic Top
Level Domains <http://www.icann.org/committees/gac/new-tld-opinion-16nov00.htm>
(November 16, 2000).
408. For a thorough discussion of these points, see supra pt. II (An Economic Analysis
of Domain Name Policy).
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contestable markets that exist in domain names.
1. ICANN and gTLD Expansion
At its annual meeting in November, 2000, the ICANN Board
considered 44 applications for new gTLDs that had been submitted
under working rules devised by the DNSO and Names Council.409 The
Board accepted 7 of the proposals. The application process was
complex, expensive and somewhat mysterious. Aspirants had to
complete lengthy forms involving their technical and business plans,
their internal structure, eligibility standards, market projections and
dispute resolution policies.410 They were advised to “secure now the
professional assistance of technical experts, financial and
management consultants, and lawyers to assist in [the] formulation of
their proposals and preparation of the applications.”411 ICANN
imposed a $50,000 processing fee, which also served to weed out the
disfavored, weak, and undercapitalized applicants. Selection criteria
were never fully articulated and the hearing at which applications
were reviewed was, putting it mildly, unstructured.412 Applicants had
only one day to review staff recommendations before the hearing,413
and only 3 minutes each to make their cases to the Board. Much of
the Board’s discussion was based on speculation or trivial factors,
such as whether a TLD string was “pronounceable.”414 ICANN has
acknowledged the subjective nature of the process, but has
proclaimed that as one of its strengths.415
This is no way to make law, sausage or domain name policy.416
409. For an excellent narrative of this story, see Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN as
Regulator (preliminary draft Sept. 2, 2001) <http://www.law.wayne.edu/weinberg
/icannasregulator2.pdf> (accessed Dec. 17, 2003).  Jon Postel, acting for the Internet
Assigned Names Authority (IANA), established the original gTLDs in the 1980s.
410. See ICANN, Description of the Review Procedure <http://www.icann.org/tlds/tld-
app-review-procedure-02oct00.htm> (Aug. 3, 2000).
411. ICANN, New TLD Application Process Overview <http://www.icann.org/tlds/
application-process-03aug00.htm> (Aug. 3, 2000).
412. The hearing has been compared to “The Gong Show.”  See NTKnow, Hard News
<http://www.ntk.net/2000 11/17> (accessed Nov. 17, 2000).  It drew ire from the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) which, in a letter to Commerce Secretary, Norman Mineta,
complained that “ICANN’s decision making process was characterized by a large number
of arbitrary decisions, process failures, and plain mistakes of fact.”  American Civil
Liberties Union, Letter to Norman Mineta from American Civil Liberties Union
<http://archive.aclu.org/congress/l011601a.html> (accessed Jan. 16, 2001).
413. See ICANN, Report on New TLD Applications <http://www.icann.org/
tlds/report> (Nov. 10, 2000).
414. Weinberg, supra n. 409.
415. Id.
416. With apologies to Otto von Bismarck.  (“If you like law and sausages, you should
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Nonetheless, it is the only precedent for adding new gTLDs.417
Perhaps because of it, ICANN has taken a much slower and more
deliberate approach to considering further applications.418 Many of
the original 44, and some new ones, are still pending. Two years after
the initial expansion, ICANN President Stuart Lynn issued A Plan for
Action Regarding New gTLDs, proposing “up to three more
sponsored TLDs,” (sTLDs) and referral to a committee to “develop a
recommendation on how to evolve the generic namespace . . .”419 At
its December, 2002 annual meeting, the Board referred the Lynn
proposal to the newly-formed Generic Name Support Organization
(GNSO).420 Constituency groups of the GNSO have put forward their
own ideas. The Business Constituency (BC) argued for a
“differentiated” or taxonomized expansion,421 under which no new
unsponsored or unrestricted gTLDs would be allowed. This drew fire
from the Non-Commercial Users Constituency (NCUC) as “inimical
to the interests of most domain name users.”422 A committee of the
GNSO Names Council mildly endorsed the BC proposal and sent it
back to the Board.423 At the spring, 2003 meeting in Rio de Janeiro,
the Board posted draft Criteria to Be Used in the Selection of New
never watch either one being made.”  Respectfully Quoted 190 (Library of Congress 1989).
417. At its meeting in Stockholm in June, 2001, the ICANN Board convened a New
TLD Evaluation Process Planning Task Force (NTEPPTF) to “recommend processes for
monitoring the implementation of the new TLDs and evaluating the new TLD
program . . .” ICANN, New TLD Evaluation Planning Task Force <http://www.icann.org/
committees/ntepptf.>   (Apr. 13, 2003) (NTEPPTF issued its final report in July 2002.).
See ICANN, Final Report of the New TLD Evaluation Process Planning Task Force
<http://www.icann.org/committees/ntepptf/final-report-31jul02.htm> (July 31, 2002)
[hereinafter NTEPPTF Final Report].  Note that NTEPPTF did not itself evaluate the 7
new gTLDs; it merely suggested tasks for an “Evaluation Team” to perform that function,
together with an “on-going Monitoring Program.”  This is an excellent example of how
bureaucracies function.  The evaluation process is still underway.
418. Id.
419. See Stuart Lynn, A Plan for Action Regarding New gTLDs
<http://www.icann.org/committees/ntepptf/new-gtld-action-plan-18oct02.htm> (Oct. 18,
2002).
420. See ICANN,  Preliminary Report <http://www.icann.org/minutes/prelim-report-
15dec02.htm> (Dec. 15, 2002).
421. See The Business Constituency, A Differentiated Expansion of the Names Space
<http://www.bizconst.org/positions/Differentiatednamespace.doc> (Dec., 2002).
422. See Milton Mueller, [ncdnhc-discuss] Proposed Statement on TLD Policy
<http://www.icann-ncc.org/pipermail/discuss/2003-February/006527.html> (Feb. 18, 2003).
The authors of this paper also responded to the BC position paper. See Karl M. Manheim
& Lawrence B. Solum, The Inefficiencies of Differentiated Expansion: Analysis and
Critique of the Business Constituency Position Paper on Expansion of the Top Level Name
Space <http://gtld-auctions.net/BC_Response.pdf> (Mar. 24, 2003).
423. See ICANN, GNSO Council gTLDS committee v3 <http://www.dnso.org/dnso/
notes/20030410.gTLD.committee.conclusions-v3.html> (April 2003).
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Sponsored TLDs, essentially incorporating the Lynn and BC
proposals.424 In customary form, the Board gave the public one day to
respond. Perhaps unexpectedly, strong objections were filed by the
deadline, followed by oral comments to the Board.425 Finally, on
December 15, 2003, ICANN released a “Request for Proposals”
(RFP) for new gTLDs, called “sponsored” top level domains or
sTLDs.426
Given the parameters of the RFP, the next round of gTLD
expansion will be limited to “sponsored” domains (e.g., “.union”)
with restricted eligibility,427 rather than open and commercially
oriented (“unsponsored”) domains such as “.web.” This will serve to
maintain scarcity in the name space and the resulting monopoly value
of existing domain names and gTLDs. Incumbent registry operators
and registrants will again be the winners of this round of gTLD
expansion; competitors and consumers will again be the losers. And
despite the now familiar refrain of “serving the public interest,” the
proposal actually achieves the opposite. Because of eligibility criteria,
the two or three new “sponsored” gTLDs are likely to be “well-
financed globalized non-profit membership organizations [rather
than] regional, relatively poorer institutions that serve the needs of
communities in the third world.”428 This is how public choice theory
works; organized special interests work to defeat regulatory reform
that would benefit the public.429
ICANN’s behavior in connection with regulation of the name
space is analogous to “agency capture,” the phenomenon where an
agency becomes “uniquely susceptible to domination by the industry
424. ICANN, ICANN Rio de Janeiro Meeting Topic: Criteria to Be Used in the
Selection of New Sponsored TLDs <http://www.icann.org/riodejaneiro/stld-rfp-topic.htm>
(Mar. 25, 2003).
425. See Karl M. Manheim & Lawrence B. Solum, sTLD Beauty Contests: An Analysis
and Critique of the Proposed Criteria to be Used in the Selection of New Sponsored TLDs
<http://gtld-auctions.net/sTLD_Analysis.pdf> (Mar. 26, 2003); Michael Froomkin, ICANN
Watch, Same Old Shell Game All Over Again,  at <http://www.icannwatch.org/
article.pl?sid=03/03/26/0451239&mode=thread> (Mar. 25, 2003).  Submitted responses to
the ICANN proposal are collected at Submissions to the stld-rfp-comments forum
<http://forum.icann.org/riodejaneiro/stld-rfp-comments/general/index.html> (accessed
Dec. 17, 2003).
426. See ICANN Releases Request for Proposals for Sponsored Top Level Domain
Names, at <http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-15dec03.htm> (accessed
Feb. 4, 2004). The six-part sTLD application can be found at <http://www.icann.org/tlds/
new-stld-rfp/new-stld-application-parta-15dec03.htm> (accessed Feb. 4, 2004).
427. See id., NTEPPTF Final Report, supra n. 417, at pt. 4.
428. Manheim & Solum, supra n. 425, at 2.
429. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A
Critical Introduction  (1991).
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[it is] charged with regulating.”430
In ‘captured’ agencies, agency regulators do not act as
‘arms-length’ representatives of some larger ‘public interest’
in their interactions with regulated industries. Instead,
government officials work to advance the agenda of current
firms in the industry by formulating regulations that benefit
or at least do not substantially burden the industry. In the
most malignant capture account, the captured regulatory
agency enables an industry to bar new entrants and [to]
extract monopoly rents so that consumers are materially
worse off with regulation than without it. Capture of this
sort, theorists claim, is particularly likely when an agency is
charged with regulating only a single industry.431
In the case of ICANN, the influence of those who are affected by
ICANN’s actions is facilitated by the newly adopted governance
structure with built-in influence of “constituencies.”432 These, for the
most part, are the incumbent stake-holders – the trademark holders,
large telcos, ISPs, and registration service providers that would be
most disrupted by expansion of the name space. To be sure, ICANN
is not a government agency, but it wields regulatory power
nonetheless.433 Indeed, it superintends a monopoly as strong as any
the FCC or most state public utilities commissions ever has.
The FCC was also “captured” by the industries it regulated.434
This is one reason Congress began deregulating the
430. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 Chi.-Kent. L.
Rev. 1039, 1043 (1997).
431. David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining In The Shadow Of Democracy, 148
U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 497 (1999).
432. More specifically, under the new bylaws, the ICANN Board is selected by a
Nominating Committee which is comprised, de minimis, of  “constituency”
representatives.  These include: the Business Users Constituency (2 members), the gTLD
Registry Constituency, gTLD Registrars Constituency, the  Internet Service Providers
Constituency, the Intellectual Property Constituency, and the Non-commercial Users
Constituency.  See ICANN, Appendix A to Minutes ICANN Board Meeting in Shanghai,
Art. X, sec. 5 <http://www.icann.org/minutes/minutes-appa-31oct02.htm> (Oct. 31, 2002).
433. Tamar Frankel, The Managing Lawmaker In Cyberspace: A Power Model, 27
Brook. J. Intl L. 859, 860 (2002) (“ICANN establishes some of the Internet’s constitutive
rules that facilitate universal connectivity.  It has used its power to determine the process
under which new top-level domain names (‘TLDs’) are allocated. To this extent it is a
lawmaker.” (citation omitted)) see also Jonathan Zittrain, ICANN: Between the Public and
the Private—Comments Before Congress, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1071 (1999).
434. See Wendy M. Rogovin, The Regulation of Television in the Public Interest: On
Creating a Parallel Universe in Which Minorities Speak and Are Heard, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev.
51, 70 n.68 (1992) (“Making a case for ‘agency capture’ is not difficult with respect to the
FCC . . . the FCC has, historically, strongly favored the industry ‘players’”).
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telecommunications industries in 1996 with the Telecommunications
Act.435 The following year, Congress extended frequency auctions to
broadcast licenses. As much of this article suggests, we believe
ICANN should follow this course. It should do so not simply because
it would ameliorate capture or produce revenues, although it would
accomplish both of those. Rather, it should do so because market
allocation of private goods—in this case, the domain name space—is
a more efficient way to manage them. Auctions would insure that
specific gTLDs in particular and the name space in general would be
put to their highest and best economic use.
2. The Market for Scarce Name Space
The second level domain (SLD) name space is scarce. A huge
number of domain names remain available—the theoretical
dimensions of even the SLD space in the .com TLD alone are vast.
But, the most desirable domains are those which are both easy to
remember and which also have commercially exploitable symbolic,
generic or trade meaning. Many, perhaps most, of the potential SLDs
in this subgroup have already been registered. That scarcity creates
value, which in turn creates a market where values can be realized.
With most domain names, the market exists only at the secondary
level; i.e., “used” names can be bought and sold among registrants,
sometimes for millions of dollars.436 Domain name brokers, appraisal
services and online auctions can facilitate the transactions.437 In a few
cases, mostly in the ccTLD space (such as .md, .tv and .us), a primary
435. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (“To promote competition and reduce
regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies.”).
436. For instance, the value of “sex.com” has been estimated at $65 million.  See
Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 715, 728 (2003).  Business.com
was sold in 1999 for $7.5 million; america.com was offered for $30 million.  See MSNBC,
Cool.com: Most Valuable Domain Name? <http://zdnet.com/2100-11-519606.html?
legacy=zdnn> (Mar. 30, 2000).  HitDomains.com, a domain name auction site, has claimed
an average domain name price of $ 1.6 million.  See Kevin J. Heller, The Young
Cybersquatter’s Handbook: A Comparative Analysis of the ICANN Dispute, 2 Cardozo
Online J. Confl. Resol. 2, n. 160 (2001).
437. See, e.g., DomainSystems.com, About DomainSystems <http://www.
domainsystems.com/ds.htm> (accessed Feb. 22, 2003) (The site claims to have “developed
the very first domain appraisal algorithm and formula that is now used in more than 85%
of all domain appraisals performed on the web, and we have performed more than 350K
appraisals to date.”).  There are over 250 web sites for domain auctions, appraisal services,
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market functions at the retail level. Profit-maximizing TLD operators
extract monopoly rents by charging a premium for popular second
level domains drawn from generic terms, common names and
nouns.438 The economic value created by scarcity is thus monetized. In
this unregulated environment, windfalls go to the registry operators
or first-in-line registrants during the inevitable land rush.439
The TLD name space is also scarce, for the same reasons that
scarcity exists in the SLD. Yet, there is no market for gTLDs despite
their tremendous economic value, in one case (.com), denominating
an entire industry.440 gTLD operators acquire their rights and
resulting value either by being in the right place at the right time (e.g.,
Network Solutions, Inc., the first .com registry), or by the grace of
ICANN. In neither case did the operators have to pay for their
exclusive rights, other than perhaps administrative processing and
lobbying fees. ICANN, as keeper of the root, has systematically failed
to capture value at the wholesale level. Instead, registry operators
have obtained windfalls worth hundreds of millions of dollars or
more. The stock value of Network Solutions was estimated to be $21
billion when it was acquired by Verisign.441
The current round of gTLD expansion is following the same
model. ICANN will make bureaucratic and well-intentioned efforts to
promote the Internet community’s interests by assuring smooth
administration of the root and name space. It will not, however,
realize any monetary benefit from the new value it creates. It will
instead endow a lucky few successful applicants with monopolies they
can monetize at the retail level. ICANN’s conduct today parallels that
of the FCC during the era of comparative license hearings. It tries to
evaluate applicants on the basis of “public interest” criteria,442
438. See Peter B. Maggs, The “.us” Internet Domain, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 297, 311-12
(2002).
439. Creating a primary market isn’t necessarily an easy task.  The operator of the .biz
TLD was sued for violating a California law prohibiting lotteries.  See ICANN, Smiley v.
ICANN (Los Angeles Superior Court No. BC 254659)  <http://www.icann.org/
announcements/advisory-29dec02.htm> (accessed Feb. 13, 2003) (class action against
ICANN, NeuLeval, and others, for running criminal lottery enterprise in the sale of .biz
SLDs).
440. Again, ccTLDs provide a special case since each country regulates its own
country-code top level domain.  Some have sold their rights to private for-profit operators,
e.g. .tv.  See Domain Name Glossary, <http://www.igoldrush.com/glossary.htm> (accessed
Feb. 13, 2003); UK Domain Name Search: Country Code Top Level Domains,
<http://www.uk-domain-names-search.co.uk/cctld-list.htm> (accessed Feb. 13, 2003).
441. See David E. Kalish, VeriSign Buys Network Solutions for $ 21 Billion, Chi. Sun-
Times 4 (Mar. 7, 2000).
442. These criteria fall into four general categories: technical, business, legal and
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knowing full well that behind the scenes a game of “Who Wants to be
a Millionaire” is being played out. If the root is a public resource,
then ICANN should not be so generous. Instead, it should adopt a
system of competitive bidding, drawing on recent FCC policies and
experience for guidance.443
B. Competitive Bidding for new gTLDs
When new radio frequencies become available for commercial
use, federal law requires that licenses be auctioned off to the highest
qualified bidder.444 The FCC does a reasonably good job in designing
and conducting spectrum auctions. They are often familiar in format,
not much different than found for consumer goods on eBay.445 In
other cases, such as with “Simultaneous Multiple-Round”446 or
“combinatorial bidding,” the auction design is fairly complex.447
Because of complexity in these cases, the FCC sponsors periodic
conferences on auction theory and seminars on auction mechanics for
potential bidders.448
Compared to spectrum auctions, we believe gTLD auctions will
be relatively simple, both in concept and operation. Nonetheless, we
think actual auction design should be worked out by ICANN to
assure compatibility with technical standards and to maximize
economic efficiency. ICANN can draw on the FCC’s operational
process.  See NTEPPTF Final Report, supra n. 417.
443. The proposal contained here covers only new gTLDs, not assignment of SLDs
within the new hierarchies.  Admittedly, that is not an insignificant problem.  Once a new
TLD is approved, registrars (and perhaps ICANN) will need to consider claims of right to
secondary names.  We expect the familiar concerns of trademark and incumbency (in
parallel gTLDs) to dominate any such consideration.  But, in principle, such claims will be
no different for gTLDs created under this model than they would be for any mechanism
expanding the domain name space, or for that matter existing gTLDs.
444. See supra n. 349 and accompanying text.
445. eBay in fact has served as a secondary market for licenses, which can be
transferred upon the sale of a broadcast station.  For instance, AM station WGAB in
Evansville, Indiana, was for sale on eBay in February, 2003.  The asking price was $2
million. See Radio Magazine, WGAB Evansville for Sale on Ebay,
<http://beradio.com/ar/radio_currents_17/> (Jan. 27, 2003).  Two low-power TV stations
were auctioned off in January, 2003.  See William LaRue, Watertown TV Stations For Sale
On Ebay, The Post-Standard (Jan. 10, 2003) <http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/
Archives?p_action=list&p_topdoc=11&p_maxdocs=210>.
446. This is the primary auction format used by the FCC.  See Fritts, supra n. 340, at
857.
447. All FCC auctions are conducted electronically over the Internet.  See FCC, About
Auctions: Auction Designs <http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/about/auctiondesigns.html>
(Sept. 12, 2001).
448. The FCC also maintains an extensive auction web site.  See FCC, Auctions
<http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions> (Feb. 10, 2003).
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experience with auctions as well as a large body of literature on
auction theory and design.449 Although we describe an auction model
below, we do not propose that ICANN accept it based on our analysis
alone. Rather, our purpose here is to lay out a framework, describing
what should be auctioned and roughly how.450 The actual process of
auction design should include input from economists who specialize
in auction theory;451 indeed, ICANN should either hire a staff
economist or develop a consulting relationship with an economist
specializing in auction design.452
1. What Should Be Auctioned?
Unlike the allocation of radio licenses or telephone numbers,
where the relevant space is identified prior to issuance, the domain
name space is constrained only by the allowable character set and
string length.453 Thus, allocation of gTLDs involves selection both of
domain names and sponsors or operators. The former is analogous to
the radio frequency band or telephone number set; the latter are the
449. See e.g. Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13 J. Econ.
Surveys 227 (1999) (available at <http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/Survey.pdf>
(accessed Jan. 4, 2004)); Paul Klemperer, Using and Abusing Economic Theory
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=379242> (February 2003); Cramton,
supra n. 337.  In this paper we assume that ICANN would itself conduct the auction.
However, it need not.  It could outsource the actual operation to a private party.  There
may be several advantages of privatizing the auction process, not the least of which is
enlisting expertise in an area unfamiliar to a non-profit corporation.
450. As this article was nearing completion, we learned of a similar policy proposal by
Milton Mueller and Lee McKnight, The Post-.COM Internet: A Five-Step Process for Top
Level Domain Additions <http://dcc.syr.edu/miscarticles/NewTLDs-MM-LM.pdf> (Mar.
19, 2003).  We endorse much of the analysis in that paper, which contains somewhat
different and more detailed auction mechanics than here.  To the extent the two proposals
propose different auction designs, this reinforces our suggestion that ICANN should seek
independent advice from qualified economists on the auction design issues.  However, the
fact that we have approached the issue of gTLD expansion from different perspectives,
but reached nearly identical conclusions, reinforces the soundness of the core idea that is
shared by both proposals—gTLD auctions represent the best mechanism for expansion of
the root.
451. In mandating spectrum auctions, Congress also required the FCC to “design and
test multiple alternative methodologies under appropriate circumstances.”  47 U.S.C. §
309(j)(3) (2000).  ICANN should do likewise.
452. In addition to the theorists listed in Klemperer, supra n. 449, specialists at the
FCC are likely available to ICANN for consultation on auction design.
453. The only restriction is that the English alphabet be used.  However, the new
IDNS system is backwards compatible—it allows a user to register non-English characters,
such as Arabic or Chinese, and IDNS converts the characters to ASCII so that the system
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licensees. FCC spectrum auctions, until now at least, have determined
only licensees. Determination of the frequencies to be awarded (the
“auction inventory”), or their permitted uses, is subject to pre-auction
administrative processes.454 Adapting this practice to gTLDs means
that, prior to auction, ICANN would first determine the domain
name or names to be added. An auction would then select the
operators of the newly approved gTLDs. For example, ICANN might
decide to add .sex to the name space, and then hold an auction solely
to determine the registry operator. While this mechanism might
facilitate gTLD expansion, and would certainly produce revenue, it
does not address the principal nature of inefficiency now
encumbering the gTLD selection process.
It is unrealistic to expect ICANN to rationally determine which
gTLDs should be added to the root. There are few if any objective
selection criteria. Does a gTLD need to be pronounceable or have
semantic meaning? Does it need to be descriptive? These questions,
while sensible in the abstract, are not germane to the question at hand
any more than whether nouns and adjectives are eligible to become
gTLDs. In one notorious case, the ICANN Board selected .aero over
.air because it felt the latter was a public resource.455
The principle at play during the first expansion round in 2000
was “proof-of-concept” domains.456 As useful as that might sound for
evaluating many aspects of expansion, including root operation,
allocation methods, and even individual applicants, it is not a
meaningful tool in distinguishing among possible gTLDs. In fact,
there may be no rational policy choices. Regulatory decisions on
which gTLDs to add are inevitably arbitrary, or simply favor
particular interest groups. The highly engineered grid of gTLD
assignments that marks the current domain name space does not
necessarily measure or meet the needs of the Internet community.
Why not let the market decide? If .air has greater utility to the
Internet community than .aero, why shouldn’t it be added? Why not
add both? To be sure, some users may enter .air when they are
looking for .aero. And some domain holders might be induced to
protect their trademarks or investments by buying domains in
454. See e.g. FCC, Public Notice: Revised Inventory and Auction Start Date for Auction
of Lower 700 MHz Band Licenses, DA 03-100  <http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/
bandplans/700lower.pdf > (Jan. 29, 2003).
455. See Scribe’s Notes, ICANN Board Meeting - November 16, 2000 - Los Angeles,
California  <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/la2000/archive/scribe-icann-111600.html>
(Nov. 16, 2000).
456. See Weinberg, supra n. 409, at 25.
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multiple gTLDs (so-called “defensive registrations”). But, those
inefficiencies occur now, and are presumably reflected in the value of
the gTLDs themselves. In short, the auction process should be
structured so the question of which gTLDs to add is itself determined
by the market.457 This is likely to yield a higher and better use of the
name space than would be achievable by any bureaucracy. The
experience of the FCC with “flexible spectrum” allocation strongly
supports economic theory on this point.
Closely related to the question of which gTLDs should be added
is the issue of how many should be authorized at any time. Here
ICANN must play an important role. Integrity of the root and domain
name system is its raison d’être. Unlimited or too-rapid expansion
could overwhelm both the infrastructure and the markets that have
developed based on existing practices. It could also undermine the
goals to be achieved by competitive bidding in the first place. Instead,
ICANN should make an informed judgment, based on technical and
public policy factors, on how fast to expand the domain name space.
But their decisions must be transparent, so as to avoid any suspicion
that stakeholders are manipulating the auction process so as to
maintain scarcity or protect incumbents. In expanding radio bands or
telephone numbers, the FCC is faced with real-world technical
constraints. ICANN needs to articulate similarly objective criteria for
any decision reached on how many gTLDs to add.
In this respect, “proof-of-concept” is a prudent policy. We think
ICANN can legitimately limit the first round of gTLD auctions to a
technically and administratively manageable number. If for no other
reason, the model and economics need to be tested. There were 44
serious applicants for new gTLDs in December, 2000, each anteing up
the $50,000 application fee.458 Several more applicants have emerged
since then. We believe this number – roughly 50 – provides a suitable
lodestar figure for ICANN to consider.459 Presumably, the root server
457. As described by Yochai Benkler in the context of spectrum allocation, “auctions
in and of themselves, without flexible use rights, are but a pale shadow of real market-
based allocation.”  Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16
Harv. J. Law & Tech. 25, 27 (2002).  The analogy for the domain name space is to release
gTLD specification from administrative determinations and let the market decide which
ones have optimal utility.  Or as Karl Auerbach has put it, “the question of new TLDs [is]
not as a question of names but rather of slots.”  Karl Auerbach, Cavebear Blog: Why
Lotteries Are Better Than Auctions When Distributing New TLD Slots
<http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000016.html> (accessed Apr. 4, 2003).
458. Several hundred new gTLDs were proposed by the applicants. See ICANN, supra
n. 201.
459. Mueller and McKnight suggest 40 in the initial round.  See  Mueller & McKnight,
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system can support this number of new gTLDs. And if ICANN’s
cumbersome selection process were replaced by an auction, no
significant administrative burdens would be encountered.460
What should be the duration of the right, purchased at auction,
to operate a gTLD? Should it be like a spectrum license which has a
prescribed term (e.g., 8 years for broadcast licenses), and renewable
thereafter? Or should the right be perpetual? One advantage
licensing has over outright sale is the oversight it forces at renewal
time. ICANN’s agreement with Verisign for operation of the .com,
.org, and .net registries was for eight years, with no mention of
renewal.461 We think this is a suitable term, but that a renewal
expectancy will enhance the price paid and capital investment of new
gTLDs. The right should also be revocable upon material breach of
an agreement with ICANN for the stable operation of the gTLD. So
long as the rules are transparent and term security is worked out in
advanced, the auction should function smoothly.
One objection to an auction for new gTLDs is that incumbent
supra n. 450, at 2 (proposing addition of “40 top-level domains to the Internet domain
name system on an annual basis”).  McKnight and Mueller’s proposal differs from ours in
that they suggest an initial round of 40, ten fewer than we propose, and they suggest that
the same number be auctioned on an annual basis.  We suggest that the first auction be
evaluated by independent economists with auction design experience, and that subsequent
auctions be designed at that stage.  These differences are at the level of detail and do not
reflect a fundamental difference in principle.  We emphasize the importance of consulting
independent economists with auction design expertise because of difficulties we perceive
in the ICANN policy formulation process. See infra pt. V(A) (Auctions and the ICANN
Process).  We do believe that it would be unfortunate if the various constituencies and
supporting organizations under ICANN’s umbrella were permitted to take either our
proposal or the Mueller and McKnight proposal as a baseline and then go through a
bargaining process that would end in the adoption of a consensus auction design.  The
danger that the consensus proposal would facilitate the cartelization of bidders can be
minimized if the auction design itself is developed by independent economists answerable
directly to the ICANN board.  Their recommendations and the board’s deliberations
should be fully transparent.  See Paul Hoffman, Reforming the Administration of the DNS
Root <http://www.proper.com/ICANN-notes/dns-root-admin-reform.html> (April 25,
2002) (proposing 25 new gTLDs every six months).
460. Administrative costs could be recouped, either by establishing a minimum bid or
by requiring bidders to pay a fee—for example $5,000.  In addition to determining the
amount of the fee, ICANN would also need to determine whether the fee would be
refundable to losing bidders.  Although these decisions may seem arbitrary, this is not
necessarily the case.  A bidding fee could affect the yield from the auction, or serve as a
barrier to auction entry.  ICANN should consult with an auction design specialist in
making any decision regarding a bidding fee or minimum bid.
461. See ICANN, ICANN-NSI Registry Agreement,  <http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-
registry-agreement-04nov99.htm#23 > (Nov. 10, 1999) (superceded by Agreement for
Restructured Relationship with VeriSign, <http://www.icann.org/tlds/agreements/verisign/
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registry owners get a free ride. The question is whether the existing
gTLDs should also be auctioned, either in the first round or when
their agreements with ICANN expire. Otherwise, the argument goes,
they would have an advantage over competitor gTLDs because their
acquisition costs were much lower. The half-dozen existing
commercial gTLDs could be auctioned as part of the expansion,
either by ICANN (perhaps with delayed transfer to reflect extant
agreements) or by the private operators as part of a double-sided
auction.462
For a variety of economic and practical reasons, we think
incumbent registry owners should be grandfathered in, at least in the
current round. First, they are already likely to take a significant hit
with large-scale expansion of the root through loss of monopoly
power and rents. Second, their pricing structure for SLDs, often for
long terms, was set in reliance on making annual payments to ICANN
rather than paying a capitalized up-front purchase price. Finally, the
incumbent gTLDs have enormous influence on ICANN’s decision-
making process. That reality of “regulatory capture” cannot be
ignored in restructuring gTLD expansion policies. If incumbent
expectancies were suddenly unsettled, it is less likely that the
necessary paradigm shift would be approved.
In sum, we propose that ICANN authorize a first-round auction
of 50 new gTLDs, for renewable terms where both the specific gTLDs
and their operators would be selected by competitive bidding. We
next show how the process might work.
2. Auction Framework
Although auctions were used by ancient societies, they have
gained considerable attention in recent years among economists and
mathematicians, striving to test game theory and theories of market
pricing, formation and mechanics.463 Often there are asymmetries of
information, or unknown quantities (such as future revenue streams),
which make precise market pricing impossible. An auction is a good
way to interact amidst uncertainty; hence their attraction for game-
theoretic analysis.
Once the rationale of auctions has been accepted, the next issue
is their design. There is a rich body of work on this, both theoretical
462. See Kwerel & Williams, supra n. 358, at 24 (provides discussion of a double-sided
public-private auction for spectrum licenses).
463. See generally Klemperer, Auction Theory, supra n. 449.
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and empirical.464 “What really matters in auction design are the same
issues that any industry regulator would recognize as key concerns:
discouraging collusive, entry-deterring and predatory behavior. In
short, good auction design is mostly good elementary economics.”465
The literature generally describes four basic types of auctions:
• the ascending bid auction (bids increase as participants drop
out until only one is left);
• the descending bid auction (“Dutch auction”) (offering price
starts high and is lowered in successive rounds until one
bidder accepts the price);
• the first-price sealed-bid auction (each bidder submits a single
bid without seeing any others; the highest bidder wins); and
• the second-price sealed-bid auction (“Vickrey auction”) (as
above, but the highest bidder pays the price of the second
highest bid).466
Ascending bid auctions are the most common and are probably
the easiest to implement, especially given the nature of the bidding
we propose (highest bids determine not only which parties gain slots
but also which party gets a slot on which more than one party bids.
However, they are also prone to collusion, as Klemperer
demonstrates.467 They can also discourage entry by risk-adverse
bidders – those for whom perceived overbidding (called the “winner’s
curse”) would be costly. In ascending bid auctions, participants with
an advantage or greater perceived staying power, can not only win,
they can win at a low price by discouraging participation by others.
Developing an advantage through tactical measures (e.g., intimidating
competitors) or predation can be profitable.468 Sophisticated bidders
prepare in advance to “game the auction.”469
Many of these pitfalls can be mitigated by proper design and
mechanics. Low entry barriers, high reserve prices, minimum
464. Other advocates of gTLD auctions have also proposed ideas for auction design.
See e.g. Hoffman, Reforming the Administration of the DNS Root, supra n. 459; Internet
Democracy Project, Answers from Emerson Tiller  <http://www.internetdemocracyproject.
org/IDPanswerstiller.htm> (last modified Sept. 25, 2000).
465. Paul Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, at 2  <http://www.nuff.
ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/wrm6.pdf> (Aug., 2001).
466. See Klemperer, Auction Theory, supra n. 449, at 4-5.  Mueller and McKnight
suggest a form of Vickery auction under their proposal for gTLD expansion.  They would
determine the 30 highest bids by ascending price, but all winning bidders would pay the
bid price of the lowest winning bid.  See Mueller & McKnight, supra n. 450.
467. See Klemperer, Auction Theory, supra n. 449, at 3-4.
468. See id. for a fuller analysis of these points.
469. Id. at 9.
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increments, and enforced rules (e.g., collusion and cartel formation)
can help secure the validity of the auction. Misbehaviors are
minimized in our model by the variable identity of the good sold
(artificially low bids for any particular gTLD will be surpassed by
bidders for other names; neither the low bid nor its proffered gTLD
will win).470 “Punishing” anticompetitive behavior is an important
safeguard.
The benefits of an ascending price auction have been
demonstrated in the case of spectrum auctions.471 This format tends to
“allocate the prizes to the bidders who value them the most,”472 thus
achieving the prime desideratum—an efficient outcome. Especially in
open multi-unit auctions, as we propose, ascending auctions allow for
greater information exchange among bidders, thus reducing risk
aversion.473 Attractiveness to bidders is a key element of successful
auctions.
Finally, an ascending auction with a specified ending time can
reap some of the advantages provided by a sealed-bid auction without
that format’s principal disadvantage – disgruntled buyer or seller in
the event of outlying (grossly high or low) bids.474 Toward the end of
bidding time in a fixed length auction, serious bidders tend to make a
last best offer—thus, effectively simulating the so-called English-
Dutch auction (combining an initial ascending open-bid phase with a
subsequent first-price sealed-bid phase). Perhaps it is no accident that
eBay, the world’s largest auction house, uses an ascending auction
with the safeguards and features described here. Accordingly, that is
the structure we propose as a baseline for the process of designing the
first gTLD auction.
Eligibility and Standards
In most auctions, only qualified bidders are eligible to
participate. The auction house needs to satisfy itself that the bidder
has means to pay or is credit-worthy, is lawfully entitled to take
possession and use the item, and hasn’t engaged in collusion or anti-
competitive behavior in the past. On eBay, for instance, bidders must
pre-register and their bidding history is available for all to see. At
470. For instance, if bidders A and B agreed in advance to low bid a gTLD, it would
likely finish outside the top 50; hence it would not be approved.
471. See Crampton, supra n. 232, at 2-3.
472. Klemperer, Auction Theory, supra n. 449, at 12.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 15.
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FCC auctions, bidders must pre-qualify475 to show they meet license
eligibility requirements. They must also make upfront payments to
assure financial ability. We think ICANN should similarly set
eligibility standards to pre-qualify bidders prior to auction. These
standards would be mostly of a technical and financial character. In
fact they need not be significantly different than those in effect now.
gTLD operators should have a registry plan in place, be technically
competent to provide robust domain name services (or contract with
a third-party to operate the name servers, zone files, and other
technical services),476 and be adequately capitalized.
One could take the contrary position that anybody should be
able to participate in the auctions; whether they ultimately are
allowed to operate the gTLD is a separate matter. For instance, a
successful bidder at an auto auction is not guaranteed the right to
drive the car off the lot. She must also have a driver’s license. But that
approach overlooks ICANN’s role as superintendent of the root and
domain name system. It has a public trust responsibility to
information providers and users alike. That is best discharged by
insuring that gTLD bidders can actually provide the name services
they claim to offer.
One eligibility requirement deserves special mention – the right
to use a trademark as a gTLD. An entire industry, consisting of a
special purpose law – the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act (ACPA)477 – and an arbitration procedure – Uniform Domain-
Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP)478 – is built on trademark
usurpation in domain names. Up until now, this problem has arisen
only with SLDs. But trademarks such as .ibm have been proposed as
gTLDs. To avoid involving the auction process in trademark
litigation, ICANN should assure that bidders for trademarked gTLDs
have the right to use them. It could do this by adopting a “sunrise
policy;” i.e., a gTLD reservation process limited to trademark owners.
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) recently set a similar requirement for SLDs within the .us
475. See FCC, Form 175: Application to Participate in an FCC Auction
<https://auctionfiling.fcc.gov/form175/index.htm> (accessed Feb. 18, 2003).
476. As others have observed, there is no reason why the proprietor, or manager, of a
gTLD must also be the operator.  Pre-qualified registry operators can manage back end
technical operations and contract their services to gTLD proprietors.  In fact, ICANN
could qualify contract registry operators as part of a structured root expansion.  See
Business Constituency, supra n. 208 and accompanying text.
477. 15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq. (2000).
478. ICANN, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy <http://www.icann.
org/udrp/udrp.htm> (Aug. 26, 2001).
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country code TLD.479 But we see no reason trademark owners should
get a free ride in the allocation of gTLD space. Nor should
trademarks necessarily prevail over other gTLDs, at least in the
limited first round of gTLD expansion by competitive bidding.
Accordingly, while a trademark owner may be the only one lawfully
entitled to operate a trademarked gTLD, it should compete in
auction for the right to do so.
ICANN should also set a reserve price. This serves several
purposes. Among them are: discouraging collusion, recovering costs
of administrative overhead, generating revenue, maintaining
minimum values in the name space,480 assuring financial ability, and
avoiding speculation (super cybersquatting). We think the processing
fee charged to applicants in 2000 ($50,000) serves as a good baseline
reserve price.481 The precise amount, as well as eligibility standards
and auction mechanics, should be determined by ICANN through
referral, notice and comment, as it does now with policy initiatives.
The collective judgment of the Internet community can shed
substantial light on specific auction parameters beyond the
framework we have described. We next illustrate how the auction
would work.
Sample Auction
Assume, for the sake of illustration, that 100 bidders meet
eligibility standards and participate in the auction.482 When bidding
starts, each participant can offer one or more gTLDs together with a
479. See Brian Kahin, Making Policy by Solicitation: The Outsourcing of .us July 16,
2001 <http://icannwatch.org/essays/kahin.htm> (accessed Feb. 22, 2003).
480. One advantage of opening up the domain name space is to vitiate the monopolies
created by artificially-created scarcity.  Nonetheless, many existing stakeholders have
developed reasonable investment-backed expectations.  These should not be wiped out
unnecessarily.  A measured pace of expansion will give those who relied upon quasi-
monopolies in the name space an opportunity to at least partially amortize their
investments.
481. According to Klemperer, game theory also enters into the calculus of setting
reserve prices.  In standard auctions, setting a “reserve price equal to the seller’s cost is
revenue maximizing for the seller.”  Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, supra n.
449,  at 22.  Here, however, ICANN has no cost of goods other than its administration of
the root and operational expenses (including running the auction itself).  We presume
$50,000 is a good first approximation of those costs, based on round 1 in Nov. 2000, but
other reserve prices could be argued for equally forcefully.
482. It is important that the number of gTLDs offered be substantially less than the
number of bidders, so as to avoid signaling near the close of bidding.  If fewer than 100
bidders qualify, we think ICANN should correspondingly lower the number of gTLDs that
would be approved.
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bid amount.483 For instance, a Hollywood entrepreneur might make an
opening bid of $250,000 for the right to operate .movie. Some bidders
may be content to bid on gTLDs already on the bid list, rather than
proffer their own. Other bidders will have a unique claim to a gTLD.
For instance, if IBM proposes .ibm, no other bidder would be
qualified to operate it. One might expect IBM to offer the reserve
price ($50,000) and not a cent more, confident that no one else can
outbid it. But $50,000 for .ibm might not be one of the top 50 bids, in
which case, that gTLD would not be approved.
Bidding would take place in public over the Internet, much the
same way that other on-line auctions are conducted. Between the
open and close of bidding, all bids would be listed, showing rank,
gTLD, amount, and bidder. It would hypothetically look something
like this (only six shown):
Time remaining: 1 day, 16 hrs, 4 min.
Rank gTLD Bid Amount Bidder
1 .movie $250,000 Hollywood Domains, Inc.
2 .sex $247,500 Hustler
3 .web $244,200 Image Online Design, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
50 .site $195,000 Afilias, Inc.
51 .mobile $194,500 Nokia, Inc.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
100 .geo $50,001 SRI International
Relative ranking in the top 50 is unimportant, as each will win
the right to be added to the root. Accordingly, bids in this group are
likely to be close to one another. The real battle will be waged at the
boundary, between the 50th and 51st ranked bids. As the auction nears
close, Nokia and Afilias will both raise their bids, trying to
preemptively outflank the other, as well as bids higher up the ladder.
Anyone who has lost an eBay auction can appreciate how seasoned
bidders have perfected winning strategies, such as last-second stealth
483. We expect that some participants will offer multiple gTLDs, and some gTLDs will
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maneuvers. Indeed, bidding software helps those who are serious
about the enterprise.484
This is an auction within an auction. For instance, if Hustler and
Playboy both bid for .sex, only the higher of the two can succeed,
even if they are both among the top 50 bids. Subjecting both gTLDs
and operators to competitive bidding serves two salient purposes.
First, it works as an anti-collusion mechanism. Competitors are
unlikely to conspire to make low bids, since that could exclude both
from the winning pool. Second, the auction identifies the 50 most
valued gTLDs, not merely those who most want to operate registries.
This not only maximizes revenue to ICANN, it puts the domain name
space to the highest and best use, as measured by market players. To
facilitate this assessment, the auction should remain open long
enough (perhaps 30 days) so that participants can obtain feedback
from potential customers and other constituents.
The most notable result of an auction along these lines is that the
successful gTLDs are not likely to be ones that ICANN would select
under existing policies and practices. Therein lies a principal purpose
in preferring markets for the allocation of private goods.
C. gTLD Auctions Would Serve the Public Interest
In this section, we demonstrate that auctions of new gTLDs
would serve the public interest. First, we establish that as a matter of
law, ICANN has a mandate to serve the public interest.485 Second, we
argue that auctions serve the public interest in three ways:486 by
securing adequate funding for ICANN to perform its core missions,487
by allowing ICANN to subsidize uses of the root space that are in the
public interest, but not supported by the market,488 and by putting the
root to its highest and best commercial uses.489
484. See e.g. Auction Sentry, Auction Sniping, Tracking and Bidding Tool
<http://www.auction-sentry.com> (accessed Feb. 18, 2003); Auction Sniper, Are you tired
of losing eBay auctions? <http://www.auctionsniper.com> (accessed Mar. 18, 2003).
485. See infra pt. IV(C)(1) (ICANN’s Mandate to Serve the Public Interest).
486. See infra pt. IV(C)(2) (gTLD Auctions Serve the Public Interest).
487. See infra pt. IV(C)(2) (Auction Revenue Can Address ICANN’s Funding
Problems).
488. See infra pt. IV(C)(2) (Surplus Auction Proceeds Would Enable ICANN to
Pursue Public Interest Projects Consistent with its Core Mission).
489. See infra pt. IV(C)(2) (Auctions Provide for Efficient Allocation of the Root
Resource).
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1. ICANN’s Mandate to Serve the Public Interest
ICANN is a California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation.490
To qualify as such, the corporation must have a “public or charitable
purpose.”491 Public benefit corporations “are not operated for the
mutual benefit of their members but for some broader good.”492
ICANN is also operated, “exclusively for charitable, educational, and
scientific purposes within the meaning of § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code.”493 Principal among “the charitable and public
purposes” of ICANN are “performing and overseeing functions
related to the coordination of the [DNS], including the development
of policies for determining the circumstances under which new top-
level domains are added to the DNS root system.”494
In short, ICANN’s TLD policies must promote a public purpose
that inures to the “broader good,” not unlike the FCC’s mandate to
promote the “public interest, convenience and necessity.” This is
confirmed by ICANN’s MOU with the Department of Commerce,
which stresses the Corporation’s public trust responsibility over the
TLD name space.495 If auctions fail to serve the public interest, or
transmute ICANN into a for-profit corporation,496 they ought not to
be considered in any expansion of the gTLD name space. But the
public purpose of market allocation policies is well demonstrated by
theory,497 analogous FCC practice,498 and by ICANN’s own statement
of purpose. Thus, in “operat[ing] for the benefit of the Internet
community as a whole,” the Corporation shall do so “to the extent
appropriate . . . through open and transparent processes that enable
competition and open entry in Internet-related markets.”499
490. See Cal. Corp. Code § 5110, et seq (2003).
491. Cal. Corp. Code § 5111 (2003).
492. Cal. Corp. Code § 5110, Legislative Committee Summary (2003).
493. See ICANN,  Articles Of Incorporation of Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (As Revised) <http://www.icann.org/general/articles.htm>
(November 21, 1998).
494. Id.
495. See generally Froomkin, supra n. 79.
496. This would occur, for example, if the proceeds were treated as proprietary and
distributed to members of the  corporation.
497. See supra pt. II (An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy).
498. See supra pt. III (Comparisons with Telecommunications Policy).
499. ICANN Articles Of Incorporation, supra, n. 493.  See also ICANN, Bylaws for
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers <http://www.icann.org/
general/bylaws.htm> (Dec. 15, 2002) (“In performing its mission, the following core values
should guide the decisions and actions of ICANN: . . . 5. Where feasible and appropriate,
depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment 6.
Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where
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2. gTLD Auctions Serve the Public Interest
Is our auctions proposal consistent with ICANN’s obligation to
serve the public interest? Opponents of auctions might argue that the
auction scheme puts ICANN in the role of a profit-maximizing
market participant, and hence that auctions are inconsistent with
ICANN’s role as a trustee for the public interest. In this section, we
demonstrate that this concern is misguided. In fact, gTLD auctions
would facilitate ICANN’s ability to serve the public interest in a
variety of ways. Indeed, we demonstrate the gTLD auctions better
serve the interests of the public at large, including end users,500 than
would the alternative options available for expansion of the TLD
name space.
Because auctions promote allocative efficiency, per unit
operational costs for name services will decrease. In a competitive
world, some or all of these savings are passed along to consumers. In
the case of name service in the gTLD space, it means that marginal
costs by registry operators in the form of annual fees paid to ICANN
may go down or rise at a slower pace. Lower costs are likely to result
even though gTLD operators will bear acquisition costs not realized
currently. These up-front payments are offset by marginal cost
reductions and reduced need for periodic payments from name
service providers. SLDs will share in these reductions as well as from
elimination of monopoly rents that gTLD operators charge due to
their quasi-monopoly status in an environment of artificial scarcity.
If gTLD operators are paying ICANN at auction, should they
continue to make annual contributions to ICANN’s budget?
Broadcast and telephony analogies are imperfect since consumption
of the respective name spaces in those industries had been at zero
cost prior to the advent of competitive bidding. Still, the FCC charged
license application fees (analogous to ICANN’s gTLD application
fee) which partially funded ongoing agency operations.
Thus, ICANN could continue to charge an annual fee to
registrars and registry operators, but the amounts should reflect the
costs of specific oversight functions (e.g., IANA), rather than serve as
a general purpose tax, as is the case now. Even with a lower fee
structure, ICANN’s annual revenue stream might go up, rather than
down, because of the increased number of gTLD operators and
registrars. The ultimate level of non-auction fees requires further
economic and fiscal analysis. We simply observe that auction
practicable and beneficial in the public interest.”).
500. See supra n. 16 (defining end users in contrast to information providers).
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payments by successful gTLD bidders would not necessarily increase
consumer costs; it would very likely reduce them.
Auction Revenue Can Address ICANN’s Funding Problems
One obvious effect of conducting gTLD auctions would be to
increase ICANN’s revenues. Is this necessary or desirable? In its July
2000 report to the House and Senate Commerce Subcommittees, the
General Accounting Office (GAO) noted that “funding has been a
source of concern for ICANN.”501 An original proposal to levy a $1
per year licensing fee on each domain name registration was rejected
by the Department of Commerce. Instead, ICANN relies on
payments, some voluntary, some contractual, from various registries
and registrars for its annual budget of approximately $4 million.
Because many country code registries refuse to pay their share (they
call it an “arbitrary tax”), “ICANN has experienced continued
difficulties in securing a stable funding mechanism.”502 Even more
problematic, “ICANN’s current fundraising is a recipe for
undermining legitimacy. It is likely to (1) subject ICANN to
undesirable influences; (2) subvert its objectives by increasing its
staff; and (3) render its decisions unfair and arbitrary.”503
From an economic standpoint, the controversy over ICANN’s
attempt to charge ccTLD operators a fee for the provision of root
service seems odd on the surface. ICANN is providing a valuable
service that ccTLD operators utilize. Why would the ccTLD
operators expect this service to be provided for free? Putting the
point another way, why do ccTLD operators expect that they should
be allowed to be free riders, consuming a service for which others
pay? Part of the answer to these obvious questions lies in the history
of the DNS and root service. Root service was historically provided
free of any specific charge. Because the ccTLD operators were not
required to pay for root service in the past, they may have come to
see free root service as an entitlement. Moreover, each ccTLD is
organized autonomously. Some ccTLD operators provide name
501. Ltr. from Robert P. Murphy, Gen. Counsel, GAO, to Subcomm. on Commerce,
Justice, State, and the Jud.; Comm. on Appropriations, United States Sen.; Subcomm. on
Commerce, Justice, State, and the Jud., and Related Agencies; Comm. on Appropriations,
H. Rep. to Honorable Judd Gregg, Subcomm. on Commerce, J., State, and the Jud.,
Depart. of Commerce: Relationship with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers 43  <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/og00033r.pdf> (July 7, 2000).
502. Id. at 44.
503. Tamar Frankel, Accountability and Oversight of the Internet Corporation for




Published by Digital USD, 2004
SOLUM2V8-FINAL.DOC 2/9/04  10:06 AM
2003] ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DOMAIN NAME POLICY 431
service within their domain free of charge.504 For such operators, the
imposition of a fee for root service may pose a substantial challenge.
The subsidy to the ccTLD operator may be insufficient to cover the
charge for root service, and it may not be politically feasible to cover
this charge by either charging for name service within the ccTLD’s
domain or by obtaining public or private subsidies. Hence, it is quite
natural for ccTLD operators to strongly oppose the imposition of a
fee for root service.
In a first-best world, ccTLD operators should bear the cost of
root service and pass that cost on to registrants within the ccTLD.
This solution is first best, because it prevents the inefficient use of
root service. But the first best solution may well be unavailable—
“outside the feasible choice set,” in economic parlance. ICANN’s
bottom-up, consensus-driven process has so far proven resistant to
the effective collection of a root service charge from the ccTLD
operators. Hence, there is good reason to consider second-best
solutions. One possibility is to utilize revenues from a gTLD auction
to subsidize the provision of root service to the ccTLDs. In this essay,
we do not address the legitimacy or desirability of ICANN’s charging
a fee to the ccTLD operators for the provision of root service. Our
point is a modest one: auction revenues do not have the practical
problems associated with charging the ccTLDs for root service.
A stable and unified root is in the public interest. For historical
reasons, ICANN provides the best currently-available institutional
home for the maintenance and management of a stable root. It
follows that it is in the public interest for ICANN to have an adequate
source of funding, and gTLD auctions provide a very attractive,
politically feasible means by which ICANN can obtain necessary
funding.
We recognize that ICANN has critics. Some of these critics may
oppose gTLD auctions on the ground that fiscal instability may be a
likely route to ICANN’s economic demise. It is possible that populist
rhetoric aimed at the “ICANN tax” is motivated by opposition to
ICANN itself. These topics are outside the scope of this paper. We
believe that if ICANN is replaced, the replacement entity will be in a
better position to make DNS policy if ICANN commits to (or carries
out) an auction experiment. We also note that it is far from clear that
a replacement entity would be better positioned to replace the
“beauty contest” model with auctions.
504. See DomainConquest.com, Registration Overview  <http://www.domainconquest.
com/register/overview.htm> (accessed Dec. 17, 2003).
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Surplus Auction Proceeds Would Enable ICANN to Pursue Public Interest
Projects Consistent with its Core Mission
What if gTLD auctions were to yield revenues that exceeded
ICANN’s budgetary requirements? We take no position on the
question whether this is likely to happen. On the one hand, it is
difficult or impossible to estimate the revenues that would result from
a gTLD auction. Presumably, those revenues would be invested in an
endowment fund that would yield income for ICANN’s operational
budget.505 On the other hand, ICANN’s current budget does not
provide a clear picture of ICANN’s true financial need. For example,
the root system is currently subsidized by various root server
operators. If ICANN were adequately funded, it might be
appropriate for ICANN to pay fair market value for root server
operation. Moreover, ICANN’s current staffing plan is arguably
inadequate. For example, ICANN does not have a professional
economist on staff—a dangerous condition for an entity responsible
for making economic decisions with potentially enormous
consequences.506 Moreover, ICANN lacks funding to conduct
substantial outreach programs that would enable end users507 to
participate meaningfully in the ICANN policy formulation process.
Because both revenues and expenditures are difficult to estimate,
the notion of an auction revenue surplus is hypothetical. However,
were such a surplus to materialize, ICANN would have ample
opportunities to utilize the surplus in ways that are consistent with
ICANN’s core mission and that would serve the public interest. The
obvious comparison here is to the telecommunications industry’s
universal service and e-rate funds. These support a number of
consumer subsidies, from “plain old telephone service” (POTS) to
high speed broadband access by schools, libraries and rural health
care providers. They are in partial fulfillment of Congress’ mandate
to promote “deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of
505. We assume that bidders in a gTLD auction would be required to submit lump-
sum, as opposed to periodic payment bids.  We also assume that a fixed number of gTLDs
would be auctioned, and that auctions would, at least initially, be relatively infrequent.
We also assume that the value of new gTLDs could decline over time, as alternatives to
the DNS emerge and as the baseline number of gTLDs grows.  Thus, it would be prudent
for the ICANN board to treat the proceeds of the initial gTLD auction as a capital
endowment, as opposed to annual income.
506. By way of comparison, the FCC has traditionally employed a sizable professional
staff of analysts, headed by a nationally renown economist.  The agency’s current chief
economist is Simon Wilkie, Professor of Economics at California Institute of Technology.
507. See supra n. 16 (defining end users in contrast to information providers).
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advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.”508
Approximately $4 billion are made available annually through the e-
rate fund alone for a variety of public interest programs. Although
ICANN’s surplus revenues are likely to be far less, templates exist for
use of such funds in the public interest.
Public interest organizations have already explored options for
subsidizing public interest uses of the root. For example, .Kids, one of
the pending applicants for a new gTLD has proposed auctioning off
“glamour” SLDs and using the proceeds to fund charitable activities
on and off the Internet.509 The Benton Foundation proposed to the
Department of Commerce that the .us ccTLD be restructured with
SLDs auctioned off with proceeds funding various public interest
programs. Their goal was to narrow the “digital divide” by
“promot[ing] access by all Americans to communications services.”510
We do not advocate these particular proposals.511 We urge
ICANN to act cautiously, limiting its public-interest projects to those
which have a strong connection with ICANN’s core functions. For
example, one serious problem with the DNS is that the system
currently is limited to domain names that utilize the standard Roman
alphabet and Arabic numerals. This obviously creates barriers of
access to Internet users who are literate only in languages that use
other alphabets or ideograms. ICANN has already initiated a project
for the development of Internationalized Domain Names (IDN).512
Surplus auction funds could be used to accelerate this process and
extend IDN beyond the major international languages, such as
Mandarin Chinese, Japanese, and modern Arabic, to smaller
language groups that would benefit from native language domain
name service. Perhaps, in addition to consulting economists on
domain name policies, ICANN should also consult linguists, social
anthropologists and others with relevant expertise, regarding the
impact of the DNS on Internet usage by those whose written
508. 47 U.S.C. § 157 (2003).
509. See .Kids Domains, Inc., Description of TLD Policies <http://www.icann.org
/tlds/kids4/policies> (accessed October 31, 2003).  The .Kids registry would have been
operated for free by ICM Registry, Inc., another rejected applicant.
510. Benton Foundation Media Access Project, Comments of the Benton Foundation
and the Media Access Project <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/usrfc2/
comments.html> (Oct. 6, 2000).
511. Nor are we opposed to them on their merits.  We believe that worthy “digital
divide” programs should be pursued by government agencies and non-governmental
organizations.
512. See ICANN, Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) Committee <http://www.
icann.org/committees/idn/> (accessed April 8, 2003).
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language does not employ the Roman alphabet / Arabic numeral
character set.
With surplus auction revenue, ICANN could fund other
programs that overcome the global digital divide. Among these are
grant funds for gTLDs in Less Developed Countries (LDCs), or
targeted at outreach to Internet users in LDCs. Overcoming the
digital divide, especially in LDCs, is a long-term goal consistent with
ICANN’s mandate to operate in the public interest. Many programs
towards this goal, such as the current IDN project, can be adopted
and implement by ICANN on its own initiative. However, ICANN
should work with other international groups, including Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), to develop other programs.
While many such programs can and will operate independent of
ICANN, only ICANN can approve new gTLDs or create a
mechanism to do so. In short, ICANN could make tremendous
headway in coordinated efforts to overcome the digital divide, if only
it had the revenue to do so.513
Auctions Provide for Efficient Allocation of the Root Resource
There is yet another and more fundamental reason why gTLD
auctions serve the public interest. Auctions put the root to its highest
and best use. It is a fundamental assumption of current ICANN policy
that the root space is a scarce resource. Why is the root “scarce” in
the economic sense? There are two reasons. First, we assume that the
Domain Name System cannot feasibly support an unlimited number
of TLDs. We neither endorse nor oppose this assumption. It rests on
historical experience with the root and technical judgments best made
by experts. Second, and more fundamentally, the root is a scarce
resource, because for any given unique string of characters that could
function as a gTLD name, there can only be one authoritative system
of name servers for that string. In other words, there can only be one
.com, one .net, one .biz, and so forth. Either of the two reasons would
independently establish that the root is scarce in the economists’
sense of that concept.
Given that the root is a scarce economic resource, the question
becomes: how can the root be put to its highest and best use? At this
point, we have already established the foundations for an answer to
this question. We have established that, as a matter of economic
theory, the DNS is a private good, although it is also a public
513. See Equity Enhancing gTLD Auctions <http://gtld-auctions.net/eeauctions.html>
(accessed April 8, 2003); Mueller & McKnight, supra n. 450, at 21-22.
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resource. The analogous cases of the broadcast spectrum and the
telephone number space provide a wealth of experience for
determining whether theory conforms to practice. In both arenas, a
similar lesson has been learned. Well-designed auctions can put
public resources to their highest and best use.
At this stage, we complete our argument. We shall demonstrate
that gTLD auctions will lead to the most efficient use of the root
resource. Our argument will proceed in three stages. In the discussion
that immediately follows, we show how an auction combined with a
secondary market in gTLDs leads to an efficient allocation of the root
resource—in the abstract as a matter of economic theory. We then
proceed in the section that follows to reinforce this demonstration by
comparing gTLD auctions to four alternative policies: a static root, a
taxonomy plan, case-by-case public interest evaluation, and a rule of
first occupation.514 Although gTLD auctions have advantages of each
of these four alternatives, the alternatives themselves are not equal.
First occupation is the best of the alternatives, case-by-case
evaluation is next best, a taxonomy plan is the third best option, and a
static root is the worst of all. In the final section of this part, we
attempt to anticipate and answer objections to auctions as a means to
allocate new gTLDs.
Why are gTLD auctions efficient? No doubt some readers will
think this question answers itself. An auction creates a market for
gTLDs. For any given gTLD name, the bidder that can put the string
to the highest and best use will make the highest bid for the string. If
the number of new gTLDs is limited, then an auction provides a
mechanism by which those gTLDs that produce the greatest value
will be created; the most valuable gTLD strings will receive the
highest bids. Since the Internet is an economic engine of unparallel
strength, “highest and best use” gTLDs means further economic
growth. “Billions of dollars of cumulative loss to the U.S. economy
have been attributed to inefficient spectrum allocations under the
[pre-auction] system.”515 It is impossible to know whether the current
regime of gTLD deployment has been as damaging. Still, one cannot
gainsay that more efficient allocation in the gTLD name space will
have a positive effect on the economy and provide services of value to
end users of the Internet.
514. See infra pt. IV(D) (gTLD Auctions Have Comparative Advantages over the
Feasible Alternatives).
515. Evan Kwerel & John Williams, A Proposal for a Rapid Transition to Market
Allocation of Spectrum 1 (FCC Office of Plans and Policy 2002).
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However, many readers may raise an objection at this point.
What about valuable gTLDs that are not associated with profit-
making enterprises? For example, in a gTLD auction, it is likely that
.museum would not have been created. Isn’t it possible that the
.museum domain will create more good than some alternatives with
greater market value, for example .sex, .ibm, or .biz? This is a
complex issue,516 but it does not need to be resolved. If there are high
social value, low market-value gTLDs, an auction scheme will do a
better job of creating and supporting them.
How can that be so? We have already seen the answer in our
discussion above.517 If there is a need to subsidize public-interest
gTLDs, then the best way to accomplish that goal is to provide
ICANN with adequate resources. The proceeds of gTLD auctions can
be utilized to subsidize public-interest gTLDs, and if necessary, to
expand the capacity of the root to make the DNS capable of
supporting the additional gTLDs. If ICANN should subsidize some
uses of the root, then ICANN needs the resources that will enable it
to do so.
Finally, the experience of the FCC in the United States and of
regulators in a variety of other nations suggests that auction design is
important. A badly designed auction can facilitate the cartelization of
bidders—leading to lower auction prices. Auction structure might
itself result in inefficient uses of the name space. For this reason, we
urge ICANN to seek input from outside the ICANN community
when designing the gTLD auction. Telcos are players in spectrum
auctions for wireless phone bandwidth, and they also play an
important role as both backbone operators and ISPs. But it goes
without saying that the telcos should not be permitted to dominate
the auction design process. ICANN’s board must seek independent
516. From an economic perspective, the question is whether there are public-good
gTLDs.  That is, are there gTLDs that cannot be provided by the market?  This question is
complicated in part by the availability of second level domains for public-good associated
hosts.  In the gTLD space, the .org domain provides a home for many nonprofits; the .gov
domain provides a home for government entities.  In the ccTLD space, third level domains
serve the same function.  Even if there are gTLDs that are associated with the provision of
public goods, it isn’t clear that the gTLDs themselves should be considered public goods.
Provision of public goods requires a variety of scarce resources.  Governments, for
example, need to purchase gasoline, electricity, paper, and personal computers.  No one is
much inclined to argue, however, that gasoline should be provided to the government for
free or that suppliers should be required by law to sell gasoline to the government at
below cost, making up the difference (in the form of a hidden tax) by charging more to
other consumers.  For the sake of argument, however, we assume that public-good gTLDs
may exist.
517. See supra pt. IV(C)(2) (gTLD Auctions Serve the Public Interest).
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advice about auction design to be faithful to its statutory mandate to
act in the public interest.
D. gTLD Auctions Have Comparative Advantages Over the Feasible
Alternatives
Fundamentally, gTLD auctions are a good idea, because they put
a scarce resource, the root, to its highest and best use. Our argument
thus far, however, is incomplete, because we have yet to consider the
alternatives to auctions. No doubt the human imagination can devise
an almost infinite number of conceivable policies for allocating the
root space. Here we consider five options that we believe are within
the feasible choice set and are at least somewhat likely to be on the
agenda for consideration by ICANN.
1. A Static Root
The first option is a static root. It is likely that within the ICANN
process, there will be some advocates for a static root. For example,
Verisign derives an economic rent from its position as the quasi-
monopolist registry for the .com domain and as the legacy registrar
for many of the second level domains in .com, .org, and .net. We do
not pretend to know whether the expansion of the gTLD name space
will have a significant impact on Verisign’s rents, but there are good
theoretical reasons to suspect this might be the case. New gTLDs can
compete with Verisign in the provision of registry service, and
competition will tend to drive prices down to the level of costs
(including, of course, the cost of capital). Proprietors of other gTLDs,
for example, the .biz, .info, and .name gTLDs may be in a similar
economic position. To take one example, the proprietors of .name
may fear that a .nom domain would be a potential competitor for the
registration of individual names as second level domains.
But these advocates for a static root do not represent the public
interest. They are rent seekers; that is, they seek to charge prices
higher than those that they could charge in a competitive market.
Those rents come at the expense of information providers and end
users. Such rents lack economic justification. They are naked wealth
transfers to the firms that receive them.
But a static root does more than simply benefit some existing
stakeholders at the public’s expense; it also precludes innovative uses
of the gTLD space that could produce substantial benefits. We do not
pretend to know what these uses are. Some of the possible uses are
contained in the various proposals that were submitted to ICANN in
the last round of gTLD proposals. Undoubtedly, others would
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emerge in a gTLD auction. We do know that private firms that
submit gTLD bids will not make the bids, unless they believe that
they can make a profit on the operation of the new gTLD.
2. The Taxonomy Alternative
A second alternative is for ICANN to expand the root by
adopting a taxonomy. By taxonomy, we mean a structured set of
names. The current root was intended to be taxonomized. The
ccTLDs are semantically significant designators for geographical
regions, nations and their territories. The gTLDs were intended to
designate various categories of information providers.518 Thus, .com
was for commercial enterprises, .org was for nonprofit enterprises,
.net for internet related information providers, and so forth.519 This
same concept could be extended to add additional categories. These
categories might be laid out by ICANN or by some other body
charged by ICANN with the task of expanding the taxonomy. For
ease of reference, we shall refer to whatever body would produce the
taxonomy as the “taxonomy committee.”
Auctions would be superior to an expanded taxonomy for
reasons that we have already made clear in our discussion of a static
root. The taxonomy approach does not permit the market to operate
in the allocation of the root resource. If the gTLDs that would be
proposed by the taxonomy committee are the highest and best use of
the root, then private firms will have an incentive to bid and win the
right to provide gTLD names that would be included in the
taxonomy. It seems more likely, however, that a gTLD auction can do
a superior job of identifying those gTLD names that would put the
root to its highest and best use. There are several reasons for this
conclusion:
• Auctions bring the resources of many firms into the
identification process. Each firm that bids will expend
resources and deploy personnel in the process of deciding on
a maximum bid price. A taxonomy committee, however,
would consist of a small number of individuals, likely
volunteers, likely without a substantial staff, who would work
part-time on the project of developing the taxonomy.
• Auctions bring the profit motive to bear. Whereas a taxonomy
committee has no profit incentive to identify the highest and
518. See supra n. 16 (defining information providers by way of contrast with end
users).
519. See supra pt. I(C)(2) (The Generic TLDs).
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best uses for the root, firms bidding in a gTLD auction would
have such incentives.
• Adoption of the taxonomy approach is itself a decision about
the highest and best uses of the root, but this decision would
be made on the basis of limited information. If ICANN did
decide to expand the root by creating an expanded
taxonomy, that decision would be made by the bottom-up,
consensus driven ICANN process. But that process is not
well suited as a method for determining the highest and best
uses of the root. Participants in the ICANN process are, for
the most part, technical specialists, and not entrepreneurs.
Moreover, some participants in the process have economic
incentives to resist expansion of the root.
• The name space is not the only method of access to the
Internet. Guessable domain names are supplemented by
search engines and other means of access. A thoroughly
organized taxonomy would simply be yet another
hierarchically organized outline of links to IP Addresses. But
we do not need to taxonomize the root in order to add Yet
Another Hierarchically Organized Outline to those that
already exist.  Such taxonomized schemes of Internet access
are provided by YAHOO, Google, Lycos, and dozens of
other services.
Advocates of the taxonomy approach might argue that a
taxonomy has the advantage of “guessability,” e.g. that a top-down
taxonomy will allow Internet end users520 to know intuitively which
gTLD to query for a desired host service. The argument might have
prevailed in the early days of the Internet, before the advent of
comprehensive search engines. Moreover, the taxonomy paradigm
has already been violated by the opening of restricted TLDs (such as
.org, .net, and even ccTLDs such as .tv and .us) to general commercial
use. But given the existing Internet, guessability does not prove that a
taxonomy is better than auctions:
• Guessability is doomed to failure, because the DNS is not
uniformly taxonomized at the level of SLDs. A truly
taxonomized root might have .com as a gTLD, .car as a SLD,
.fordmotorcompany as a third level domain, and so on. The
guessability argument fails, first and foremost, because
second and third level domains are not taxonomized.
• Taxonomy can be provided by auctions in a variety of ways.
520. See supra n. 16 (defining end user in contrast to information provider).
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For example, one proposal for the root might be for a gTLD
that is designed for guessability. Thus, chevron.
petroleum.guess, chevron.oil.guess, chevron.servicestation.
guess and chevron.gasoline.guess might all be sold by the
proprietors of the .guess domain as a package to Chevron. If
guessability has market value, we can expect that some
portion of the root will be used for guessable domain names.
“Taxonomy” may be new jargon, but beneath the surface the
idea that the root should be taxonomized is simply another name for
ad-hoc public-interest decisionmaking by ICANN. Before the
ICANN board moves to a taxonomy approach, it should reflect
seriously on the lessons of history. Nothing about the FCC’s
experience with command-and-control public-interest decision
making suggests that a taxonomy committee would succeed. Rather,
the lesson of history is that auctions would outperform a taxonomy
committee—if the goal is to put the root to its highest and best use.
3. Case-by-case Public Interest Evaluations by ICANN
A case-by-case approach to domain name expansion is, of
course, the equivalent of the “beauty contest” approach now
abandoned by the FCC. We have already examined the difficulties
that the FCC encountered. There is simply no reason to believe that
the ICANN board, with volunteer members and a very thin support
staff, can do a better job at case-by-case evaluation than the FCC
(with a large staff and budget in the hundreds of millions of dollars)
was able to do. Indeed, ICANN’s single experience with root
expansion using this approach was, by most accounts, a failure of
process.521 More fundamentally, the ultimate economic value of
various creative uses of the root is difficult to predict in advance.
Entrepreneurial firms are in a far better position to value their
proposals for new gTLDs than is ICANN. Such firms possess more
information than ICANN about their own proposals, and have better
internal resources for evaluating the profit potential of their
resources.
In addition, profit-maximizing firms have strong incentives to
maximize the accuracy of their bids. If their bid exceeds the
difference between revenue generated by the gTLD minus the non-
auction costs, then the firm will lose money. If the bid equals that
difference, then the firm will fail to realize profits. By way of contrast,
ICANN lacks such incentives. ICANN is a nonprofit corporation, and
521. See supra pt. IV(A)(1) (ICANN and gTLD Expansion).
125
Manheim and Solum:
Published by Digital USD, 2004
SOLUM2V8-FINAL.DOC 2/9/04  10:06 AM
2003] ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DOMAIN NAME POLICY 441
ICANN’s staff, management and board do not have strong incentives
to approve the most profitable gTLD proposals or to deny gTLD
proposals which do not rank high in terms of profitability. Even if
ICANN’s staff, management, and board make a good faith effort to
select new gTLDs in the public interest, they simply lack the
knowledge and resources to do the job as well as auctions can do it.
Indeed, we think the effects of such efforts are pernicious. Rather
than assure that licenses or gTLDs are put to the most beneficial uses,
they tend to defeat innovation and homogenize the respective
services. In other words, ICANN, with its public interest mandate,
must necessarily be risk-averse to innovation. Moreover, a wrong
guess by a commercial entity, with losses borne by investors, is
preferable to a wrong guess by a regulator, with losses borne by the
entire Internet community.
4. A Rule of First Occupation
First occupation has history on its side as an allocation model for
the distribution of natural resources. It has been used for real
property, water, minerals, as well as the radio spectrum in pre-
regulatory days. Supporters argue that first occupation promotes
discovery and hard work. The early bird gets the worm.
Unfortunately, the traditional conception applies poorly to intangible
rights where vast numbers of claims (e.g., domain names) can be filed
with little effort. In practice, a rule of first occupation has led to
cybersquatting because the investment required to stake a claim is so
low. As with tangible property, counter-rules are necessary to assure
that first occupation does not lead to waste. Thus, common law
doctrines of adverse possession, usufructuary use, and active working
of claims have been adapted to prevent squatting on first occupation
rights.
Given zero transaction costs, the Coase theorem predicts that the
choice of allocation method (e.g. a rule of first occupation versus an
auction) has no impact on who ultimately emerges as the right holder.
In the case of gTLD sponsors and operators, first occupiers can be
expected to monetize their rights by transferring control over their
registries to firms that will put them to higher and better uses. Of
course, they are likely to reap a windfall, as is the case with SLDs
now. Auctions capture that windfall and transfer it where it can do
the most good. The windfall can be suppressed by using non-market
allocation schemes and erecting barriers to transfer. That describes
the current regime, which might also be described as a deliberate
decision to waste the root resource. It has little to commend itself.
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5. Lotteries
The last of the options ICANN is likely to consider is random
assignment of gTLD slots. Three influential advocates of domain
name reform have proposed the use of lotteries, at least in part, as a
way to allocate an expanded name space. In their white paper on
“The post-.COM Internet,”522 Milton Mueller and Lee McKnight
propose a combined auction/lottery system. Commercial gTLDs
would be awarded by auction, while non-commercial gTLDs and
those from Less-Developed Countries (LDCs) would be awarded by
random selection.523 Karl Auerbach, the former elected ICANN board
member for North America, prefers a lottery for all new gTLD
slots.524 He argues that lotteries best promote the non-economic social
value of distributional fairness, a goal also reflected in the
Mueller/McKnight proposal.
There may be cases in which auctions would create distributional
problems, but we are concerned about the use of lotteries to achieve
fairness and efficiency, at least as the principal means for allocating
new gTLDs. First, lotteries may be foreclosed by law, as in California,
where ICANN is located.525 Second, lotteries produce none of the
revenue that ICANN needs to operate and advance other public
interest goals. Third, and most importantly, lotteries are economically
inefficient. For commercial gTLDs, lottery winners would serve only
as temporary conduits for new gTLDs as they worked their way
through the transfer process (and transaction costs) to operators who
more highly valued the slots. As common sense and experience
indicate, lottery winners often resell their rights on the open market,
capitalizing for themselves the revenue otherwise produced by
auction.526 In fact, lotteries are auctions, only removed one level down
from initial assignment.
It is possible to avoid the windfall gains that lotteries would
confer on the winners of new gTLD strings by making new gTLDs
inalienable. This would have the effect of reducing the windfall gains
produced by lotteries, but it would create another, and more serious
problem. Nontransferable gTLDs will not be transferred by the
market to their highest paying and best users. The result may be
522. Mueller & McKnight, supra n. 450.
523. Id. at 21.
524. See Karl Auerbach, Why Lotteries Are Better Than Auctions When Distributing
New TLD Slots <http://www.cavebear.com/cbblog-archives/000016.html> (accessed Apr.
17, 2003).
525. See supra n. 439.
526. See supra n. 339 and accompanying text.
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tremendous inefficiencies—as inefficient gTLD managers are locked
into the role by the transfer restrictions. Of course, such restrictions
may be circumventable. For example, rather than transfer the gTLD,
the corporate shell can be transferred. ICANN is in a poor position to
assess the economic realities underlying transfers of corporate
ownership. To the extent that ICANN does not police such
transactions, a secondary market for gTLDs will emerge, but it will
have the undesirable characteristic of high transaction costs. To the
extent that ICANN does police such transfers, the effect will be to
divert ICANN’s resources into a nonproductive task.
Despite these concerns, a lottery restricted to non-commercial
and LCD TLDs, as Mueller and McKnight have proposed, is worth
exploring further. For instance, although commercial broadcast
licenses are allocated by auction, noncommercial licenses (e.g., public
radio) are assigned free of charge.527 There may be other options that
could be examined as well. For example, ICANN might create
transferable bidding credits for LCDs and public interest entities,528
which in turn could allocate them to proposed new gTLD projects on
the basis of an open competition.529 In sum, lotteries, bidding credits,
and other options should be explored as part of the comprehensive
design phase of any auction plan.
E. Objections to Auctions
Arguments against expansion of the name space by auction fall
into two general categories. One set of arguments is propounded by
existing stakeholders, i.e., those whose economic self-interests lie in
maintaining a relatively static root.530 A debate with them would not
be about rational domain name policy, but about vested rights,
entitlements and the status quo. We think this article as a whole
responds to those arguments; we need not engage them further at this
point. But a second set of objections is made on the grounds of
527. These free licenses come with strings attached – restrictions on commercial
speech.  See 47 U.S.C. § 399(b) (2000); Nat’l. Pub. Radio v. FCC, 254 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
528. The FCC provides bidding credits to small businesses.  See 47 U.S.C. §
309(j)(4)(D) (2003).
529. A similar mechanism has been proposed for spectrum auctions.  See Ellen P.
Goodman, Bargains in the Information Marketplace: The Use of Government Subsidies to
Regulate New Media, 12 J. of High Tech. and Info. L. 217, 232 n. 43 (Nov. 25, 2002)
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=366020>.
530. Some potential entrants may have similar interests, either because they feel better
served by the existing process than the market, or are confident they too will soon be
stakeholders, and want to reap the benefits of incumbency.
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economic and public policy, often by well-respected ICANN
observers and critics. To the extent we have not fully responded to
these points elsewhere, it is prudent that we do so now.531
1. Why Exclusive Rights?
Hardly anyone believes the root should remain fixed at its
current size. In the campaign for the first and only ICANN election,
many candidate platforms included a position favoring gTLD
expansion.532 Since that time, the debates have been mostly about the
pace of expansion and methodology. Views on these issues turn on
one’s understanding of engineering and economic principles. With
respect to the former, there is a general consensus that hundreds or
thousands of new gTLDs can be added to the root without
jeopardizing its stability, but that its capacity is not unlimited.
Accepting this, the issue next turns to economics and social welfare.
Should the name space be regulated at all; if so, by whom; if by
ICANN, how; and if by exclusive licensing, how should rights be
allocated? This article concerns only the last point; we have assumed
an affirmative answer to the first three. But before considering
specific objections to gTLD auctions, we step back a moment to ask
again whether the name space should be regulated and subject to
exclusive licensing in the first place. If not, none of the allocation
methods we have discussed need be entertained; domain names
anywhere on the hierarchy could simply be used as needed.
As surprising as this might sound to anyone familiar with the
domain name system, it is emerging as the principal battle ground in
spectrum licensing. Rather than quibble over auctions, beauty
contests and such, why not simply open the spectrum up on an as-
needed basis, creating a “commons” instead of property rights?533
Advances in radio technology have made this debate possible as
interference problems can now be mediated without human
intervention. Isn’t the same true of the Internet? Why “assigned
names and numbers”? Why ICANN?
531. In addition to the arguments discussed below, we will discuss one additional
argument in this footnote.  It might be argued that an open gTLD auction would be
problematic because obscene or offensive gTLDs might be established, causing both
offense and possible political backlash.  This problem exists in other arenas—for example,
license plates.  The conventional solution is to establish a list of forbidden strings.  We
assume that a similar solution would be devised for gTLD auctions.
532. See e.g. ICANN, ICANN candidate statements of Johannes Kuo-huie Chiang,
Winfried Schueller, Lawrence Lessig, and Emerson Tiller  <http://www.members.icann.org/
nominees.html> (accessed Dec. 7, 2003).
533. See supra n. 369 and accompanying text.
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The engineering answer is simple. Unlike frequencies, domain
names cannot be shared or multiplexed. We can envision a telephone
network that uses shared or “party lines,” but not an Internet name
and number system that does so. Unless every device and packet on
the Internet has a unique address identifier, the system fails. Still, isn’t
the number of possible DNS addresses so vast as to render licensing
exclusivity wholly unnecessary? This once again raises the question of
proprietary rights in a public resource. As George Gilder said in the
context of spectrum auctions, “you can no more lease electromagnetic
waves than you can lease ocean waves.”534 A similar observation could
be made of alphanumeric strings that constitute domain names. As a
statement of physics, Gilder is undoubtedly correct. But physical and
economic principles do not track here. Ocean waves are not scarce
private goods; they have no differentiated value. Domain names do.
It makes little difference if I catch this wave or the next when surfing
the ocean. But it makes a huge difference which domain name I surf
to on the Internet. Because of that, and because of the limited
capacity of the root, assignment of domain names (and numbers) is
unavoidable. ICANN exists.
2. Public Interest gTLDs
We next turn to two specific objections to auctions as means for
allocating scarce gTLD resources. One, as we have seen,535 is that
public interest uses and economically disadvantaged commercial
users (typically from LCDs) are unable to successfully compete in
auctions. In other words, they cannot afford the private good (domain
name) when sold at market price. Yet, social welfare policies demand
that these uses be encouraged; therefore, acquisition should be
subsidized in appropriate cases.
There are strong arguments for this position, but they neither
augur against gTLD expansion, nor undercut the basic rationale for
market pricing of new gTLDs. Instead, they make a case either for
beneficial use of surplus auction revenues or some adjustment to the
auction framework. The latter can take the form of bidding credits,
set-asides, or other non-market mechanisms, so long as they are
carefully policed so as not to be subverted.
There are costs associated with assigning gTLDs for free or
below market price. Opportunity cost is one, as someone must
534. See Noam, supra n. 345, at 769 (quoting George Gilder, Auctioning the Airways,
Forbes, April 11, 1994).
535. See supra pt. IV(D)(5) (Lotteries).
130
University of San Diego Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Art. 1 [2004]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_econ/art1
SOLUM2V8-FINAL.DOC 2/9/04  10:06 AM
446 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [25:317
subsidize these uses. Recall that root service is not free. Another is
accountability. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires that all
telephony subsidies be transparent, rather than embedded in an
integrated price structure.536 That is why telephone bills have all those
separate line-item charges for Universal Service and similar
programs.537 An open economy demands that consumers know what
they’re paying for and who they are subsidizing. Hidden and cross-
subsidies are abundant on the Internet. Many are salutary; indeed
ICANN could not currently operate without them. But, we are all
better served by disclosure. One of the biggest problems with the
current method of gTLD allocation is that it encourages both rent-
seeking and subsidization. Auctions cure those problems. Where
subsidies ought to continue, they are made more legitimate by
specific, targeted and transparent programs.
The Bell System (now AT&T) maintained its monopoly for
nearly a century by convincing regulators that competition and inter-
connection would destroy the quality of service and undercut its
ability to provide service at affordable rates.538 Broadcasters made
similar arguments against band expansion and new technologies, such
as low-power FM radio.539 In each case, incumbents pretended to
speak for the public interest. We now know those claims were mostly
false and simply the successful tactics of monopolists. Yet, similar
arguments have prevailed when it comes to the domain name system.
In the end, the most important answer to the public interest
objection is that it assumes a false dichotomy. Unless one believes
that all of the unused capacity of the root should be devoted to
subsidized public-interest TLDs, the question arises as to how to
allocate the resource available to competing commercial users.
Auctions are the best way to do that. Auctions also generate revenues
that can be used to subsidize public interest TLDs, if such subsidies
are necessary.
3. Cybersquatting and Defensive Registrations
The final objection to root expansion is that it will create a
536. See generally Robert W. Crandall and Leonard Waverman, Who Pays for
Universal Service? When Telephone Subsidies Become Transparent (Brookings Instn.
2000).
537. See 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2003) (Universal Service).
538. See generally M. L. Mueller, Jr., Universal Service: Competition, Interconnection,
and Monopoly in the Making of the American Telephone System (MIT Press and AEI
Press 1997).
539. See supra n. 224.
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negative externality—a harm to the interests of the owners of
intellectual property in trademarks. If a new commercial gTLD is
created, the argument goes, then cybersquatters will occupy the new
name space unless trademark owners engage in defensive
registrations to protect their intellectual property. Such defensive
registrations are a dead weight loss—because the trademark owners
are unlikely to have a real economic use for the SLDs associated with
their mark in the new gTLD. For example, IBM does not have a real
economic use for ibm.biz, once it already has ibm.com.
This is a real objection and not a mere makeweight, but, as we
shall demonstrate, once the objection is thoroughly analyzed, it
actually provides additional reasons in favor of root expansion.
First, the cybersquatting/defensive-registration objection at best
provides a cost to be weighed against the benefits of root expansion.
The creation of the .com gTLD resulted in cybersquatting and
defensive registrations, but no one would seriously argue that these
costs outweighed the benefits of creating a space for commercial
SLDs. Thus, in order for the objection to succeed, it must be shown
that the costs of cybersquatting outweigh the benefits of root
expansion. So far as we know, no one has even attempted to make
such a demonstration.
Second, the objection is less compelling now than it was at the
time that the .com gTLD was created. This is because the legal
position of trademark name owners is much stronger now than it was
then. First, ICANN has adopted its UDRP, which provides trademark
owners a relatively inexpensive mechanism for reclaiming SLDs from
cybersquatters.540 Second, the United States Congress has enacted the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, which provides a
comprehensive set of remedies, including in rem actions to reclaim
domain names that are the same or substantially the same as
trademarks.541
Third, the economics of cybersquatting would be fundamentally
altered in a world with multiple, competing commercial gTLDs. The
value of domain names in .com has been, in large part, a function of
scarcity. Because .com was the first commercial gTLD, it was very
540. See ICANN, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy
<http://www.icann.org/udrp/> (Feb. 5, 2002); see also Graeme Dinwoodie & Laurence
Helfer, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 141, 152-53 (Oct. 2001).
541. See Gregory B. Blasbalg, Masters of their Domains: Trademark Holders Now
Have New Ways to Control their Marks in Cyberspace, 5 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 563
(2000).
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important for the owners of famous marks to acquire the rights to the
SLD in .com that would be most “guessable.” Thus, IBM would want
ibm.com, ATT would want att.com, Sony would want sony.com, and
so forth. In a world with multiple, competing commercial gTLDs, the
value of the corresponding SLD is lower because the artificial scarcity
in the name space has been removed. Once ATT has att.com, it is not
clear that ATT will be willing to pay very much for att.biz or att.corp.
Fourth, the opening of the gTLD space to an open auction
process would actually enable the owners of famous marks to
definitively establish a domain name that is unambiguously associated
with their trademark. Thus, ATT can establish .att as a proprietary
TLD that is unambiguously associated with the company and its
products and services. Given this option, it is not clear that the
owners of internationally famous and valuable marks would have any
reason to pay cybersquatters anything for SLDs.
Fifth, once there are multiple competing commercial gTLDs, the
economic harm associated with the registration of an SLD that is
similar to a trademark is likely to diminish considerably. When .com
was it, a firm that did not own the SLD that corresponded to its
trademark followed by .com was at a serious economic disadvantage.
But in a world where there are multiple commercial gTLDs, it is not
clear that an SLD that is associated with the trademark is any more
harmful than any other use of a communications medium that might
constitute trademark infringement or dilution. It is absolutely true
that every time a new communications medium is introduced, it opens
up new opportunities for trademark infringing or diluting
communications, but it does not follow that new media should be
restricted for this reason. Likewise, it is currently possible to infringe
a trademark by creating a 3LD that is the same or substantially the
same as a trademark. But this possibility does not worry trademark
owners, and no one has argued that 3LDs should be restricted or that
a UDRP should be adopted for 3LDs. ATT and IBM are simply not
worried about the possibility that the owner of the gTLD-auctions.net
SLD will create an att.gTLD-auctions.net or ibm.gTLD-auctions.net
3LD.
The burden of persuasion is on trademark stakeholders to
demonstrate that root expansion would create external costs to them
that outweighs the benefits of gTLD auctions. The arguments
adduced here suggest that they will be unable to meet this burden.
V. Conclusion: The Path to Rational Domain Name Policy
“Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” This popular law of
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biogenics542 holds that the embryonic development of an individual
organism replicates the evolutionary stages of its species
development. The biogenic law can also be found in technology
policy.543 Each telecommunications industry, it seems, follows the
same evolutionary path from monopoly to competition.544 As applied
to the Internet, the law suggests that ICANN will go through the
same stages of allocation policy that other telecommunications
industries “evolved” through. In many ways, we are still early in that
process.
When auctions were first proposed to the FCC, they were
dismissed out of hand as “too academic” and ridiculed as “of the
realm in which it is merely the fashion of economists to amuse
themselves.”545 The same attitude can be found in many of the
objections to gTLD auctions espoused by defenders of the status quo.
Just as, over time, auctions have become accepted as means for
allocating economically scarce spectrum and telephony resources, we
believe they will become seen as the best means for expanding the
TLD name space. Indeed, the case for auctioning new gTLDs is
compelling. In this Part, we explore the process by which gTLD
auctions might be adopted by ICANN546 or by some other agent or
process.547 We end with a review of our major themes.548
A. Auctions and the ICANN Process
Is our proposal practical, given ICANN’s structure and history?
Could ICANN adopt an auction plan, even if the ICANN Board of
Directors were to be convinced that auctions best serve the public
interest? Some may argue that the answer to these questions is “no.”
ICANN’s unwieldy governance structure, it might be argued, will not
permit a substantial shift in DNS policy.
We have already given some of the reasons for skepticism. Even
if we focus exclusively on ICANN’s board of directors, there are
542. It is known as the “biogenic law,” proposed by Ernst Haeckel in 1866.  See
University of California - Berkeley, Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) <http://www.ucmp.
berkeley.edu/history/haeckel.html> (accessed Dec. 17, 2003).
543. See e.g. Kenneth E. Rinaldo, Technology Recapitulates Phylogeny: Artificial Life
Art  <http://www.artnode.dk/contri/rinaldo/index.html> (June 2002).
544. The law also seems to apply to specific technological devices, such as the tendency
of individual hardware and software applications to be backward compatible with legacy
versions (pulse dialing and DOS are good examples).
545. See Noam, supra n. 345, at 768.
546. See infra pt. V(A) (Auctions and the ICANN Process).
547. See infra pt. V(B) (Alternatives to ICANN).
548. See infra pt. V(C) (A Recapitulation of the Argument).
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reasons to doubt that a consensus will emerge on what constitutes the
public interest with respect to the operation of the root. As we have
already discussed, ICANN’s board has a complex structure, as does
the nominating committee (NOMCOM) that selects a majority of
board members.549 The formal structure of the board interacts with
ICANN’s tradition of bottom-up consensus-based decision making.
Many of the parties with an economic stake in domain name policy
are represented directly or indirectly on the ICANN board and in the
various supporting organizations that are the locus of bottom-up
consensus-based decision making. The result is predictable. Any
change in DNS policy that might adversely affect the entrenched
interest groups can be opposed by a variety of delaying or blocking
tactics. It would be surprising, given ICANN’s structure, if the
ICANN board were able to overcome such resistance in every case,
and even more surprising if the board were able to reach speedy
decisions that adversely affected entrenched players when the
negative economic impact of the decision was substantial. gTLD
auctions may be such a case.
Moreover, the ICANN board has institutional interests of its
own. Board members are unpaid volunteers. The ICANN board does
not delegate substantial policy making authority to the CEO. ICANN
does not have a large professional staff. Indeed, compared to the
FCC, which has a regulatory task of similar economic importance,
ICANN’s staff is miniscule. For example, ICANN does not have even
a single economist on its staff, much less a Chief Economist with a
large staff of highly qualified subordinates with PhDs. Given this bare
bones structure, it would not be surprising if ICANN became
dependant on its supporting organizations for information and
analysis. But the supporting organizations are in even worse condition
than ICANN itself. None of the supporting organizations have any
full-time staff, much less full-time economists and lawyers. Given
ICANN’s organizational structure and lack of internal resources,
ICANN’s board has an institutional interest in avoiding decisions that
will create conflict or controversy among the most powerful
stakeholders. The lack of independent staff and resources means that
controversial decisions would impose personal costs on board
members—as they are personally lobbied and are forced to devote
even more time to an already time-consuming process.
Despite these reasons for pessimism, we believe that gTLD
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auctions should be attractive to ICANN. First, there are good reasons
to believe that members of the ICANN board have good intentions—
that they attempt (given the constraints they face) to act in the public
interest. One advantage of an auction plan is that it is relatively easy
for the board to confirm for itself the arguments advanced in this
paper. If the ICANN board consults economists who are
acknowledged as experts in either auction theory and design or
communications policy, they will soon discover that the case for
auctions and against ad hoc public-interest hearings (beauty contests)
is overwhelming. The theoretical case for auctions is well-confirmed
by substantial regulatory experience. If the ICANN board consults
with experts and policymakers at the FCC, they will hear a similar
story. Although there are horror stories about badly designed
auctions, the ICANN board can verify that a well-designed auction is
far superior to the methods of root name space allocation utilized by
ICANN to date. The fact that the case for auctions is not
controversial among neutral experts will make it easier for ICANN’s
board to resist lobbying pressure.
In addition, auctions have institutional advantages for ICANN.
Auction revenues could assist in putting ICANN on a sound fiscal
basis—of necessity, a primary concern for board members and staff.
Moreover, auction revenues would allow ICANN to hire sorely
needed technical staff—particularly a Chief Economist as well as staff
or consultants in other areas (such as linguistics and anthropology)
relevant to DNS policy.
B. Alternatives to ICANN
If ICANN is unable to adopt an auction plan, are there
alternative institutional mechanisms? The experience of the FCC
suggests that there are. DOC could require auctions as a condition for
renewing the MOU. Congress could mandate auctions by statute. We
believe that these are inferior policy choices. The Internet is a global
system of cooperation, and not the property of the United States
government. A mandate of auctions by the United States might well
be viewed as illegitimate by other institutions, particularly other
nations and the ccTLD operators. For this reason, we believe that the
best path to auctions is through ICANN and not through federal
mandates. However, as new proposals for name space expansion
appear, ICANN must either take them seriously or run the risk that
another institution will be compelled to act to safeguard the public
interest.
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C. A Recapitulation of the Argument
This article has argued for expansion of the generic top level
domain name space using a specific market allocation mechanism –
auctions. In this conclusion we briefly recapitulate the several steps
that support gTLD auctions.
First, the domain name space is scarce in economic terms. There
are several dimensions to this scarcity. At one level, scarcity is due to
the Internet’s architecture, the hierarchical addressing system
embodied in the Domain Name System (DNS). Theoretically, there
could be an infinite number of top-level domain names, but one
would have to revamp the current DNS and re-engineer the Internet
to make it happen.
Another dimension of scarcity flows from the differential value
that unique character strings have as domain names. For a variety of
reasons, “cars.com” simply has more economic value than “rt85-
e4.u9cj3,” even if they were to point to the same IP Address.
Differential value leads to scarcity, at least in meaningful and useful
names.
A third level of scarcity is intentional, and not the result of
engineering or economic forces. It results from regulatory choices by
ICANN that have persistently limited the number of gTLDs to levels
far below those warranted by any technical requirements. These
limits create monopoly power in stakeholders who, by virtue of
ICANN’s structure, reinforce ICANN’s resistance to name space
expansion. Artificial and unnecessary scarcity has profound
consequences: it impedes economic growth and promotes rent-
seeking by incumbents.
Second, domain names, both at the top and lower levels, are
classic private goods as economists use that term to analyze allocation
policies. They are both rivalrous and excludable. Preference for
market allocation of private goods is supported both by economic
theory and by experience in comparable telecommunications
industries. As a matter of theory, regulatory decisions are inferior to
market choices in determining the highest and best economic and
social uses for the goods. Moreover, in the absence of transaction
costs, regulatory decisions will have little impact on who ultimately
gets to use the good, only on who reaps the windfall of below-market
pricing.
The domain name space is functionally similar in salient respects
to the spectrum and telephone numbering space. As an empirical
matter, regulatory allocation of those scarce resources has been sub-
optimal, and has done little to achieve the underlying goal and
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rationale of regulation – promotion of the public interest.
Third, experience at the FCC has demonstrated the economic
and social utility of scarce resource allocation using auctions. Even
telephone numbers will soon be auctioned off, rather than dispensed
for free. Auctions reduce administrative costs, replace arbitrary
decision making with predictable criteria, disentangle the web of
agency capture, and produce revenue for the public or public interest
programs. If properly constructed, auctions can approach allocative
optimality from nearly all perspectives.
Fourth, specific auction design and implementation should
proceed cautiously. ICANN should consult economists and auction
specialists to construct and hold a test round. We have proposed, as a
framework, a fixed-length ascending bid auction for 50 gTLDs. We
think this number is technically feasible, economically supportable,
and unlikely to materially disrupt existing expectations. The number
might be higher or lower, and the auction design may be different, but
the fundamental policy choice to hold an auction is, we believe,
unassailable.
Fifth, alternative mechanisms, such as taxonomy or first
occupation are either inefficient or counter-productive. A static root
or lethargic expansion merely entrenches vested interests and
perpetuates economic inefficiencies. The current “beauty contest”
system is corrupt and disserves the public interest. It is anti-
democratic, has solidified American hegemony over the Internet, and
violates ICANN’s federal mandate to promote competition in name
services.
Sixth, auction revenue will enable ICANN to pursue its
contractual and bestowed mission – to maintain a stable root and
domain name system. Surplus revenue, if any, will enable ICANN to
accomplish public interest projects related to its jurisdiction – such as
upgrading IP Addressing and inclusion of non-English characters in
the DNS. gTLD expansion will also remove most of the monopoly
pricing in name services. That, by itself, is an excellent public interest
outcome.
In sum, the case for gTLD auctions is compelling. An obvious
first step for the ICANN board would be to begin a process to seek
independent advice from reputable economists and public policy
experts. Once the ICANN board is satisfied that the case for gTLD
auctions is sound, the next step is to begin a process of auction design.
While ICANN delays, the root lies fallow. Already years have
passed without significant expansion of the root name-space;
undoubtedly, the cost of delay has already been substantial. ICANN’s
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laudable commitment to a bottom-up, consensus-based policy process
should not be allowed to trump its most fundamental responsibility—
to manage assigned names and numbers in the public interest. In the
case of expansion of the root name space, that responsibility demands
that ICANN proceed with deliberate speed.
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